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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE POLITICS OF THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

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A FRESH START IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

I. A GLANCE BACKWARDS

THE transformation of the international situation which has taken place in the last six months is almost as complete as that which has occurred in Great Britain after the general election in May. Though there have been, as yet, no sensational results in the political sphere—indeed no such results are likely—the centre of gravity in the politics of the world has already profoundly altered. The nature of this change can best be judged from a brief historical retrospect.

The Washington treaties which purported to put an end to the competition in building between the naval Powers on the basis of the "parity" of the British and American navies, and the 5:3:1.67 ratio for these two Powers, Japan, and France and Italy respectively, and which settled satisfactorily the problems of the Far East, had been concluded in 1922. Three years later, in 1925, the Locarno treaties put an end to the bitter discord which had led to the occupation of the Ruhr, and gave Europe a fresh start towards reconciliation and peace on the basis that war between Germany and her neighbours was to be entirely renounced, that Germany was to become a member of the League of Nations and to settle her disputes with her neighbours only by arbitral or League methods, and that Great Britain and Italy were to guarantee the integrity of the demilitarised Rhineland. No basis of political relation-

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ship between the United States and the League Powers had been found, but these treaties seemed to provide a foundation upon which further progress towards disarmament and international unity could be built.

Then gradually there came an estrangement. In 1927 the conference called at Geneva by President Coolidge to extend the Washington limitation to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines broke up in failure. By the following year it had become clear that the Locarno spirit had vanished; the evacuation of the Rhineland hung fire, the reduction of Allied land armaments to a level nearer to the limits imposed on Germany failed to materialise, and the relations between Italy and France became difficult. The marked drop in the international barometer was strikingly revealed in September last over the so-called Anglo-French naval compromise—a proposal which seemed to imply a close Anglo-French entente to perpetuate the military preponderance of France in Europe and to present a common front against the American proposals for a solution of the naval problem.

It will serve no useful purpose to-day to try to apportion blame for this steady deterioration in the relations between the world's chief Powers. The storm which was aroused by the draft Anglo-French compromise is irrefutable evidence that things had gone badly since Washington and Locarno. The root causes were two-fold. On the one side, neither Great Britain nor the United States had thought out or were prepared to accept the political consequences of naval parity. On the other side, Great Britain had insensibly abandoned her independence and her position as a mediator between France and Germany in Europe, and had gradually subordinated her policy to that of France, whose policy, not unnaturally, was principally concerned with maintaining her own power to prevent a rapidly recovering Germany from obtaining a position of equality in Europe and re-opening the settlement of Versailles. The detailed history of this period has already been set

A Glance Backwards

forth in these pages in an article entitled *A Plea for an Independent Foreign Policy*.*

The tremendous dangers implicit in this situation have now been swept away by events in the United States and Great Britain. In August last—simultaneously with the beginning of the commotion over the Anglo-French compromise—there was signed in Paris the Pact of Paris, better known as the Kellogg Pact, a treaty whereby practically all the nations of the world renounced war altogether as an instrument of national policy and undertook to settle their disputes only by pacific means. This treaty will probably play a vital part in the future movement for the prevention of war. Its immediate significance, however, was that it made a breach in the political isolation which had existed between the United States and the rest of the world since the rejection of the Covenant of the League by the Senate in 1920, by uniting her with the other signatories in a common agreement to renounce war. This treaty was ratified by the Senate early this year, in the same week that Congress passed a Bill for the construction of fifteen new 10,000 ton cruisers in order to give the American navy technical parity with the British navy. In April President Hoover, speaking through Mr. Gibson at Geneva, proclaimed the desire of the United States not merely for a limitation, but for a reduction of naval armaments, and proposed a new and flexible "yardstick" whereby the relative strength of navies could be more easily measured than by the rigid mathematical formula which had hitherto held the field. In June a Labour Government replaced the Conservative Government in London, and it immediately, through the MacDonald-Dawes conversations, responded to President Hoover's advances in the most cordial way, and announced, in the debate on the King's Speech, that it considered that the Rhineland ought to be evacuated without further delay. A week or two later the reparation experts announced their agreement on the "Young Plan" for dealing with repara-

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 73, December 1928, p. 1.

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tions and inter-allied debts, though acceptance of the "plan" by the Governments concerned is still doubtful.

In place, therefore, of the menacing situation which existed in 1928, the way is now comparatively clear for a fresh start. It is obvious that the Washington and London Governments, backed by the public opinion of their respective countries, are determined to find a solution of the naval problem on the basis that war between the two halves of the English-speaking world ought to be ruled out of calculation as completely as it has been between Canada and the United States for the last hundred years. It is no less obvious that the period during which the British Foreign Office thought that the peace of Europe could be best furthered by supporting a French preponderance in Europe is also at an end. The Labour Government will, it is clear, return to that independent policy of arbitration, security, and disarmament which it followed in 1924. In this connection Mr. Arthur Henderson's remarks at Brussels in August 1928 may perhaps be taken as significant:—

Four years ago in Geneva (he said) the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, under the leadership of two great Governments of the Left, drew up a document known to history as the Geneva Protocol. It laid down that Governments should take all their justiciable disputes without exception before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague. It provided arbitration in the last resort for other disputes, which the Council of the League was not able to settle by agreement. It provided for effective preventive action whenever there was a threat of war, action to be taken—and note the vast importance of this point—before hostilities actually broke out. Then it also provided for disarmament, for the reduction and limitation of all national forces by international treaty, and it laid down that without such disarmament, before such disarmament has been agreed upon and carried out, no part of this system of the Protocol could come into force.

The Fifth Assembly, in short, made for the first time a full answer to the unsolved problem of international war. It provided a complete mechanism, a complete law, for the establishment and maintenance of peace.

Until there is true security among the nations—not security

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merely against defeat, or security of one nation at the expense of all the rest, but security of all nations against all war—until there is such true security as this, the international institutions which have been created can never develop as they should. Moreover, the Governments can never co-operate as we intend they should co-operate, in building up the common prosperity and welfare of mankind.

To say, however, that the international situation has profoundly changed in the last six months is not to say that its problems have been solved or that they are easy of solution. The problems which lie ahead, the Anglo-American difficulty, economic reconstruction, the general question of disarmament, the organisation of peace and the prevention of war, are immensely difficult to solve, far more difficult perhaps than is generally understood. What has happened in the last six months is that a method of approach which would never have solved them, which might, on the contrary, have led to further and even more dangerous complications, has disappeared, and a new and more hopeful method of approach has taken its place.*

II. THE BASIC EUROPEAN PROBLEM

IT is not the purpose of this article to attempt to put forward solutions of the many practical problems which confront the Governments of the day. One and all, however, hinge upon the question whether war is to continue to be, in the future as in the past, the ultimate court of appeal for nations when they cannot achieve their ambitions, redress their wrongs, or satisfy their needs by diplomatic means.

Let us consider the European problem first. Europe has been stabilised in the past in one of two ways, either by the military preponderance of one Power or group of Powers, a preponderance which sought to make it useless or too

* It is impossible to discuss the Reparations problem in this article as the Hague Conference has only just assembled as *The Round Table* goes to press.

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dangerous for any other Power to try to achieve its purpose by war, or else by the balance of power, a system which brought two or more groups into existence which were so nearly equal in armaments that it was hoped that neither would attempt to try conclusions with the other in war. The peace of Europe has been preserved for short periods of time by both these means, but never for very long, for they were based on force, not justice, and on competitive armaments, which invariably end in producing war; and because war was, in fact, the only way in which political changes made necessary by progress and change in other fields could be effected.

The alternative to peace by preponderance or peace by the balance of power is the system, already in force nominally but not yet in fact, established by the League of Nations and the Peace Pact: that is to say, a system under which the settlement of international problems by war is renounced and prevented, and machinery is created whereby they can be solved by an appeal to reason and justice. The outward and visible signs of such a peace system exist. There are the obligations which nations have assumed under the Briand-Kellogg Pact not to resort to war; there are the obligations which nations have assumed under the Covenant and the Bryan treaties to allow international investigation and report about their disputes before they resort to war; there are the obligations upon members of the League under the Covenant to take economic sanctions against any nation which resorts to war in violation of the Covenant; there is the Court of International Justice at the Hague for the settlement of "justiciable" disputes; there are the Locarno and the various arbitration treaties; and the good offices of the Council and Assembly of the League are available for the pacific solution of political questions.

But the inward realities are different. If the nations of Europe really trusted the League system they would universally reduce their armaments to the level necessary

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for police purposes, and they would undertake to use their reduced armaments as the instruments for preventing resort to war and not as the instruments of national policy. But, in fact, there is at present a complete preponderance of military force in the hands of France and her allies. While the German army is limited to 100,000, the armies of France, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia, according to the armaments year-book of the League of Nations for 1928-29, consist of 617,533, 253,824, 127,012, and 107,541 officers and men respectively, while the Italian army is 251,270. In other words, the security against war at the moment is the preponderance of France and her allies, not all-round disarmament, and the determining factor in deciding whether the treaties of peace shall be altered or any political change shall be made in Europe is the will of this same group of Powers, and not the judicial decision of the Hague Court or of arbitration courts or the public opinion of the world as expressed through the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.

These facts are recalled not for the purpose of denouncing France or any other Power, but simply in order to indicate the formidable nature of the problem to be solved. The existing system has the merit of corresponding more or less to the impalpable political facts which are the legacy of the war; but it manifestly cannot last, and it is always liable to be replaced by a state of affairs in which Europe will again be divided more and more into two equally balanced armed camps. The policy of Sir Austen Chamberlain was, on the whole, to support this system as conducing best to European stability at the moment. The policy of the Labour Government will be to alter it and to put disarmament, collective guarantees for security, and pacific procedure for the settlement of disputes in its place. But if this policy is to succeed it will not only be necessary to obtain the evacuation of the Rhineland and the equalisation of the armaments of France and her allies and of Italy to those of their neighbours, it will be essential to

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prevent the development of a new balance of power through the equalisation of armaments upwards, by inducing all the European nations simultaneously to reduce their armaments to such low levels that collective guarantees against war or aggression will be effectual in giving security without being unduly burdensome and dangerous to the guarantors.

When Europe—including Italy, the Balkans, and Russia, as well as France and her Allies—has reached that point, a lasting alternative to the method of attaining a merely temporary peace either by a preponderance or a balance of military power will have been reached. It is truly a tremendous undertaking; but it is the only alternative to the gradual development of a new war. For the defects of the Versailles settlement will only be peacefully remedied and the ever-changing needs of Europe will only be peacefully satisfied if nations are prevented from trying to attain their ends by war, and so forced to resort to pacific methods instead.

III. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROBLEM

THE renewed Anglo-American negotiations have hitherto apparently been concerned entirely with the evolution of a yardstick by which the strength of navies can be justly measured and an all-round reduction made without altering the relative strength and security of the nations concerned. The data of the purely naval side of the problem have already been set out fully in this review.*

There should be no serious difficulty in the way of arriving at a yardstick by which the parity of the British and American navies can be tested, for governments and public opinion alike have ruled out war as a method of settling disputes between the two halves of the English-speaking world, and have in consequence ruled out naval

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 75, June 1929, pp. 448-58.

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competition also. The very idea of parity implies the renunciation of war, for no sane nation would be content with parity if it thought war likely: it would seek superiority by some means or other so as to ensure victory or at least the avoidance of defeat when the war came.

It will be much more difficult to agree upon a yardstick which will apply to the Japanese, the French, the Italian, and the German navies, partly because the ratio of strength of their respective navies is not yet agreed, as it is between the United States and Great Britain, and partly because it is not easy to define any yardstick which would enable the battleships of one navy to be balanced against, say, the cruisers, or destroyers, or submarines of another. The value of "tonnage and gunnage," too, is obviously affected by naval bases, dependence on overseas trade, vulnerability of trade routes, and so on. In their case also, as in the case of the navies of Great Britain and the United States, a solution will depend upon whether the parties can really rule out war as a method of settling their differences. If they can, almost any yardstick will suffice; if they cannot, a yardstick will be extraordinarily difficult to find, for no nation will accept a yardstick which does not give it security in the event of war.

The real difficulty in the Anglo-American problem, however, is not technically naval at all. There is no risk whatever of any "head on" collision between the United States and the British Commonwealth over any political or economic question. There will be difficulties and disputes, of course, but nobody has been able to point to any issue which public opinion on either side would feel it was justified in trying to settle by war or which could not be better settled by pacific means. The *only* risk to Anglo-American relations, the *only* reason why there has been any talk of competitive naval building, springs from the possibility of war breaking out somewhere else. For if war breaks out anywhere, in Europe or in the Far East, for instance, it will probably involve one of the two Powers,

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before it involves the other, and that immediately raises the old issue of neutral versus belligerent rights, the only issue which has ever seriously embroiled the two countries in more than a century of their history. The essence of the Anglo-American naval problem, therefore, is "What is to happen when war occurs in the rest of the world?"

It is often suggested that the solution, as Senator Borah suggests, is to define belligerent and neutral rights in time of war, or to distinguish between "public" and "private" war, or to permit the use of belligerent rights against neutral trade when dealing with an "aggressor" while denying to belligerents the right to interfere with neutral trade in all other circumstances. But, as has been repeatedly pointed out in these pages, none of these proposals solve the problem. The late war proved that it is no longer possible to distinguish between contraband and non-contraband, or between public and private property on the high seas in a large scale war. To try once again to make rules for the conduct of war, would not only be to pursue a road which has always led to failure in the past, but would be tantamount to an admission that the Kellogg Pact was useless, and that war was going to continue as before. It is the same with proposals which would distinguish public from private wars and would define an aggressor. Where is the authority to be found which will make a definition that will be accepted by the whole world, including the United States? Further, even if such an authority could be found, how is it possible for it to arrive at a decision quickly enough in the moment of crisis? Who, for instance, yet knows whether Bolivia or Paraguay was the aggressor in the recent dispute? "Automatic" tests, such as the refusal to arbitrate, generally fail to effect justice, and their adoption would simply mean that the purpose of future diplomacy would be to manœuvre an opponent into a position in which he would be "automatically" in the wrong.

Nor would an agreement on the yardstick, by which Anglo-American naval parity or the ratio between other

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navies is to be tested, however complete, solve the fundamental difficulty of what is to happen when war breaks out anywhere in the world. The naval nations may be on the best of terms with one another, the ratios between their navies may be agreed, parity may be a fact, but if one of them should be drawn into an international conflict before the other, it would be bound to take action which would be detrimental to the trade and prosperity of the other. To-day the British Commonwealth is more likely to become involved in international complications than the United States, for its component nations are members of the League of Nations, and therefore bound under the Covenant to take common action to cut off trade relations with any violator of the Covenant. But, as recent events have shown, there are considerable possibilities of danger in the Far East, where the United States might become involved in trouble before Great Britain. There is, as Senator Borah clearly sees, no possibility of avoiding this issue. It is probably the right course to try to secure agreement about the yardstick as a first step. But, however complete the agreement about the size of navies, the real menace to Anglo-American relations will not be removed until the problem of war itself is dealt with. For war anywhere is liable to precipitate an Anglo-American crisis over the question of interference with trade at sea.

The only solution of this problem is to implement the Kellogg Pact with understandings or arrangements which will enable its principal signatories to consult and take common action together to prevent war whenever a situation arises which threatens the peace. If the signatories do this, they will, in nine cases out of ten, be able to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; in the tenth case it ought to be possible to localise hostilities, or at any rate to prevent them from causing the other Powers, and especially the naval Powers, to fight among themselves. To-day any minor nation has it in its power to precipitate an Anglo-American crisis by starting a local war. If the leading

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Powers make collective action to prevent war the first article of their foreign policy, they will anyhow have taken the most effective step that they can to prevent a local war from becoming a world war.

There is no need to require the signatories of the Kellogg Pact to bind themselves to take sanctions against an aggressor. It is not only extremely difficult in any particular case to decide who is the aggressor, but no nation will commit itself to take sanctions against other nations so long as they are armed to the teeth, for such an obligation amounts to an obligation to take part in a world war. Moreover, in the crisis, what matters is not a decision as to which side is in the wrong, but common action to prevent resort to hostilities. Once the great nations are serious in their determination to prevent hostilities, they will discover for themselves the best methods to use. The various proposals put forward in the Capper, Burton, Fish and Porter resolutions now before Congress, which would enable the United States to place an embargo on the export of munitions or other things to belligerents, indicate the way in which public opinion is coming gradually to consider what steps can, and should, be taken for the prevention of war. Nor is there any need for every nation to assume responsibility for the settlement of international disputes in every corner of the world. The prevention of war is a primary interest of every nation, because any war may, as we have seen, precipitate quarrels between the great Powers over the question of neutral and belligerent rights. But once hostilities have been prevented the settlement of the issue can generally be better left to regional or *ad hoc* bodies, as was the case in the Bolivia-Paraguay affair. Though they may agree that the prevention of war is their primary concern, there is no reason why the United States should assume responsibility for settling all the internal problems of Europe or why Great Britain should assume responsibility for settling all the internal problems of South or Central America.

Disarmament

IV. DISARMAMENT

THE third problem of immediate concern is disarmament. The only basis for any all-round agreement for the reduction and limitation of armaments is the total outlawry of war as a method of settling international disputes. So long as resort to war is legal, so long as nations feel that there is serious risk of their becoming involved in war, they will maintain armaments, for armaments are their only protection in the event of war. Moreover, they will maintain competitive armaments, with all that that implies, for no nation is going to keep armaments which it recognises to be inferior. On the contrary, it is going to keep the armaments which it believes will give it victory, or at least security, in time of war ; *i.e.*, armaments which will make its neighbours insecure. As all history shows, nations may be able to preserve their security by armaments, but only at the price of constant war.

Further, so long as war is legal and armaments the instruments for ensuring national security, it will be impossible to obtain the just settlement of international disputes. Nations will not agree to territorial changes, frontier ratifications, the revision of treaties, and other such measures, however just, if the effect is to diminish their own strategic security in the event of war. Thus the *Anschluss* is forbidden, not because anyone wants to keep Austrian and German Germans apart, but for purely strategic reasons. The effect of the retention of war as a legal institution is to make inevitable those very injustices which drive nations to think that war is preferable to the indefinite endurance of them.

Moreover, there will be no effective agreement for disarmament until armaments are not only simultaneously reduced to somewhere near the police level, but until their primary use is recognised to be the prevention of

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resort to hostilities and not the settlement of disputes by fighting. No nation will lightly undertake the obligation to apply sanctions if it implies taking part in a first-class war against a fully-armed nation. International guarantees for security will be forthcoming and effective only in proportion as national armaments are reduced.

Nor is it possible to keep land, sea, and air armaments in separate compartments. War anywhere tends to spread, and, as already explained, a war of any kind, anywhere, is likely to bring about an Anglo-American crisis over the question of the interruption of neutral trade. There is no halfway house between the universal prohibition and prevention of war as a method of settling international disputes and the continuance of wars, all of which tend to become world wars.

V. CONCLUSION

FROM whatever side the international problem of to-day is approached, then, whether it be the European, the Anglo-American, or the disarmament aspect, the answer is the same. If there is to be a really effective agreement for the reduction of armaments ; if the present military hegemony of France in Europe is not to be replaced by a fresh military balance of power ; if there is to be an enduring naval settlement ; if there is to be genuine national security and lasting international peace, it is not enough just to renounce war as the Kellogg Pact provides ; its signatories must combine actively to prevent hostilities. The form that their association should take is still obscure—for a long time to come it will probably be both informal and flexible. But there is no escape from the conclusion that an effective resolution by the nations that States shall no longer be allowed to settle their disputes by war, but only by pacific methods, is the only alternative to competitive armaments and renewed wars. For until war itself is

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effectively outlawed and trustworthy machinery for the settlement of international questions by pacific means is put in its place, no nation will deprive itself of the only means of maintaining its rights and its security that are open to it, that is, resort to war.

Peace begins within the State, not when the community organises legal and political machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes, but when it prohibits and prevents recourse to violence. It is exactly the same in the international sphere. Lasting peace will begin to appear when the nations are not only willing to permit international problems in which they themselves are involved to be settled by processes in which reason and justice, not the high hand, decide the issue, but when they succeed, through disarmament and active co-operation against belligerency, in making it impossible for any nation successfully to set aside pacific methods and to attain its ends by war.

YOUNG RUSSIA

(BY AN EYEWITNESS)

I. YOUTH

"IT is the year one hundred and seven," exclaims a character in one of Alexy Tolstoy's recent stories, and the reader perceives instantly that neither author nor speaker mean one hundred and seven A.D. or B.C., but A.O.—after October, the month of the Bolshevik Revolution. How dramatically these words coincide with the remark of a Russian girl, a student in Moscow University, who in response to a query of mine as to what was the key to the spiritual life of the revolutionary youth, replied, "Always remember that for us the world is just beginning!"

The world just beginning! Outside of science all that had happened in Russia and in other countries in the pre-October days was not of much account. Man groped, blundered, brutalised and deluded himself with chimeras and utopias. He had no sense of true reality. Science had opened to him new vistas of knowledge and brought him into closer harmony with his sternest foe, Nature. But the achievements of science, however glorious and heroic, man had subordinated to the perpetuation of inequalities in possession and enjoyment. The one effort to usher in real enlightenment and righteousness—the French Revolution—was smothered in blood. The proletarian, the real "hero of our times," was unfree, had not

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yet come into possession of the means of production. Man, therefore, was weighted down with injustice and the whole past was a maze of horror and gloom, riven now and then by a flash of revolutionary lightning.

Consider the immense implications of such an approach to life. Consider the deliberateness with which Russian youth has dammed up the stream of spiritual nourishment that flows into the very soul of the youth of other lands. Religion, morality, family, nationalism, social justice, all these, as understood in the outside world, mean little, if anything; they furnish neither inspiration nor guidance. The standards, traditions, sublimations, exultations, that have clustered about them, the Russian youth has cast aside almost like so much cluttering garbage. Despite Lenine's admonition that the new man must assimilate the useful cultural heritages of the former bourgeoisie, youth has no reverence and hardly any respect for the past nor for those habituated to its ways of life and thought.

Hence the boisterous conflict between youth and age in Russia, between fathers and children, is the harshest that Russia, or perhaps the world, has ever witnessed. The barbaric thrust at elders of a Bazarov in Turgenev's *Fathers and Sons* is a warm caress compared to the deluge of blows that modern youth has been levelling at its elders. The so-called revolt of the younger generation in America and in Europe is a good-humoured caprice, almost a childish jest, compared to the passionate defiance of age by Russia's revolutionary youth. No two worlds could be farther apart in spirit and in manner than youth and age in Russia. The two may be living in the same home, eat at the same table, sleep under the same roof, perhaps in the same bed as so often happens in Russia, yet they are separated by a chasm which it would be hopeless to attempt to bridge. Never have I been in a Russian home either in town or village, without finding evidence of a continuous battle between fathers and children. Well indeed might Russian youth boast, as did one of its leaders, that this era of the

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proletarian conquest, of the Red October, is a challenge and a battle to the end against the civilisation of the Ten Commandments and of the Golden Rule.

I am speaking, of course, of the youth that has been won over heart and soul to the new gospel. This youth dominates the life of the young generation, but it does not embrace all of it. Outside its fold there are two groups of youth which must be mentioned here, even if briefly, for they are both of them a problem which thus far has eluded solution, a tragedy. In their social and cultural antecedents these two groups are quite unlike one another. Yet both find themselves, one by choice, the other by compulsion, stranded in a no-man's land. They have lost their roots in the old civilisation and have struck none in the new. Both accept the new regime as something that is and must be, yet socially and spiritually they are alienated from it. Both drift about, one seeking and failing to find an anchorage, and the other scorning attachment to a definite social base.

It is this latter group that chiefly yields the hosts of hooligans who infest the Russian community—principally the city—and who now and then perpetrate some atrocity, like mass assault on a woman, that convulses the nation with rage and horror. The one thing it has copied from the revolutionary youth is group life, but it behaves like a wolf-pack. It attacks in unison. I have before me a stack of books discussing the outrages which this kind of youth has, during the past few years, been perpetrating, and they make ghastly reading. It is not only beyond the reach of home, school, and church, but also of revolutionary public opinion. It swims along on a wave of immediate impulse, recognising no responsibility, no restraint. In every land there is, of course, such an anti-social youth, but it is to all appearance more conspicuous in Russia than elsewhere, possibly because of the very obliteration of the old world and its steady bulwarks.

This sort of youth is impervious to public opinion, and for that reason it is, in its own way, happy. It lives with

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and for itself. More tragic is the fate of the other group of nonconformist youth, if only because it is over-sensitive to the reactions of the outside world. It has a sense of social responsibility, and it is the unhappiest youth in Russia, if not in the world. It is wondering all the time where it will end. It accepts the Revolution as a finality; it would fain make friends with it, but it is held on the sidelines. It is refused a place in the procession; it is not regarded as chaste enough. Its antecedents, in the eyes of the revolutionary, are tainted. It is largely of the intelligentsia and of the former propertied and professional class, and, in the eyes of the revolutionary, it has been somewhat "spoiled and softened" by its home environment, a charge not entirely unwarranted. This group, even if it is at variance with its elders intellectually, has not broken its ties with them. It has too much fear and too much reverence for life to take it into its own hands and break it as one would a withered limb off a tree. It responds with warmth to the woes and perplexities of its elders, suffers with and for them. It has intellect, ambition, imagination. It aspires to make something of itself. It seeks the choice fleshpots perhaps more assiduously than the revolutionary group does; it wants, however, even more to develop its capacities. But it finds the bars up. It does not "belong." It would fain flee to a foreign land, but it has not the material means, and it is not always allowed to escape abroad. When it is admitted to the higher institutions of learning it feels itself in exile as it were, at any rate a stranger. The revolutionary organisations keep it out of their inner life. It is thrown on its own resources, its own inner reserves, and sometimes its patience ebbs, its courage snaps. It becomes introspective. Its sensitiveness feeds on itself, morbidity sets in and "there is nothing good to live for." The result is suicide, by shooting, by poisoning, seldom, incidentally, by hanging.

However, it is of the revolutionary youth that I wish to speak in this article; of the youth that is an integral

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and boisterous part of the Revolution. This kind is the creative youth of the land. It is to be the future ruler of Russia, and it knows it. It is, in fact, to an astonishing degree already a part of the governing apparatus of the land. Not the least impressive feature of present day Russia is the amazing rise of youth to power. In no land in the world, hardly even in nationalist China, has youth been elevated to such a position of responsibility in the judicial, administrative and economic functions of the State as in Russia. The policy that other nations follow in putting into places of command persons of mature age, because of their supposed experience and ripeness of judgment, is precisely the one that the Russians have discarded. They will have none of the "ripeness of judgment" of persons reared in the old days, save in the purely technical fields of effort. They would rather take chances with inexperienced youth, which at least possesses a feeling for the spirit of the Revolution.

This sort of Russian youth is a world all of its own, compactly organised, sternly disciplined and boisterously articulate. There is the Komsomol (Young Communists) for youth between sixteen and twenty-four. There are the Pioneers, for youth between seven and sixteen. There are the Octobrists, for youth under seven. The Komsomol, being made up of the oldest youth, is the leader of all youth. Everywhere it has its own quarters, libraries, schools, club-houses, playing fields, little theatres, parks, and at times its own courts of honour. It has its own press, far-flung, deep-rooted, virile. Its daily organ in Moscow, the *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, is the most lively, the most audacious, the most indelicate and the most enjoyable journal in Russia. It is the only one with a sense of humour. Its monthly organ, *The Young Guard*, fairly spills over with challenge and aggressiveness. Its publishing houses have turned out the most sensational novels of the Revolution, all dealing with the problems and vagaries of youth.

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Through these many-sided literary avenues and through discussion at its meetings this group bares itself to the outside world, its hopes and despairs, its achievements and, even more, its failures. Its voice is the loudest, the clearest in Russia—and the most intriguing.

The chief purpose of the revolutionary youth is to prepare itself for life in a communist society. It is, therefore, seeking to habituate itself to manners and standards that will fit such a society. First and foremost it is endeavouring to saturate itself with the new political faith. This faith is always in the foreground of its life, its guide and its inspiration, its avocation and its adventure. That is why political education is so outstanding a feature of all Russian education. Everything is political in the Russian schools, especially in the lower ones, even lessons in geography, geology and biology. In no country in the world, not even in Fascist Italy, is youth so continually deluged with political ideas and political enthusiasms as in Russia. I doubt if there ever was a religious movement in the world which sought to inculcate its tenets more, or even as assiduously, in youth as the Communist party is doing in Russia. Youth is made not only to believe in the new political faith, but to thrill to it, to be ready to fight and to die for it.

With their innate love of drama, the Russians have linked this faith to everyday life, have woven it into the very fabric of their everyday experiences. They have made it not merely a philosophy, an abstraction, an idea, but a guide and an inspiration, a body of sanctions and usages. It is to them not merely a wave on the ocean, but the ocean itself, constantly heaving up new waves, new storms that overwhelm, submerge and transform. (Where else in the world, for example, is youth being reared in a spirit of international mindedness as it is in Russia? The Ukrainian boy speaks his own language, knows that he is an Ukrainian. The Georgian girl knows that she is a Georgian. The Buryat youth knows that he is a Buryat. But they are all

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brought up to feel that first and foremost they are internationalists ; they are to draw no line against any person because of race, colour or nationality. They are to join hands with the African, the Mongol, the Hindu and the Turk, as readily as with the German, the Englishman, the American or any other white person. An earthquake in Japan ? A strike in Johannesburg ? An uprising in Java ? They are to contribute their copecks to provide succour for the struggling and suffering mass, because they themselves are a spiritual part of this mass, are one with it, and must always be for it. Watch a parade of revolutionary youth in Russia and you will instantly perceive the boisterous, the almost terrific, quality of this spirit of international mindedness. No national assertiveness, no national banners, no national songs. Nowhere a sign of race or colour discrimination. All the tribes and peoples of Russia and other lands, principally Asia, in their native garb and with their native slouch, marching arm in arm, boys and girls always together, all under the same red banners, wrapped in the same red bunting, striding to the same red tune, singing the same International !

I cannot help wondering, however, especially as Sovietism fails to spread in other lands, if some day this international mindedness will not crystallise into a new and rabid nationalism ? The colour line may play no part in it, nor race. But then the Russian has never shared the Anglo-Saxon's sense of superiority over other peoples. Racially he always has been rather humble minded and humble mannered, save towards Jews, in which respect he is far from having shed his ancient coat-of-arms. Anti-semitism, despite vigorous propaganda against it, is still deep-rooted in the Russian soul, even among the proletarians. Let us remember, however, that at present this Russian international mindedness means mainly, perhaps solely, loyalty to Sovietism. Supposing Sovietism remains entrenched in Russia and spreads no farther ; supposing Sovietism remains synonymous with Russia ; it matters not that the

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word Russia is no longer in use, has given place to the euphonious "Soviet Union." After all it is a geographic and political entity. Will not this new passion for the proletarian cause become localised, centre itself on Russia, or what was Russia ?

Communists dismiss with a flitting laugh any suggestion that Russia is developing a new and robust nationalism. But it is not at all a matter to be lightly dismissed. Russia may yet become the most rabidly nationalist land in the world, especially as the youth is growing up with the notion, which in Russia remains undisputed, that the Soviet Union is in the vanguard of mankind, the champion of the holiest principle and the holiest cause the world has ever known. In the past there have been nations which, though spurred on by motives alien to those animating modern Russia, have set themselves up as superior to other nations, and we know how this *idée fixe* of theirs has disturbed and exasperated their neighbours. May not history repeat itself ? There are voices in Russia, still feeble, that do now and then express misgiving lest such be the outcome in the Soviet Union. Certainly the older Russian revolutionaries, who cherish their internationalism as though it were a new divinity, have before them, among all the other tasks that are racking their minds, this one of keeping the tide of internationalist sentiment from bursting into a distinctively nationalist direction !

At best, however, the internationalism which Russian youth is espousing does not imply social tolerance. Just the contrary. It implies a flagrant social intolerance. It could not be otherwise, with the notion of the class struggle so much in the forefront of the intellectual and emotional life of the people. From its earliest days youth is reared in the belief that mankind is divided into a class of proletarians and a class of bourgeois, who are at constant war with each other. The history it studies at school is not the history of nations, but of classes and their struggle against one another. The Bible and religion it approaches

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as the record and the products of this class struggle. That author is most eminent who through his art has perceived the class struggle most lucidly and has bestowed his tenderest sympathy on the submerged mass. Tolstoy, Turgenev, Dostoevski, Anatole France, Dickens, all are subjected to this test, and all receive praise or censure according to the measure or the intensity of the sympathy they manifest with the struggling class. All civilisation, in short, is a matter of class struggle. Often when I used to tell Russian youths that I was a writer they would immediately ask what was my political *napravlenie* (orientation). What they really meant to ask was whether I was for or against the class struggle. They could not conceive of a writer being non-political and indifferent to political viewpoints. To them the class struggle is a magic wand, a Holy Grail.

It is in the purely human aspects of its life that the revolutionary youth of Russia presents such a dramatic spectacle. Nowhere in the world is youth so independent of parental authority or of the guidance of elders. Nowhere is it so militant and so militarised, nowhere so habituated to the notion of sex equality and sex freedom, to a repudiation of religion, to the conception of social service as a motive and a goal in life, to aversion to personal acquisitiveness, to group action, to the exaltation of labour. Labour is not merely a source of livelihood, it is a part of livelihood. It is not merely a means to an end, but an end in itself. Is there a grist mill or a fishery in the neighbourhood? Youth must familiarise itself with the methods and purposes of the enterprise, and with the contribution which these are making to the social self-sufficiency of the community. Is there a farming region specialising in cotton, corn, horticulture, stock-raising? Youth through its schools must learn to appreciate their economic and social value and how to enhance both. Is there a textile factory, a hardware store, a coal mine, an electric project in process of construction? Youth must know what it is

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all about, learn to appreciate its social, political and economic implications. All education is related to some type of labour, to some constructive effort.

It is in the application of principle to conduct that Russian youth encounters its chief perplexities, and receives its chief schooling. A member of a "collective" commits suicide. He was a loyal worker, but he is a suicide. He believed in the right to die, and a revolutionary must only believe in the right to live. How is he to be buried with honours, speeches, a parade, red flags? Can revolutionary youth recognise the merits of the man, independently of his lack of revolutionary stamina? What is to be done? A girl has gone through an abortion, without consulting her immediate group. Abortions, of course, are legalised. But a revolutionary must think of the obligation to the new society. An abortion weakens the health and renders a woman less capable of doing her best work for the cause. Besides, the Revolution demands that women should give birth to children. So again what is to be done? A youth is in love with a girl. He is an atheist. She is not. He loves her desperately; he is sure that in time, after marriage, he will win her away from her faith. Meanwhile she is stubborn; she will marry him only if he consents to a church wedding. Has he a right to yield to her? And supposing that he has, without consulting his collective, gone through a church ceremony—has, as one youth expressed it, "compromised with his atheism for no more than two hours"—what is the collective to do? Expel him and lose an active worker for the Revolution, or pardon him and compromise with "the powers of darkness"? What is to be done? A youth has married, and has been coming to the collective meeting alone, very seldom with his wife. Is he pursuing the right attitude toward her and the cause? What is going to become of the principle of equality of sexes if she is to slump into domesticity and wrap her life in mere household tasks, and in children? What should and what can the

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collective do in such a case? A Gentile youth has made an insulting remark to a Jewish girl, just because she refuses to be his sweetheart. How is such a youth to be regenerated, to be drained of the ancient taint of race hate? A youth has been hobnobbing with the son of a nepman.* That in itself is no misdemeanour. The son of a nepman may some day become a fervent revolutionary, and it behoves a class-conscious revolutionary youth to associate with him and to propound to him the new gospel. But the revolutionary youth has been visiting the nepman's home too often, has accepted gifts from his friend's father—a gold chain, which he has been flaunting before his comrades and rousing the envy of some and the scorn of others. Was it proper for him to accept this gift? Is it ever proper for a revolutionary youth to accept a gift from a nepman, and if so what sort of gift, and where is the limit to be drawn?

Endless are the problems that youth is facing in its daily life, and always it is obliged to seek solutions in its own heart. It can hardly seek them anywhere else. It will not heed the counsel of its elders, who, even when in the ranks of the revolutionaries, are not entirely free from old notions and standards. Party men likewise, if of adult age with the fires of youth and the passions of adolescence burned out of them or held in the background, can suggest answers to perplexing questions, but not always with the touch of life in them. Consider, for example, such a mite of counsel as the inveterate Zalkind once offered when in all earnestness he admonished youth that it is just as fitting for a revolutionary to marry a daughter of the bourgeoisie, as to marry a gorilla! Youth will listen to older Party men, but it often feels bound to smile at their words of guidance. For a gratifying solution of its own dilemmas it must take counsel with itself, experiment, suffer, discard, select and stick!

*i.e., one of the private traders permitted by Lenin's New Economic Policy. For an account of the N.E.P. see THE ROUND TABLE, No. 47, June 1922, pp. 544-546.

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Yet it is a happy youth, perhaps the happiest on earth. It has its failings, too obtrusive and too pathetic not to be noticed by the most casual observer. It is boisterously self-assertive; it is insolent. It is so cocksure of itself, its aims, ideas and prejudices, that it regards the rest of mankind as still living in some dark age. Of course, it has no way of learning to understand the outside world. It has no personal contact with it, and the sources of information at its disposal are adapted to suit the political purposes of the ruling party. It is almost savage in its lack of compassion for a foe. Like the proletarian, it still has much, very much, to learn about the sheer worth of human individuality. It has still to discover the value, if not the beauty, of respect for human personality. It still has a whole world to unlock, explore, admire and emulate.

Yet in its own rights and by its own lights it is as happy as only youth can be. The civil war, the famine, the Party conflicts, the international crises have hardened it to obloquy and privation. It has made a virtue, not of self-denial, but of indifference to material enjoyment. It does not complain if it has to share a room in a dormitory with three, four or even six other persons. It does not grumble if it must sole and resole its tattered boots. It is content enough to eat black bread and cabbage soup every day. It lives with its loyalties, not to home, not to parents, not to elders, not to any church, not to the past, but only to the Revolution and to the future. It has none of the scepticism of Scott Fitzgerald's "Sad Young Men," or of Ernest Hemingway's and Aldous Huxley's desolate folk. It is bursting with faith and an eagerness to live and to struggle. "Do you see how the sun is trying hard to shine?" remarks a character in a new Russian novel. "It is all for us, for our sake." Yes, the sun and all nature seem to Russian revolutionary youth to be in alliance with it in its battle for a new world. "To live," says another character in the same novel, "so that every nerve, every muscle might participate in this big struggle,

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in this big construction"—which is precisely how revolutionary youth wants to live.

Some day a wave of disillusionment may sweep over Russia and dissolve youth's overpowering faith in itself and in its cause. If that time ever comes Russia will witness an epidemic of suicide, the like of which the world has probably never known. For the present this faith, like a full moon, shines high and bright.

II. THE INTELLIGENTSIA

PEASANT, proletarian, Communist, youth! To them the Revolution has meant havoc but also hope, frustration but also fulfilment. Above all it has meant expansion of personality, social and intellectual ascent. But what shall, what can, be said of the *intelligentsia*? To them the Revolution has brought havoc and hardly any hope, frustration with but little fulfilment. It has meant not expansion but contraction of personality, not social ascent but descent. It has been a holocaust.

Intelligentsia! What a hallowed word it was in Russia in the pre-Bolshevik days! What nobility it symbolised, what reverence it inspired! Coined in Russia the word has made the round of the world, but nowhere had it attained the distinction and distinctness that it had in the land of its birth. Everywhere in Russia it aroused respect and adoration. The peasant might fear the official, but not the intellectual. The proletarian might snarl at the capitalist, but not at the intellectual. The Czarist might howl at the rebel, but in his heart he cherished a sneaking admiration, coloured often with envy, for the intellectual. The intellectual himself might be an official, a rebel, a capitalist, but as an intellectual he was the symbol of something noble and indispensable, transcending age, politics, institutions, personalities, classes, something related in a warm and intimate way to life, to the very soul of man.

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The intellectual was the soul of Russia. The very word "intelligentsia" brings to mind Gogol, Pushkin, Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Byelinsky, Dobroliubov, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoevski and other literary luminaries who were not only the soul but the conscience and the glory of Russia. Sceptic and sufferer, the intellectual was also the great discoverer and the great builder, the great humanitarian and the great lover of the dark people. He it was who had made the name of Russia revered in the outside world. All that Russia has given to mankind in literature, art, music, science and social movements he had created. "A king in the realm of ideas," as a Russian writer makes one of his characters express himself in speaking of the intellectual, "and," one might add, "without any living king daring to dispute his right to his throne." He, if anybody, lived in a kingdom that was not of this world—a kingdom of dreams and illusions, of hopes and even more of despairs.

[The Revolution itself is largely his creation. Long before there ever was a proletarian in Russia he had dreamed of revolution, had actually built barricades and had fought behind them and was hanged for doing it. Witness the Decembrist revolution in 1825. Where would this much-vaunted proletarian, this roistering self-anointed master of Russia's destiny be, if the intellectual had not lavished on him his sympathies, his talents, his very soul? Omnipotent and all-righteous as the proletarian may now deem himself, he was only a semi-savage peasant when he first appeared on the Russian scene. Illiterate, suspicious, somewhat afraid of the outside world, he was interested not in ideas, not in humanity, not in a new civilisation, not even in revolution, but only in himself, his own slothful little world. He cared for nothing so much as for a few roubles with which to hie back to the folks at home in his barbaric village and to help them to buy a new plough, a new horse, a new strip of land. What did he know of class-struggle, of class-consciousness, of dictatorship, of soviets, of freedom, of culture, of personality, of science, of technique, aye of Marx himself and of mate-

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rialism—of the whole avalanche of ideas and terms which he is now so freely and exuberantly bandying about, and which so exhilarate and intoxicate him? What did he know of anything, even himself, before the intellectual descended on him and like a loving mother embraced and fondled him and washed the sloth away from his eyes and opened them to a new world, new ideas, new inspirations?

Yet now in the moment of the triumph of the Revolution, of the conquest of the proletariat, the intellectual—teacher, guide, inspirer—finds himself not discarded, but disowned, shoved into the background, into the shadow, to watch, to obey, never to command. His talents are exploited, for after all he is the intellectual, the big creative force; but he himself is mistrusted, watched over like an unruly child that might break discipline and indulge in mischief.

A characteristic incident the following: I had once invited a young engineer and his wife to join a group of Americans in the Bolshaya Moskovskaya, one of the leading hotels in Moscow, for supper and a dance. He shook his head and refused to come. "That is a luxury which only you foreigners can allow yourselves." I sought to argue him out of his contention. But he was steadfast. "We Russian intellectuals," he explained, "know our place. We have to." He was no Communist and, therefore, not subject to the rigid discipline of the Party. He was no nepman and, therefore, immune from the disapprobation visited on this group of cast-offs whenever they make themselves obtrusive or conspicuous. He never had been in sympathy with the counter-revolutionary movement and was, therefore, beyond all possible suspicion of disloyalty. He was an engineer of some prominence, faithful to his job, on the best of terms with the ruling powers. Still—"We Russian intellectuals know our place. We have to." Bitter words pregnant with tragic meaning. Doubtless he was a sensitive person. So are all intellectuals. They often magnify possible consequences. "Fear," says a Russian proverb, "has big eyes," and the intellectual has the biggest eyes of anybody in Rus-

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sia. He is abnormally anxious. He finds himself in a position of defence, almost on probation, and he cannot help being over-cautious.

Not that he is politically recalcitrant. He has long ago become reconciled to the inevitability of the new regime. He is not seeking, and most positively would not welcome, an overthrow of the Soviets. He is sick of destruction. He is tired of war. He is afraid of fresh strife. He is nerve-racked and wants a chance to recuperate and to pursue his labours in peace. "We are just getting started again," remarked to me once a famous and venerable Russian archæologist whom I met in my wanderings in Siberia, and "now there is talk of war with England. Do you really think there will be a war?" He shrugged his shoulders, looked at his tools and tears glistened in his pathetic eyes. No, the intellectual wants no more upheavals. He dreads further conflict. He is content to let time and destiny complete the necessary readjustments.

(Yet to the proletarian he is still the link with the pre-October age, a remnant of the pre-October civilisation, a reminder of the most hectic day in his history. Whenever an incident bursts on the scene involving an intellectual, like the trial of the mining engineers in the spring of 1928, his old wrath rises hot and high, and must be held back by a hand vigorous enough to keep it from spilling into action. The plain truth is that the proletarian's distrust of the old intelligentsia will continue as long as there is such an intelligentsia in existence. It is too deep-seated to die out completely. It is rooted in a mighty, historic passion. To the proletarian and to the Communist the intellectual damned himself eternally when he failed to respond to the October Revolution. Of course, the chief leaders of this Revolution were intellectuals. They still are. But in the mass the intellectual not only held aloof, but denied and defied the October Revolution.

He could hardly have done otherwise. History had not ripened him for the event. Culturally and psychologically

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he was as utterly unprepared for it as a child is for trench warfare. He was primarily a man of compassion with a deep reverence for human individuality. He was and is a "soft fellow" without "audacity and malice." Think of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov, who after killing with an axe the withered and rapacious pawnbroker—a "mere insect" as he had regarded her—discovers that he has really killed himself. There was much of the Raskolnikov in all Russian intellectuals.

True, in the Social Revolutionary party there were intellectuals who embarked now and then on acts of terror, hurled bombs and fired revolvers at Czars, governors, ministers, generals. But they were rare exceptions and terror was to them an act of desperation. They saw no other way of bringing tyrants to an abatement of their cruelties. Yet on the whole no person shrank from bloodshed with deeper revulsion than the Russian intellectual.

Besides, he was a child of a private property civilisation. With his mind he may have been floating in a socialistic utopia, but with his body he was hugging a private property reality. Despite all his revolutionary proclivities and ardour he was a man with a middle man's tastes, a middle man's sense of caution and comfort, a middle man's revulsion against rash action, a middle man's love of compromise.

What then more natural than that he should shrink away in horror and disgust when the proletarian pleaded for support in the crusade for the dictatorship? He had been with the proletarian again and again and for him, but to storm the citadels of power after the almost bloodless overthrow of the Czar, was to him the height of stupidity and madness. He saw only battle and death ahead—chaos, agony, despair, the ruin of all that he had loved and revered. The march of the proletarian to power was to him a Gethsemane. He pictured all Russia, all civilisation tumbling into irretrievable ruin.

The proletarian in power! This man without background, without culture, without tradition, without poli-

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tical experience, this erstwhile unwashed muzhik, with his mud-encrusted boots and his black finger nails, holding in his callow hands the destiny of one hundred and fifty million people! To the intellectual it seemed like a wicked putrid jest! He laughed with mockery, he cried with scorn. When the Bolsheviks did sweep into power he refused to be of use to them. He would not recognise them. He deserted his post in factory, office, and laboratory. He went on strike. He sabotaged. He would be no partner to what he deemed the greatest outrage, not only against himself, against Russia, but against the world. He was sure that the proletariat had only the capacity to wreck, none, or very little, to build—with his own hands. He was waiting for the inevitable collapse of the Bolshevik hegemony. He was sure it would come. He wanted it to come and by all the laws of history it should have come. But it did not. The proletariat remained master. The intellectual had miscalculated his fighting capacity, his physical endurance, his mental resourcefulness, his and those of his leaders.

The proletariat was beside himself with resentment. In the hour of his greatest trial the intellectual had failed him. The intellectual was a traitor, a foe. At one time the very word intelligentsia was as much a term of reproach in Russia as the word *bourzhui*. But Lenine with his amazing capacity for brushing aside personal rancour and facing realities, sensed the danger of crowding the intellectual to the wall. He called for a truce, for a compromise, and, since the proletariat needed brains and the intellectual needed bread, the two did reach an agreement. They joined hands for the upbuilding of Russia—hands, but hardly hearts.

Some Communists of prominence have been assuring the world that the feud between the proletariat and the intellectual has been "liquidated," that the intellectual is happy in the new society. But is he? Can he be? I am speaking, of course, here as throughout this section, of the intellectual who was reared in the environment and the ideology of the pre-October days.

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Politically he is out of the picture. He has pledged his loyalty to the new regime. He has behaved with model circumspection. He has even shown signs of penitence. Still, politically he is not consulted. Not often is he even considered. If he wants to join the Communist party—and unless he does so he can exercise no influence in political life—he must be on probation for two years instead of six months like a proletarian. Positions of political responsibility are seldom open to him. If he has not been deprived of his citizenship, he can, at election time, cast his vote, that is raise his hand for or against a would-be deputy to the Soviet. But this is a matter of routine, almost a mechanical act, without a breath of excitement.

His standard of living has sunk perceptibly from its former level. Salaries in some intellectual professions like teaching and medicine are markedly low. No intellectuals in Russia complain so vociferously of being underpaid as do teachers and physicians. Often, however, the intellectual is the highest paid worker in the land. He is after all the *spetz*—that is the specialist, the engineer, the architect, the chemist, the economist, the organiser. But even so his earnings are limited, seldom rising above four hundred dollars a month. Limited also, strangely enough, are his spending opportunities. No longer can he rent the lodging that he formerly occupied, with its parlours, its bedrooms, its playrooms for children. The housing shortage, if nothing else, makes this impossible. No longer can he subscribe, at will, to foreign periodicals and books. No longer can he travel as he wishes to foreign lands, see new sights and stimulate himself with new contacts. Even if he has enough money saved up for the trip, the State bank, because of the financial stringency of the country, will not exchange his roubles into foreign currency, unless, of course, he is a noted savant, and without such currency he cannot travel in foreign parts. No longer can he go to his favourite tailor and order an over-

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coat, a suit of clothes of choice English cloth. There is no such cloth in the country, save what smugglers haul in, and that is prohibitive in price. As for dinner jackets and dress suits, he does not bother, he has almost forgotten that there are such things in the world. He has no occasion to wear them anyway, save possibly at a banquet to a distinguished foreign visitor, and even then he feels more comfortable mentally in his everyday clothes.

Worst of all is the sense of insecurity that preys on him—sheer economic insecurity. The engineer, the architect, the chemist, the *spetz* or specialist, need have no anxiety about losing his job. The State will seek to make him reasonably comfortable, so that he can do his best work. After all he cannot be easily replaced. But the intellectual of lesser distinction, the manager of a drug store, the director of a hospital, the superintendent of a co-operative, the principal of a school, men, in other words, who are engaged in the so-called secondary intellectual pursuits, are in constant dread of dismissal. Journalists, from one end of the country to the other, who are not members of the Communist party are always fearful lest they should make some slip which will invoke the displeasure of their chiefs and result in dismissal. The same is true of clerks, of all non-partisan office workers, in industry as well as in government. With the passage of time, moreover, this condition will not improve but will grow progressively worse.

It can hardly be otherwise. The Communists complain that the old-time intellectual is too highly individualised, too conscious of his superiority, and not heartily interested in the social Revolution. He may be a more adept worker than the Party man, but he has not saturated himself in the new social spirit, and under the best circumstances he cannot infuse this spirit into his work. He must, therefore, be supplanted by men who will work not for themselves but for the cause. He must give way to Party men. A good enough reason for the Communist, but it does not mitigate the tragedy for the intellectual. With

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a quaking heart he is constantly casting his eyes upward to see if the political axe is descending on him. I once asked a group of literary folk in Moscow why they spurned offers from the State and co-operative publishing house of lucrative editorial positions. "Why should we not?" replied one of them. "The moment our assistants, who will, of course, be Party men, learn from us how to edit books, they get our places and we get the gate." So the feud persists, invisible and irrepressible.

Gone also for the intellectual is his old social world—a mere cracked shell as it now is. The physical surroundings of his everyday life and his economic position do not permit of social expansiveness. Besides, there is always the danger of becoming conspicuous. He gathers, of course, at scientific conferences, at meetings of his professional group. But the old social outlet with its amplitude, its cheer, its abandon is now a thing of the past.

To add to his discomfiture there is the problem of cultural readjustment. The values in which he has grown up, in which he exulted, do not fit the new society. He has retested and recast them, but the flavour of the old civilisation persists, and it is not at all to the liking of the new rulers. They are constantly censuring him for his failure to adopt and to promote the new proletarian cultural values. For him, of course, these new values are still in a state of flux. He is sure that cultural values, unlike clay dolls, cannot be made to order over night. Time, he insists, effort, tradition, social mood, and sentiment, must distil the ingredients out of which to mould them, and if he dared be more frank, with his rulers if not with himself, he would bluntly inform them that the spirit of these new cultural values is not to his taste. They lack the æsthetic finesse, the social delicacy of the old values. But, however annoyed he may feel, he says little or nothing in reply.

Terrific, indeed, has been the ordeal of the Russian intellectual since the coming of the new regime. It has

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meant trial and turbulence, tears and pain, self-denial and even self-abasement. Gone is his old comfort, often enough his security. Gone is his old prestige. The peasant, the proletarian, the Communist, the youth—each in his own way has been made conscious of a new self-respect, a new dignity. They have discovered or recovered their ego. But the intellectual has had to shove his “I” into the background, to keep it from public view. It has no standing in the new society and hardly any value. As a matter of sheer psychology his has been an excruciating task. It is never easy to break off a habit, and he has had to wrench himself loose from an entire set of habits or else find himself ground beneath the wheels of the Revolution.

Still, if the Revolution has severely narrowed outlets for economic, social, cultural and political self-expression and advancement it has not been without its positive contribution. It has meant torture, but also purgation. It may not have brought new happiness, but it has opened up founts of new wisdom, or at least understanding. Despite his humanitarianism and his professed love for the dark masses, the intellectual had not, save in theory, cherished respect for labour. He would not soil his hands with menial toil. Now when he looks back at his old attitude toward labour he laughs at himself. “It does seem silly,” confessed to me one of the most famous scientists in the land. Now it no longer hurts his conscience if his neighbours see him carrying a sack of flour on his back or a load of wood in his arms. Now he has no sense of inner incongruity or perturbation when he has to wash his own windows, mend his own shoes or repair his own stove. “Yes, I am late to-day,” once announced a popular professor of literature to his class in Moscow University, “because I had company last night and not being able to afford a maid, I had to wash my own dishes.” The students roared with delight.

Young Russia

As never before the intellectual is also beginning to appreciate the value of decision and action. His ancient Hamletism is not dead, but it is no longer in the foreground of his consciousness. Life in revolutionary Russia, like water in a mill-dam, rushes swiftly on, sweeping people along with it, and the intellectual cannot and dare not pause to look back or to immerse himself in speculation and self-scrutiny.

Best of all, he has remained at home. He has escaped the cruel fate of the *émigré* intellectual. They are scattered to all the corners of the globe. Unhardened, unsophisticated, over-sensitive Russians that they are, they cannot acclimatise themselves to an alien civilisation. They cannot strike roots in an alien soil. They shake their fists and shriek defiance, they threaten and they boast; but these are mere gestures of despair, perhaps of folly. They drift along with the winds of chance and circumstance. They still live upon the inspiration of old Russia, the Russia that is no more, save in their own memory. Lonely folk they are, the loneliest in the world, and they are rapidly growing sterile. Their souls are wilting. Merezhkovsky, Hippus, Kuprin, Amfiteatrov, Milyukov, world figures once, now are withering in ever-deepening obscurity—ghosts fumbling for light and never finding it.

The intellectual who has remained in Russia, however disappointed and aggrieved he may feel, has his roots in his native soil. Nourishment flows freely to these roots. He has tasted his fill of agony and sordidness—he still tastes it, and will until the end of his days—but he has his delights, and at times even inspirations. Cut off from physical contact with the outside world, he can yet roam at will over his own vast, variegated and boisterous land. He can write, sing, dream, if not of the new social gospel, at least of the things that he has always loved and still loves—of the muzhik, the steppe, the birch forests, the Volga, the Caucasus, the Russian sky, his own yesterday, and even of the soul of Russia.

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Russia is still his homeland, his immense, brooding, ever-stirring little mother.

He cannot help realising, of course, that his end is coming—that is, the end of his old dreams and illusions, his whole old world with its pathos and beauty, its unrest and promise, its yearning and its frustration. He must smile now, perhaps with gall but certainly with amusement, when he reads the words of Chekhov's Baron Tuzenbach that "not only after two or three hundred but in millions of years life will still be as it is." He knows how pathetically deceiving these words are. He could cry out their falsity until his heart burst. People may eat, drink, sleep, fight, as they have always done, but they will seek new purposes, new adaptations, new exaltations, new desperations, aye, new follies. They have done that in Russia, and he knows that for good or for evil they have not failed. The proof, too living to be denied or misjudged, is the new intellectual!

The new intellectual has not the social background of the old intelligentsia. He comes from the earth itself, from the masses. He has no soulfulness, no delicacy, no artistry. He has not even the competence of his predecessors. He is unkempt, uncouth, unshaven, with callous hands, but with an insatiable hunger for knowledge and conquest. He smells of dirt, of coal dust, of oil and also of wind and rain. He revels, not in Nadson, in Pushkin, in Lermontov and other tearful poets, but in Marx, in Lenine, in Ford, in Edison, in Taylor. When he invites his fair one for a walk or an afternoon in a canoe he does not, like intellectuals of a former generation, declaim love lyrics to her. He does not even ask her whether she has read Pushkin's *Onyegin*, but he talks on endlessly and with passion of smoke-stacks, tractors, engines, dynamos, cities, machines and factories; and the fair one listens and glows with as much ecstasy and far less heartache than did fair ones in other days when, in a sobbing voice, men recited to them Tatyana's letter to Onyegin. Gone are Turgenev's Lizas

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who, when frustrated in love, bid the world farewell and bury themselves in the cloistered walls of a convent resigned to a life of solitude, self-abnegation and unhealed agony. Gone are Chekhov's "Cherry Orchards," "Uncle Vanyas," "Three Sisters," who sob so beautifully, suffer so nobly—and so uselessly.

In the twilight of their history well might the old intelligentsia greet the new with the words of Turgenev's Lavretsky: "Play on, make merry, grow on, young forces. Life lies before you and it will be easier for you to live. You will not be compelled, as we have been, to seek your road, to struggle, to fall and to rise to your feet again amid the gloom. We have given ourselves great trouble that we might remain whole and how many of us have failed! But you must now work, perform deeds, and the blessings of the old fellows, like me, be upon you."

* * * * *

A terrible destroyer, the Russian Communist has this to his credit—he has infused a new will into the Russian man, a new energy, a new impudence.* He is hardening the very fibre of the Russian soul. Blunderer and wrecker that he is, he never looks back on his errors save only with the thought of never repeating them. He may fail in his ultimate goal. Property may never become the possession of the collective society. He may be swept off the Russian stage, indeed, the stage of history, by a fury more mighty than he unleashed when he swooped on old Russia with the resolve to whip her into submission. But it will not be by the Kerenskys and Milyukovs, by men "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" and with eloquence as their chief weapon of combat. It will be by a new man forged by the Communist himself in his own crucible of Passion, Principle, Power, Triumph, a man mightier than he not only in thought, but in will and in deed, as ready to wreck as he, but with far more ample capacity to build and to conquer!

* For the awakening of the muzhik see THE ROUND TABLE, No. 75, June 1929, p. 530.

GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN NORTHERN AFRICA

Germany "attempts to discredit before the world our valiant and faithful black troops, because she does not wish us to be a nation of a hundred million." (M. Poincaré at Brioules, September 16, 1923.)

"*L'eupéanisation du continent n'a pas amélioré, selon les noirs, la condition des noirs... par contre, elle a mécontenté des millions d'hommes. Ils regrettent l'époque où ils vivaient dans leurs villages, et haïssent ce régime qui, sur leur sol, disent-ils, fait dépendre leur subsistance de leur travail pour l'étranger.*" (SALKIN, "L'Afrique Centrale dans Cent Ans.")

I. NORTH AFRICAN UNITY

IT has often been pointed out that there is no such country as India, in the sense of a homogeneous political entity. The continent of Africa, on the other hand, possibly because it is nearer Europe, has never, even in popular conception, been thought of as homogeneous, except perhaps in its central portion, in the *Darkest Africa* of Stanley and the missionary pioneers. As far, at all events, as its northern half goes—the half with which this article is concerned*—Africa appeared to the last generation almost as much of a geographical abstraction as the Equator. Egypt, Morocco, Abyssinia, Tunis, Hausa, Darfur and Bornu, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Dahomey, the

* The term Northern Africa is used in this article to cover roughly that part of the continent which lies north of the Equator, and the term North Africa to denote the various African countries north of the Sahara.

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Sahara, the Sudan and Tripoli were, and still are, to a large extent thought of as political entities which have little contact with each other, as countries which, though all placed by the cartographers on the space labelled Africa, have little in the way of a common African bond, and, though they are in Africa, are many of them not of it. It is only a few years since a highly-placed government official enquired of a traveller what connection there could be between Kano and Khartum. Some of these countries were commonly regarded as mere "hinterlands," undeveloped interiors, depending upon ports of entry such as Freetown, Accra, Secondi, Jibuti, Lagos, Tangier or Casablanca,* from which radiate the commerce and civilising influence of the various Powers which in the last century partitioned the continent of Africa among themselves. And to a large extent African progress is still measured in Europe by the volume of imports and exports, and the distribution of such exports and imports is organised and stimulated in bulk. The seaports have therefore always had a natural tendency to draw to themselves the wealth which results from commercial operations, and as a consequence to look to their own profit and convenience, and to press their own "half baked" type of European social and civic organisation upon the indigenous African communities of the interior, which are usually dependent on them commercially, and in many cases administratively as well.

Europe is certainly solicitous for the welfare of the inhabitants of the African continent under her control; yet, in practice, her African policy has been conditioned by political or economic considerations of an extraneous character. An instance of the political is referred to in a later section. On the economic side, the question is always apt to arise, how far a particular line is compatible with the effective export of raw materials and the import of European goods on a scale sufficient to meet the com-

* See the map at the end of the article.

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mercial requirements of the interested Power, without at the same time offending the public conscience. And it is right that the resources of Africa should be available for the world, which needs them for its industries. A cloistered seclusion would not be in the interests of the African himself, even if it were possible. But the idea that Africa is simply a vast undeveloped estate which belongs to Europe must, once for all, be discarded, and due regard must be paid to the welfare and idiosyncracies of her peoples.

Thirty years ago many of the different countries and political entities of which Northern Africa is composed were really separate countries, each a law unto itself. There was little contact or interchange of ideas. They had, indeed, nothing in common except the heritage of Islam, which is the religion of the great majority of its inhabitants. East was East, West was West, South was South, and Egypt was Egypt, *i.e.*, "the most important country in the world," but a country which, as far as the rest of the African continent was concerned, was practically without influence, and itself a pawn in European politics. Morocco was a recluse, "the world forgetting," and "by the world forgot." All this has, however, been changed by one of the incidental effects of the war, an effect which, though it was possibly not altogether due to natural causes, is none the less of immense importance and has all the appearance of durability. All over Northern Africa there is a new sense of Islamic unity. Islam may be a waning force in Asia, but so far as Northern Africa is concerned, the exact opposite has taken place. There Islam has entered upon a revivalist period which will probably continue with more vigour than ever now that the whole country is "safe for the wandering fakir." The Moslems of Egypt and the eastern side of North Africa are trying to regain an influence which they have not enjoyed for centuries in the Sudan belt, and the Sudan belt is listening. In spite of the fact too that the lighter skinned races of

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Egypt and North Africa generally affect to despise the negro as a "slave," there is a close community of thought, outlook and sympathy between the two, which is "African," the exact opposite of "European." The gradations of colour between the Sudan and the Mediterranean are, it must be remembered, not abrupt, but gradual. Since the dawn of history, the peoples of North Africa have mingled with those of the Sahara and those of the Sahara with those of the Sudan. The process has been a continuous one, and with it there is now associated this tightening of the Islamic bond, which appeals in a peculiar degree to the desert and semi-desert races. The occupation of Moslem Africa by Christian Powers is accepted by most African Moslems in a fatalistic spirit, and with quiet toleration. Christian rule has, indeed, material advantages for the commercial classes, and it is free from the grosser forms of oppression. Nevertheless, it remains in the eyes of the African Moslem an illegal and unhallowed thing, which an inscrutable Providence permits to continue for a time, but will some day remove. This is the view held all over Northern Africa, and in spite of apparent acquiescence in, and in parts even of local contentment with, the present order of things, it is tenaciously held from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to Morocco, and from Kano to Benghasi. The Moslem waits for the hour of deliverance—deliverance not necessarily by forcible means, but by the hand of God.

It is because this attitude to Christian domination is the normal one of the great mass of the people, Arab, Berber and negroid, that almost any outside agency hostile to the Christian Powers can always obtain a hearing and win adherents by making use of such slogans as, "Oppression of Islam," "Advent of the Mahdi," "Advent of the Prophet Jesus," etc. Such cries and the various theological beliefs or superstitions which are mixed up with them win popular credence, and though their true character is often exposed by Europeans or even by Moslem rulers and

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divines whose political or material interests make them view promptings to unrest with disapproval, no sooner is one form of propaganda scotched, than another lifts its head. For the root of the trouble lies not in the form taken by any particular agitation, but partly in resentment at the subjection of Islam to Christian domination, and partly in the fact that, whereas the Moslems are all African, the ruling Powers are all European.

But there is another bond, which although it is more strongly developed among the Moslems has begun to affect the whole population to a greater or less degree. The Islamic cloak which covers political agitation in Africa is exposed to view in fanatical arguments and shibboleths which are familiar enough to Europe, or at all events to her oriental students; but this other link, the racial bond, remains a factor the force of which is often hardly realised and never stressed by African Moslems themselves. While it is true that the bond of Islam overrides, at least in theory, all bonds of a local, national or political character, yet the bond of a common African fatherland bids fair, under present-day conditions, now that Africa is opened up, to equal if not to surpass it in strength. It gains additional strength, indeed, from the religious tie and the result is that Northern Africa, predominantly Moslem, is now not only more religiously conscious than ever, it is also fast becoming conscious of its cultural and racial unity. Both kinds of consciousness make for solidarity. In the East the Islamic world is torn by divisions from Stambul to Iraq and Kabul, but its discords have had practically no effect upon the African Moslem peoples to the west and south of Egypt, except to create an impression that their Asiatic co-religionists have reverted to infidelity. It is sometimes thought that such problems as the Khilafat question, the changes in Turkey, or the Wahabite occupation of Mecca must, because they loom so large in the eyes of the Indian Moslem, and indeed in those of Europe, be also matters of deep concern to the

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African Moslem. This, however, is not the case. He still worships his saints despite the fulminations of the Wahabite; the Sudanese continues to venerate his local Khalifa, the Sheikh of Bornu or the Sultan of Sokoto, and he is relatively indifferent to the fate of the Turkish Caliph or, provided that there is no interference with the pilgrimage, to the political fortunes of Mecca itself. He is even ready to substitute Aba Island on the Nile, or Sheikh Othman Dan Hodio's tomb at Sokoto for the Kaaba at Mecca, if local religious constituted authority is prepared to approve.

We find then two new tendencies in Northern Africa, an Islamic renaissance and a growing sense of political unity. Both make it important to examine the policy of the European Powers which are in control of that great inland sea of sand, the Sahara, and the countries which contain it on every side.

II. BRITISH METHODS

TO begin with British policy. First, there are the great predominantly Moslem parts, Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and more than half of Nigeria, which together represent a very large slice of the whole of Northern Africa, probably two-thirds of its wealth and a very large proportion of its population. Egypt is, of course, in a different position to any other African country, and her independent status has been recognised. There are important reservations attached to the recognition which have still to be fulfilled, and there are British troops in Cairo, but the Government is Egyptian, and Islam is free to work out its own salvation. In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan England is pursuing a policy which is tolerant of Islam and designed to preserve or to revive such native authority and influence as have survived the Mahdist upheaval of thirty years ago. The same attitude is found

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in Nigeria. For twenty-five years the large emirates have been maintained as protected Moslem polities, which on their side have responded in an extraordinary way to the liberal terms granted to them in 1903 by Sir Frederick (now Lord) Lugard. It has been the steadfast endeavour, both in Nigeria and the Sudan, to maintain, as far as is just and right, the tribal atmosphere and the existing indigenous political institutions, though these institutions are based on Islamic models and depend on the sanction of Moslem public opinion rather than on the democratic public opinion of European countries. The Egyptians have not yet got all they want or claim, and both in Nigeria and the Sudan disruptive propaganda has from time to time fanned discontent; yet, on the whole, British policy goes with the trend of native aspiration, not against it, in all three countries, and the more intelligent and far-seeing leaders of native thought recognise this. The policy of Great Britain in Egypt is necessarily influenced by the need of keeping our Imperial communications intact, but it would be generally admitted that she is not working anywhere in Northern Africa to destroy either Islam or native character. Her desire is rather that the elements of a stable African government should gradually be built up in all the countries under her control. When differences occur, they are usually not so much about the end in view as about practical matters, such as the rate of progress or the means by which the end is to be attained. If, as one who knows Africa recently remarked, the three most important factors in the good government of alien peoples are personal security, justice, and sympathy with ideas and conceptions even when they are alien to those of the controlling Power, it is evident that both in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Nigeria these desiderata are in the forefront of policy. In the non-Moslem fringe where the British, on their arrival, found the inhabitants in a more backward political state than the Moslems in the north, the method is different. British parliamentary forms have been introduced. But everywhere in Northern

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Africa the policy has been the same, to assist the different African peoples to stand on their own feet, and there is no attempt anywhere to change the African character. Nor has the development either of an indigenous government or indigenous economic enterprise—witness, for instance, the native cocoa output of the Gold Coast—been materially prejudiced by the cry, *mise en valeur*, so freely heard in connection with tropical African colonies. Writing about Nigeria in 1904 in the *Manchester Guardian*, Lady Lugard remarked :

The policy holds good of going in boldly to the healthier lands and the finer races, and developing from the interior to the coast, not from the coast to the interior. . . . We have for the first time penetrated to the interior, and we are trying for the first time to work with the finest races in the country.

This is the opposite policy to making everything depend on the coastal port of entry, and, far from being impeded by the general pressure of European economic competition, the "development from the interior to the coast," which Lady Lugard favoured, has been accelerated since the war. It is still necessary to take care that the commercial pressure from outside does not destroy the internal will to produce and the society which produces, but the framework of native social life has been preserved unimpaired.

We have then in our dependencies and colonies in Northern Africa one aim, but two systems. The parliamentary system prevails in most parts of the southern non-Moslem fringe. Indirect rule prevails in the Moslem block to the south and south-west of Egypt and along the Sudan belt. The Moslem rulers in the Sudan and the great emirs of Nigeria consider themselves, or would wish to consider themselves, African Chiefs feudatory to the King of Great Britain, represented personally on the spot by a Governor, rather than British subjects governed by the alien democratic institutions of Great Britain, or by a Governor in Council and a Legislative Assembly, and this view is

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shared by their peoples. Precisely in the same way the Indian Princes, as the evidence before the Harcourt Butler Committee made clear, prefer that their relations with the paramount Power should be with the Viceroy as the representative of the Crown rather than with the Governor-General in Council as the representative of the Government of India. More will be said about these systems on a later page—both have their advocates—but it is now necessary to pass on to French policy which, in its aims, stands at the opposite pole to the British. Before doing so, however, one comment may perhaps be made with advantage here. Whatever the respective merits of the indirect and the parliamentary systems, the example of India is a warning of the complications which result from depending upon both of them in the same country at the same time, without any clear idea about the direction in which they are taking us.

III. THE FRENCH SCHEME

IN an article by Lady Lugard, to which reference has already been made, attention was drawn to the systematic preparation which our French neighbours were then making for the development of their own part of Northern Africa. It is now possible, a quarter of a century later, to examine their system and to form some idea of its significance.

The goal was made clear in 1923 in the words of M. Poincaré at Brioules, which are printed at the head of this article. Northern Africa is to be a part of France just as Corsica is. It occupies a completely different position in the eyes of the French to their other colonies.* The latter are considered different, however, not because their inhabitants are looked upon as unassimilable, but simply

* See *Foreign Colonial Administration in the Far East*, by Sir Hesketh Bell, G.C.M.G., pp. 138-147.

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because they are too far away for a policy of complete centralisation and absorption. The French attitude towards colour is completely different to our own, as will be seen from the following remarks by a distinguished French writer.

Questions of the colour of a man's skin or of his race are not for us of first-rate importance. . . . Thanks to her geographical position between the Alps and the Pyrenees . . . France is the great meeting ground for the Mediterranean and Germanic races. She is inhabited by a hybrid race. . . . In everyday language, the French are a nation rather than a race. . . . For us there is no "colour" problem. We have not even a French word for it, and have to describe it in periphrasis.

On the other hand, we have a million French colonists living in Algeria, at the very gates of France, in contact with a native society, under conditions which involve the closest intercourse. These natives are themselves Mediterranean whites, and as far as race goes, not very far removed from ourselves; but they are Mahomedans, and this fact creates a gulf between us and them. . . . We call it "the native question." *

This passage enables us to understand the underlying principle of the scheme which is now being applied by the French to the whole of their portion of Northern Africa. Their basic policy there, both in theory and practice, is the propagation of French civilisation and the French language on as wide a scale as possible; The touchstone applied to every administrative proposal is how far it will advance or retard the assimilation of Northern Africa to France. The question of the ethnic type of the future French subject is subordinated to the desire for numerical strength, the suitability of the kind of education prescribed for Africans to the question whether it will assist the economical and rapid development of this greater France. The benefits of French medicine are, in a word, conferred on both Berber and negro, not only or even primarily for the sake of their health, but for political reasons. The same motive underlies the equipment and selection of officials.

* THE ROUND TABLE, No. 49, December 1922, pp. 42-43.

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Arabic is not a compulsory subject, for French is to become the *lingua franca*. Officials in the African and the other colonies of France are freely interchanged, for expert knowledge of and sympathy with local African sentiment have not the same importance for the French purpose in view as they have for the British purpose. A new outlook is to take the place of local sentiment. *La France* is, in fact, to be the goddess to whom the Franco-African of the future is to devote his life; a goddess who cares nothing for "well-defined zoological species" like the nordic or the Mediterranean race. She represents, so far as political expediency permits, a civilisation which stands for the material interests of France and, in the south at all events, is anti-Islamic. Her system for the development of Northern Africa is deliberately calculated to make it the habitat of a hypothetically homogeneous Franco-African race.

The commercial and economic aspects of this development are in a certain sense subordinate to the political question of the centralisation and unification which are to make this greater France self-contained, to shorten its internal lines of communication, and to spread a system of white, or partly white, groups, like the military colonies in the old Roman world, which will assist to leaven the black zone as far as possible in the direction of the tropical belt. And with good communications the Sahara region should prove an admirable outpost for Franco-African "colonists." But the economic side has not been forgotten. Older readers may perhaps remember the consolatory reflection attributed to the late Lord Salisbury at a time when people were alarmed at the way in which the French were extending their empire in the Sahara. "They tell me," he is said to have remarked, "that the soil there is rather on the light side. Surely we can let the Gallic cock scratch in it." There are, however, hopes to-day, and apparently by no means groundless ones, that these colonists will be able to grow both food and raw materials for

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France, and great schemes are on foot to aid production. The Nile is the only river in the old world with its source in the tropics which has hitherto been utilised for irrigation purposes in regions which are sub-tropical and not unsuitable for white labour, or even temperate. The French now propose to put the Niger to a similar use, and to create an Egypt in the vicinity of Timbuctu, a region in about the same latitude as Dongola and Berber on the Nile (*i.e.*, about 18° north) which, though hot in summer, has a dry climate which is comparatively healthy for Europeans. For this purpose the waters of the river are to be held up by a great barrage complementary to the one already constructed at Soutuba near Bamako.* The new barrage will not be far from Mopti and Sansanding above the bend of the Niger, and its water will be carried by an irrigation canal into an old arm of the river which runs north towards Sokolo and Mema. A protecting dyke will be constructed south of this canal and almost parallel to the present course of the Niger, in order to protect the old arm of the river from floods. From this barrage there will be communication by water all the year round as far as the Tosaye rapids east of Timbuctu on the one side, and with the Niger and Bani above Bamako on the other. At Tosaye the Niger can easily be bridged, and there is to be another barrage and canal there. The Niger terminus of the Trans-Saharan railway, which it is proposed to build from Beni Abbas and Colomb Bechar in Algeria to Reggan, Burem and Tosaye, will also be close by, and the Trans-Saharan railway will be continued south of the Niger at Tosaye to the Wagadugu region where it will meet the line from Dakar, which is itself to be prolonged *via* Bamako and Segou, and the French Guinea and the Ivory Coast lines, which are to be extended to Bobo Dioulasso and thence northwards. From Tosaye it is also proposed to build an eastern branch of the Trans-

* The position of the various places referred to in connection with the French irrigation and railway schemes will be found in the map at the end of the article.

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Saharan line which will follow the north bank of the Niger as far as Niamey, and then run eastward to join the Dahomey railway. The latter will itself be continued across the river, which is to be bridged in the neighbourhood of Gaya. There is a network of roads already in existence both in North Africa and in the Sudan, which will feed these lines. The intransigence of the Sahara itself is rapidly being overcome and there are already a number of motorable routes both from north to south and from east to west.

As far as mechanical means are concerned there is little to prevent France from realising these vast projects for the improvement of her communications, and it should soon be feasible to get from almost any part of French Northern Africa to any other in three or four days. It is already possible to reach Dakar by air in forty-eight hours from France, and local air communications are being developed. Man power is, however, a different matter when it comes to public works of the magnitude contemplated. The population, white and black, scattered over the whole of French Northern Africa, is comparatively small, largely nomadic and under no economic necessity to work, while the available supply of labour which can in any sense of the word be called skilled is small. The possibility of carrying their scheme to completion, both from the practical and the economic standpoint, is recognised by the French to be bound up with two great administrative proposals. In the first place, the population must be taught to speak French and they must also, as far as possible, receive a French technical education. In the second place, they must, with certain exceptions, be subject to conscription both for military and for labour purposes, for the former purpose as far as is desirable, for the latter almost universally.

The arguments used to justify these two measures are simple, and from the point of view of logic unanswerable. Neither the Trans-Saharan railway nor the barrages and canals can be constructed at all without conscript labour

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both from North Africa and the Sudan, nor will it be possible for the at present barren region of Timbuctu to be made into an Egypt without moving population *en masse* to till the millions of acres which it is hoped that the new arm of the Niger will make cultivable. Undertakings on such a scale cannot, moreover, be kept going without a considerable nucleus of trained artisans, and these, to whatever race they belong, must all have a French technical education. Success is dependent not only on the unification of tongues, but also on the unification to a large extent of race, which is a necessary corollary of language unification. Such unification requires the decay of the different kinds of African nationality, and the creation in their place of a single one, French. This, notwithstanding the fact that the races to which the system is to be applied have hitherto shown no very marked desire, generally speaking, to become French citizens.

The most important factor is obviously the children. It was early realised that the key to success lies in education in the broadest sense of the word, and the task was taken up with characteristic thoroughness. There was, however, a lion in the path—Islam. Something had to be set up as a rival, so about 1911 it became the policy of French West African Administrations to stem the disintegration of fetishism and to encourage the indigenous cults. Christian missionary teaching was, curiously enough, put a stop to, but there were other reasons for this step connected, no doubt, with politics at home. The ban certainly no longer exists. It has, however, been found necessary to try a new plan, for the changed outlook of the thousands of black ex-soldiers who served in France during the war has rendered it out of the question to keep up the old fetish worship. The solution now favoured is to teach the children the abstract truths of science. The little African is to learn "that the shadow is not a soul, but due to the interception of the sun's rays, that rain is the result of evaporation, not the gift of a spirit." A solid mass of scientific fact will be

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taught broadcast and it is believed that it can be assimilated without a disastrously rapid disintegration of native society, and that such a training will prepare the recipient for other educational processes which are bound to accompany the closer contact which is being established between the Sudan and North Africa and France. The language employed in the primary schools is entirely French, and an important object of the teaching is to familiarise the children's minds with such practical matters as the working of machinery, the structure of plants and the causes of disease. Boys who show a special aptitude go on to secondary schools where they learn to be clerks, teachers and mechanics. Finally there is an *école supérieure* at Gorée where veterinary science and agriculture are taught, and there is also a college of medicine to which boys are transferred who are going to be doctors. Naturally, conscription, especially when it is for military purposes, is a factor of enormous importance in the new curriculum, particularly when the conscript is sent to North Africa or even to France. He learns there a new standard of living and a completely new outlook on life the effects of which extend far beyond himself. Miscegenation presents a problem of peculiar delicacy in parts of the British Empire, but in French Northern Africa it is frankly welcomed, particularly if the male is French. There is no problem corresponding to the Eurasian one. In French West Africa all illegitimate half-bred children are taken over and brought up by the State in schools established for the purpose at Bamako. The boys are educated to occupy government posts, the girls to become midwives. The latter are eventually sent back to their countries of origin and remain the wards of the Government until they marry.

The logical end of the French policy is a new Roman Empire with its centre not in Rome but in Paris, with Africa as a granary and supply depot both for men and materials. This is the conception which has fired the imagination of patriotic Frenchmen for decades, but it is only since the

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war and the development of aviation and motor transport that it has passed from the domain of dreams into that of practical politics. What Tunis and Algiers are at present Morocco must shortly become, an annexe, French both in language and in mode of life, and with a large intermixture of French blood. The necessary mechanical measures for the assimilation of Tunis, Algiers and Morocco are being pushed on with unflagging zeal, and the progress which the intelligent Berber population of North Africa has already made can be pointed to to justify an expenditure, which up to 1925 amounted in Morocco alone to over £250,000,000 upon railways, roads and ports. There is a tourist programme especially designed to interest France herself in her great colonial experiment. North Africa is, however, only a half-way house on the road to the still vaster project of a gallicised French Northern Africa ; a domain in which absorption will be aided by miscegenation on a vast scale, and this sea of sand, the Sahara, is to be made navigable by fast motor and aeroplane transport, with a docile negro, negroid or mixed population both within it and beyond, which under the direction of French officers and French engineers will supply soldiers in time of war and well disciplined labour in time of peace. The conscription of the Sudanese population in the colonies of the Niger, the Haute Volta, Senegal and the French Sudan, as well as in equatorial Africa, is indeed already, both for military and labour purposes, a *fait accompli*.

From a mechanical point of view, then, the unification of some three-quarters of the northern half of the African continent is already well under way, and it is being pushed to completion with enthusiasm. The new forms of trans-Saharan transport are certain in some degree to revive the old desert trade of the Phoenicians and the Arabs, and if a sufficiently cheap form of fuel can be found it may materially affect the seaborne commerce which ousted the old desert trade, and has now had the monopoly of trade-in-bulk for a couple of decades. A native oil obtained from ground

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nuts is already being used as fuel for driving machinery in the tropical districts. But, in any event, white North Africa will be brought to the very door of the Sudan and central Africa as it never has before. The contact of people with people and tribe with tribe in both regions, and what is more, the contact of all of them with Europe will of necessity be almost entirely freed from the surveillance which the limited number of ports through which Africa could be entered has hitherto made possible. African land frontiers can no longer be effectively patrolled, and propaganda from North Africa and beyond will now reach the Sudan and even central Africa with the greatest ease. It will, indeed, in the future be impossible to set a limit anywhere to the passage of ideas through the Dark Continent.

IV. INDIRECT RULE AND CROWN COLONY GOVERNMENT

WHAT then are the prospects of the French completing their great scheme of assimilation and how will a French Northern Africa and a British Northern Africa, to which such different principles are being applied, react upon one another across a common frontier of thousands of miles?

There is no intention in this article of attempting prophecy—there are too many uncertain factors; but in estimating the French chances of success we have something in the way of experience to go upon. The tenacity of the African strain is already proved. Miscegenation has already been tried on a sufficient scale to put that beyond doubt. A Franco-African race may be a possibility north of the Sahara. The North African Berber is himself white—his isolation in the high Atlas has kept him so—and the Fulbe and the Tuareg in the Sahara are still more or less white owing to tribal endogamy. Even in the north, however, there is Islam, that formidable gulf between Europe

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and Africa which, the French writer quoted on an earlier page has told us, constitutes "the native question" of Algeria. But whatever the possibilities in North Africa, south of the desert the difficulties are infinitely greater, for there nature herself stands in the way. Nothing is more remarkable than the rapidity with which in Africa, at all events in tropical Africa, the white strain grows weaker and the black stronger after racial intermixture. Even if the French scheme succeeds at the outset, can the high degree of centralisation and the constant replenishment of French blood, upon which permanent success depends, be kept up indefinitely? Yet, without these artificial aids the negro strain would surely reassert itself in a few generations and a reversion to type and the old outlook would follow. Africa herself seems to engender an aversion to assimilation with Europe, and the neighbouring territories in which development is on African lines will be more likely to react in this sense upon a gallicised French territory than it is to affect them. If, then, the only outcome of the French policy is, after all, likely to be the reassertion of the African type and the African will, British policy would seem to be based on sound sense, for it recognises the inevitable, and going as it does with the trend of African aspiration it is more likely to place our relations with the African peoples on a permanently better footing.

It remains to consider what is the best kind of government for British Northern Africa; as has been seen, there are two systems in actual use. It may seem rather an academic question at this time of day. The existing governments have all been established for a considerable number of years and there is no question of any revolutionary change. There is no movement to do away with indirect rule and the most convinced believer in that system would not dream of demanding that the roots of Crown colony government should be torn up in, for instance, the Gold Coast. Nor is there any desire in this article to dogmatise about the respective advantages of either system from an

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absolute standpoint. Both have their own peculiar qualities, and the extent to which they are applicable depends largely upon circumstance. Both have their dangers too. The indirect system works best where there are relatively advanced indigenous institutions already in existence. There must be native authorities able and willing to stand the racket of government. These conditions are found in the Moslem block. The emirates of Nigeria and corresponding institutions in the Sudan supplied exactly what was required. The system, moreover, fitted in with Islamic tradition and prejudices which would have resisted the imposition of our more alien forms. In the non-Moslem fringe, on the other hand, the conditions were, as has already been stated, completely different. When we arrived in the country we found a much less advanced stage of civilisation. There was far less in the way of indigenous institutions to build upon, and, on the other hand, little or nothing to make the introduction of our own forms repugnant to local sentiment, certainly nothing with the force of Islamic prejudice. The difficulty was rather one of understanding. "The ideas and ways of his new masters are, as far as he (the native) is concerned," says M. Paul Salkin, "a sort of fourth dimension. The African masses with their centuries of obedience and veneration have no use for such theories as liberty and equality." The special danger of applying parliamentary institutions to African races at a certain stage of their development is that they tend to become oligarchic machines which are manipulated by minorities for the benefit, not of the people of the dependency as a whole, but of sectional interests. However that may be, we followed the well-trodden path and introduced our usual system, Crown colony government.

If this were the whole matter, there would be nothing more to be said. Each system could be left to develop in its own way. It is early to pass final judgment. There is, however, a complication. A glance at the map will show

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that the territories in the non-Moslem fringe encroach, to a greater or less degree, upon the Moslem block. In Nigeria, indeed, the Moslem section is more than half the country. The result is that both systems are found at work side by side, the indirect in the north, the parliamentary in the south, which also contains the capital of the colony. The complication to which such a state of things might ultimately lead has already been mentioned, though the situation is an easier one than it is in India, because the territory under indirect rule is a separate block, not scattered about all over the country as the Native States are in India. There is, however, an immediate problem as well. The indirect system depends above everything else upon personal influence. Native forms and native authorities have been retained, and it is an essential part of the system that they should keep their prestige. The British local representative must therefore, *vis-à-vis* the native rulers, keep in the background. At the same time, he must win their confidence and respect and *propter hoc* he must enjoy the complete confidence and respect of his own Government. For it is his task not only to assist the native authorities to maintain their position; their methods must be improved, and—the special danger of the indirect system—customs which are repugnant on humane grounds must not be suffered to continue. There is, of course, force in the background, but progress induced by force is less permanent than progress induced by persuasion. Persuasion is, indeed, of the essence of the system, and it demands an intimate knowledge of the language and exceptional sympathy with native ideas, which means that the local official must be ready to spend his career in the country.

Such is the indirect system. Its strength has stood the test of time, but personal influence is none the less a delicate matter. It must be given scope if it is to be effectively exercised. It is essential that as free a hand as possible should be left to the man on the spot, for undue inter-

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ference might easily undermine his position. Therein lies the danger. Crown colony government, the form in use in the rest of the colony, is a complicated organisation divided into a number of great departments with tentacles reaching into every corner of the country, into the regions which are administered under the indirect system, as well as the others. Under such circumstances the machine is liable to become the main consideration and the human touch, which is so important for indirect rule, to be lost. Yet, it would be a calamity if this system were to be frozen out. Decentralisation is as much needed within the limits of such a colony as it used to be between the central government and Whitehall. The advantages of the indirect system will be apparent from what has already been said. The foundations on which their future is being built will certainly not be weaker for being genuinely African. Responsibility is fostered from the start. Instead of ending with self-government the system begins with it, with self-government, however, not from the top, from legislative councils and parliaments, but from the bottom, from the hamlet, the village, the town and the district. The population is relatively speaking homogeneous in small units of this kind, and government is a comparatively easy matter. At the same time, there is nothing to prevent the system expanding when the time comes into self-government on an extended scale. As far as the local European community is concerned, it need cause no complication. There are no permanent white settlers in Northern Africa, only traders, planters and other temporary residents, and it is perfectly possible to extend local self-government to them in limited areas without any risk of acute racial conflict. This has from time immemorial been the method employed by African rulers in their dealings with immigrant communities such as Arabs, and it offers a convenient means by which co-operation between the races can be fostered.

Nor need there be any fear of the white race suffering


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either in prestige or pocket by making use of African institutions. That, at all events, is M. Salkin's view.

Local protectorates are (he says) the political *chef d'œuvres* of European rule in Africa. . . . Excellent economic results have been obtained by respecting the institutions of the races of Africa, by the whites adapting themselves to the genius of the Africans.

It is here that peace reigns in Africa, here the power of Europe has preserved, and not destroyed. . . . It is curious that we should have maintained our prestige in the native protectorates, and lost it among the Europeanised blacks.*

* *L'Afrique Centrale dans Cent Ans*, by M. Salkin, p. 86.



THE ROMAN QUESTION AND THE LATERAN AGREEMENTS

(TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH)

WHAT is known in general terms as "the Roman Question" is not one but three questions: though they are related and indeed interdependent, they are quite distinct, and, if we are to begin to understand the new situation which has been created by the Lateran agreements, we must first be at pains to disentangle the three questions. They concern the temporal power of the Pope, the relations between Church and State in Italy, and the relations between the Holy See and the Catholic world.

As regards the temporal power, the Lateran agreements recognise *de jure* a position which has existed *de facto* for half a century. During that time, though theologians and diplomatists have seemed wedded to the unchanging shibboleths of their official faith, the discerning observer has not failed to perceive a slow evolution from within towards the end now attained.

Looked at from the point of view of the relations between Church and State in Italy, the Lateran agreements represent nothing less than a revolution in the official attitude of the Italian State towards religion. The boldness and determination with which that revolution has been accepted by the one side are worthy of the qualities which inspired its leaders on the other. But this revolution, though it has converted enemies of yesterday into friends of to-day, still leaves some

Greatness and Decline of Temporal Power

points obscure, some differences unsettled, and it rests with the future to determine whether the obscurities will be clarified and the differences composed.

Finally, the agreements open a new era in the history of Catholicism—an era pregnant with the unknown, rich in promise, yet not free from danger. For the moment we need say no more than this, that the unflinching courage with which His Holiness has embarked on this venture bears eloquent witness to his faith in Divine support and in the perennial vigour of the Church of Rome.

I. GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPES

The temporal possessions of the Popes, though currently described as the "patrimony of Peter," have, we need hardly say, no foundation in the Gospels. Nor can their origin be traced in the so-called "Donation of Constantine." Invented in all its particulars at the end of the eighth century, shown to be a forgery by Laurentius Valla in the middle of the fifteenth, that document is no longer claimed as authentic, even in ecclesiastical circles. The donations of Pepin le Bref and Charlemagne seem to have been mere verbal grants; and although the Frankish kings sought favour with the Popes by granting them a temporal authority which received general recognition, they attached to it no form of sovereignty in the true sense. Sovereignty came from a prolonged campaign of influence and usurpation sustained throughout the Middle Ages. This campaign was peculiarly favoured, both by the growing pre-eminence of the see of Rome over all other sees, and by the part which the Roman Pontiffs were in the ordinary course called upon to play as defenders of the people and protectors of the city during the confusion and anarchy of the barbarian invasions. Not until the beginning of modern times, however, do we see the Sovereign Pontiff exercising his

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authority by the same right as any other sovereign over "States" which were constituted like other States. At that time they included, in addition to the "patrimony of Peter" properly so-called (i.e. Rome and the territory extending from Viterbo to Terracina and from Narni to the sea), part of the Duchy of Spoleto, of the Marches and of the Romagna, as well as the dependencies of Benevento and Avignon.

What exactly are the relations between the two sovereignties, the spiritual and the temporal, united in the person of the Pope? They are involved and they are far from clear. We have pointed out that the Pope regards himself as the lawful ruler of his States by the same right as any other sovereign. But by the side of that claim we shall not fail to observe the appearance at an early stage in the doctrine of the Church of the notion that the chief warrant for the temporal power is as a foundation and an instrument of the spiritual. Something of the sacred character of the spiritual power is thus reflected, at least in theory, on the temporal, whereas in fact the process is reversed and it is the spiritual which acquires some of the profane features of the temporal power. It was in the Middle Ages, when its temporal possessions were neither extensive nor secure, that the spiritual ascendancy of the Holy See reached its zenith (notably at Canossa, in the humiliation of Henry IV). From the sixteenth century onwards, when the Popes entered, for good or evil, upon the paths of worldly ambition and strove to round off their domains by the same methods of force or fraud as other sovereigns, we find their spiritual prestige sinking into an uninterrupted decline, without the growth of their material power bringing them any appreciable compensation. The paganism and the contempt for morality of the Popes of the Renaissance disseminated an epidemic of irreligion. As the ruler of a State whose private interests absorbed most of his time and thought, the Pope seemed to lose that character of universality which is part of the essence of Catholicism. Once he was prepared to

The Church of the Syllabus

descend to their level, other rulers treated the Pope as they would have treated one of themselves, and the historian loses count of the insults and the violence of which the Pontiff was the victim, from the sack of Rome by the Duke of Bourbon and the affronts which Louis XIV thought fit to inflict on Alexander VII and Innocent XI down to the imprisonment of Pius VII by Napoleon I. The Government of the Papal States was in almost every age deplorable, and the attention devoted to social questions in the modern world threatened to place insuperable difficulties in the way of Papal policy. In such an age the Pope might well have welcomed the loss of his States as a blessing in disguise if the New Italy had not gone to the length of depriving the Holy See even of that minimum of territorial sovereignty which it had always, reasonably enough, considered indispensable to the very exercise of its spiritual authority, and if that deprivation had not been marked by features of robbery and brigandage, inspired not by temporal greed alone but by a spirit of revolt and hatred directed against the Roman Church and Christianity itself.

II. THE CHURCH OF THE SYLLABUS AND THE ITALY OF THE RISORGIMENTO

THERE was, indeed, a rooted incompatibility between the Church of the *Syllabus* and the Italy of the *Risorgimento*.

Like all other sovereign rulers, the Pope was bound to stand or fall by the doctrine of legitimate succession. He could not recognise in any form the revolutionary principle of nationalism, in the name of which the New Italy demanded liberty, unity, and Rome for her capital. Being a lawful sovereign in two spheres, the spiritual and the temporal, he necessarily regarded any violence directed against himself as not merely immoral but impious.

But it was not solely as a sovereign ruler and, as it were,

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in his own right that he was compelled to raise his voice in solemn protest against Italian claims. That duty followed from his position as teacher of the Faith and minister of the Gospel. The dispute which brought him to grips with the ruling House of Savoy was not, indeed, another of those disputes such as he had so often had with the princes of the old régime—painful, no doubt, but superficial and secondary for all that, because they did nothing to impair the essential harmony of principles and doctrines. Here principles were ranged against principles, doctrine against doctrine. The monarchy of Savoy brought liberalism in its train. There is a loose form of liberalism which is not always or altogether intolerable—the form which Father Tyrrell had in mind when he said in his dry way that “in English, the word liberal is not yet synonymous with blackguard.” The liberalism which confronted the Pope was very different, clear-cut, pernicious, indistinguishable from the capital heresy of modern times, which the *Syllabus* had just denounced and anathematised. At that time it was not merely the temporal interests of the Papacy, nor even the dignity and the rights of the Sovereign Pontiff, which seemed to be at stake, but the salvation of souls and the stern claims of truth itself.

The New Italy, once she had attained the aims to which she had aspired through the centuries, made repeated overtures to the Church. By the Law of Guarantees, the State offered the Pope such monetary compensation as the State thought fair, together with the usufruct of territory and of property and such legal and diplomatic exemptions, privileges and prerogatives as were deemed ample for the free exercise of his spiritual power. All such approaches, for the reasons of principle which we have just described, were in vain. The Pope regarded the Law of Guarantees as null and void, refused to enter into relations with the Italian authorities, excommunicated the royal family and all the artificers of the new order, and retired, a voluntary prisoner, to the stately solitude of the Vatican.

The Internal Evolution of the Situation

III. THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION

AN immanent justice ordained, as the unforeseen sequel of these events, that the Holy See should derive great benefits from the crisis which at first had seemed likely to threaten its existence. Time soon blunted men's memories of the weaknesses and the evils associated with the temporal rule of the Popes, but the recollection of the wrongs they had suffered was kept alive in the public consciousness by the constant renewal of their protest, and was indeed reinforced by a growing feeling of admiration and respect for the calm dignity of their attitude.

Bearing in the eyes of the world the whole responsibility for the *fait accompli* to which the Pope refused to conform, Italy felt compelled to restore to the Holy See a degree of moral freedom not less than the material freedom of which it had been deprived. No steps which might conduce to this end were neglected. As the ruler of the Church throughout the world, the Pope enjoyed complete independence, which was enhanced by the glamour of abnegation and sacrifice ; and so, in the happy phrase of M. Saint-Brice, the altar became a magnificent pedestal for him. There was nothing, even to the separation of Church and State decreed by the Government on the eve of the promulgation of the Law of Guarantees, which did not help to dispel from the eyes of the world all suspicion, all semblance of an agreement made between the two Powers to their mutual advantage and to the detriment of other Catholic peoples, and thus to set beyond dispute the absolute independence of the spiritual power.

However, when the Papacy turned from its position in the world to consider its position in Italy, it was far from finding grounds for the same satisfaction. In the first place, however patient, however pliant, however intelligently alive to its true interests the Italian Government

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might show itself, it needed no improbable flight of fancy to imagine circumstances in which the Sovereign Pontiff might be driven from Rome. That might come, to mention only one possibility, through more vigorous pressure from Freemasonry, with all its power in Italy and its sworn enmity to Christianity, at least in the form of Catholicism. The mere possibility of losing Rome, with all its dread reactions on the fate of Catholicism, was enough to inspire the Papacy with the desire for a reconciliation with Italy. Apart from this, the Pope could not regard the absolute separation of the two powers, in contradiction to all Catholic dogma, as other than an abnormal and provisional situation, to which he for his part was ready to put an end, once the offence had been effaced and reparation made by formal acts of repentance and pardon. Again, how could the Pope, as the Father of all the faithful, watch without a sense of bitter grief a whole nation—that very nation which had received the Faith as a sacred trust—being drawn by its temporal leaders towards unbelief and apostasy? No doubt, even in this regard, the practice of the Italian Government was better and less rigid than its principles. It did to a considerable extent spare and respect those Catholic sentiments which had so firm a hold on the hearts of the Italian people. But such opportunism, even if it endured, could not end the spiritual torment in the minds of devout believers, who were torn between loyalty to their religion and to their country. Finally, though his divine ministry set him above nationality, the Pope was not called upon, nor had he the right, to forget that by origin, by birth, in every fibre of his human personality he was an Italian; and for that reason he was bound to be won over in advance to any settlement, if there were one, which, while securing reparation for his violated rights and guarantees of his effective independence, would contribute to the welfare and greatness of Italy.

On the other side, the change in the attitude of the Italian Government followed a similar curve. The New Italy

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had thought that unity was achieved when she seized Rome for her capital ; but she now realised that that unity would never be organic and final so long as the *dissidio*, the divorce between the Quirinal and the Vatican, remained. By his declaration of *Non expedit*, inhibiting Catholics from taking any part in political elections, the Pope overthrew beyond recovery the balance of Italian political life, and created the monstrosity of a Parliament without a party of the Right. With the rise of Socialism, the dangers of abstention which had always been serious became so urgent that unofficial negotiations were opened with the Holy See and led to the relaxation, and in the end even to the withdrawal, of the order. Abroad, the Roman question was a thorn in the side of Italian diplomacy, and the Catholic Powers did not scruple to turn it to their own advantage. No gain accrued to the Italian State from the work of Italian priests in foreign missions. When Italy decided to join the Triple Alliance, Austria refused to guarantee her territory because it included Rome, and Bismarck sent an ironical suggestion to Mancini to come to terms with Leo XIII.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that the desire for an honourable settlement of the dispute should have been felt at an early stage and in both camps. The attempts at conciliation were numerous. They began between Cavour and Father Passaglia when the first Italian Parliament declared for Rome as the capital ; they went on in 1870, before and after September 20 ; they were resumed by Crispi, who seemed at one moment to have gained the ear of Leo XIII. They were renewed many times after that. But though the goodwill which both parties brought to these discussions was undeniable, they never led to an agreement, but always met the same obstacles without overcoming them.

On the side of the Italian Government the first of these obstacles was a certain fundamental anti-clericalism which bordered on anti-Catholicism. It was reinforced by the

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fear of being accused by other Catholic nations, in the event of a reconciliation with the Holy See, of wishing to "Italianise" the Vatican. There was a jealous and passionate feeling for national unity unimpaired which made Governments look with horror at the idea of ceding territory, however small; extreme sensitiveness in regard to the absolute independence and overriding sovereignty of the civil power. There was the weakness inherent in the Parliamentary system in every country where it has been brought in from outside and artificially cultivated; and finally, the Government could not forget its Liberal origins—it was afraid to face public opinion, it dreaded the all-powerful body of Freemasons.

The Holy See, on the other hand, distrusted a régime founded on principles antagonistic to its own by men who were its enemies. It was convinced that this régime, branded alike for its blunders and its sins, was doomed to early destruction. It was unwilling to abandon claims which the Catholic world had adopted as an article of faith, or to put an end to protests which at once aroused the sympathy and calmed the minds of devout Catholics. Finally, the men of influence in the Curia could not forget their political education in the days of the temporal power, and refused to believe that any other system could ensure to the Pope the free exercise of his spiritual mission.

Time did its work, however, and imperceptibly the problem grew ripe for solution. Several conclaves were held at Rome without incident. The Pope carried on his ministry, even during the world war, in a way which made it clear that he was no man's subject. There was manifest in his person a quite special sovereignty, untrammelled by territorial power. The idea made headway that the spiritual power could preserve its complete independence without being burdened by responsibility for any State, without having any temporal basis beyond what was needed for the outward and visible sign of sovereignty. Moreover, the personal relations established in frequent un-

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official discussions brought about a *de facto* rapprochement, and smoothed over some of the harsh opposition of principles. The representatives of the Curia changed as time went on, and the successors of the men who had survived from the days of temporal power were less reluctant to admit the idea of a new order. Italy herself, despite so many gloomy prophecies, lived on, was consolidated, and not only preserved her unity but strengthened it. And so the efforts to reach an agreement were made in a different atmosphere. The negotiations between Benedict XV and the Orlando Ministry came very near to success. But the violent upheaval which shook Italy after the war through its revelation of the dangerous strength of Communism, the disintegration of the old parties, and the bankruptcy of the Parliamentary system seemed likely to throw the whole question back into the melting pot. At that moment Mussolini came upon the scene and Pius XI succeeded to the throne of Peter.

IV. MUSSOLINI AND PIUS XI

AT first sight the Fascist Revolution seemed more likely to retard than to hasten the coming of religious peace. It could ask for no sacrifice of national sentiment, for it lived by stimulating that sentiment. Since its aim was to extend and consolidate the power of the State, it could not give up even a fractional part of that power. In opposition to Catholic dogma, it preached the right of force and the virtues of violence ; and, indeed, in its seizure of all the vital organs of the nation, it spared neither the activities nor the representatives of the Church. Finally, it professed in the sphere of international politics a bellicose Imperialism poles asunder from the conciliatory and pacifist ideals of the Holy See. Thus, from its inception, the new régime seemed likely to multiply causes of friction and exacerbate relations between the two Romes. Yet it is to

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that régime that within a few years the credit is due of solving, and, in Mussolini's own expression, "extinguishing" the Roman question. How did such an astounding change of front become possible, how did it then come about? That we can only learn from a glance at the psychology of Mussolini and Pius XI.

If we examine the forceful and intricate personality of Mussolini with no wish to disparage or to defend, we cannot fail to perceive its dominant characteristics—burning patriotism, Italy as a religion even to the point of fanaticism; understanding and love of the masses of the people and the gift of handling them; an indomitable will subdued to the service of ends undeniably great; an unflinching realism, which is far from excluding a certain type of idealism, but is the deadly enemy of those two scourges of the modern world, words and Utopias.

The son of a humble blacksmith and of a little village schoolmistress, Mussolini began life as a Socialist. His was not the "breadwinning" Socialism which is so often taken up by ambitious young people of proletarian origin as the quickest and most certain road to success; it was much more the "apostolic" form of Socialism to which men pledge their faith and for which they are ready to dare and to suffer. Although perfectly capable of thinking out Socialism, and even of recasting it in a new mould to fit a changed world, Mussolini never was and never wished to be one of those doctrinaires who from the safety of their studies send other poor devils out into the streets to have their heads broken. He was a militant in the full sense of the word, he risked his own skin, he was no stranger to misery and privation, he was thirteen times incarcerated in "bourgeois" prisons. Born of the people, he has remained one of the people, but in spite of his remarkable gifts of oratory, his very understanding and love of the people have kept him from becoming, or at any rate from remaining, a demagogue. And when experience and reflection alike had brought home to him the fundamental error and the colossal

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humbug embodied in the Socialist gospel, it was from the pity which as a man he felt for the masses so shamefully misled and exploited that he drew much of the energy to set out in search of a new gospel and the courage to make himself its mouthpiece.

Even in his Socialist days, Mussolini had never been an adherent of historic materialism, and he was much closer to Proudhon and Georges Sorel than to Karl Marx. In other words, he ran counter to the movement of modern Socialism, and, while it became more and more dominated by "bread and butter" questions, he professed an idealistic Socialism with a tinge of Stoic morality. Nor had he ever accepted the position that the Socialist International involved the denial of one's own country. An instinctive patriot all his life, he became very consciously Italian in the dreary loneliness of exile. But for the war, he would no doubt ultimately have reached some vague and ineffective formula of National Socialism. For him as for many other men, the war was to be the great teacher and revealer. It brought his Socialist faith and his patriotism to grips in his conscience and forced him to choose between them. His choice was soon made: he decided for his country, not, indeed, abandoning Socialism but putting it second, so that his doctrine definitely assumed the aspect, not of a National Socialism but of a Socialist (or Socialising) Nationalism.

From that moment the national or nationalist element assumed a steadily growing importance in Fascism, and, what is perhaps still more striking, Fascism developed rapidly towards a theory at the opposite pole to that which it first held.

Italian patriotism had been intoxicated by the war and by victory. It was under the constant stimulus of the great memories of ancient Rome. It suffered through feeling that Italy had not had her fair share of the spoils divided amongst the victors. Under these influences it withdrew within itself and, like the boiling masses in a volcano, generated an alarming pressure. This was the burning

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lava, always on the point of eruption, which Mussolini has mastered and directed into new channels without allowing it to cool. He has poured it into the rigid mould of a system of ideas, with one face of the system turned towards Italy, the other to the rest of the world. Italy of the Risorgimento was the child of the principles of 1789, of Liberalism and Democracy. The Italy of Mussolini rejects democracy as the lie of lies, restores a conception of the State based on authority, for freedom substitutes discipline, for equality hierarchy, and for fraternity the struggle for existence between nations. But Mussolini has not halted even after overthrowing all political values as they have seldom been overthrown in history. Autocratic and a rigid centraliser, he is evolving a doctrine which claims the whole of man's personality and devotion. By reviving the loyalties of the City-State in the ancient world, and by adding, where necessary, a modern touch—borrowed here from the romantic mysticism of the Nation as Goddess, there from the Hegelian metaphysic of the State as God, or again from Gobineau's theory of the noble race and the chosen people (applied, of course, to Rome instead of to Germany)—he has made his country the object not simply of a cult or a religion—which in a sense Catholic theology permits and even enjoins—but of religion itself.

This brief sketch of the system of ideas represented by Mussolini should help us to see how he would regard the problem of the relations between Fascism and the Church. As the author of a revolution imposed by force, but none the less dependent for its survival on the willing support of public opinion, he might look for invaluable help in the goodwill and collaboration of the Holy See, if he could win the Papacy to his cause. As a friend of the people, who had watched the havoc wrought in the popular mind by the atheism of the laity, he could not, whatever his personal attitude towards the Church might be, be unmindful of the treasures of moral and spiritual life which a religious education can offer to the masses. As a patriot,

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he was bound to desire the end of a divorce which had inflicted grievous harm on Italy. Both by theory and practice an autocrat in the political sphere, he must necessarily be in sympathy with a power based on authority in the realm of religion. He had made an end of the weaknesses and hesitations of the Parliamentary system by reducing it to an empty show ; he had had the courage to dissolve the Masonic orders and no longer need fear them ; nothing remained to deter him from working, once the time seemed ripe, for a reconciliation with the Church. As to any differences or inconsistencies between the worship of the State and that of Jesus Christ, between the religion of Italy and the religion of the God of Love and Justice, he felt no doubt that they would disappear in face of the harsh necessities of practical life and the accommodating power of politics. He may even, with a touch of Machiavellism, have seen in these differences and inconsistencies a safeguard for the Italian people against the danger of too complete a subjection of Italy to the Holy See, and a guarantee for the Catholic world against its fears of too complete a subjection of the Holy See to Italy.

Mussolini had the good fortune to find an associate as resolute, as daring, as much in love with achievement as himself. Unlike most of his predecessors, Achille Ratti, who had become Pope under the name of Pius XI, had not attained that eminence after a long career spent in ecclesiastical activities and offices. He was an intellectual, a scholar, a librarian ; he was too familiar with the mind of the historian to feel enslaved by tradition, or indeed to see in tradition anything but a series of innovations each of which in its day had seemed revolutionary. The brief interlude as a diplomat (he was Papal Nuncio in Warsaw) which had preceded his elevation to the throne of Peter had extended his horizon over the outer world, but had given him neither the patience nor the habit of temporising which had come to be regarded as synonymous with the policy of the Papacy. With an ardent spirit and an un-

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shakable character he combined a lofty sense both of his absolute power and of his unusual responsibilities so soon after an upheaval which had left the raw material of humanity in a plastic state, ready to take the impress of the modeller for a new epoch in history. So he entered into ententes and concordats wherever he could, with a haste which the irreverent attributed to a mania for making bargains. His wish to treat with Italy was fortified by the fact that Italy now had a strong Government with a free hand to venture where no previous Government had dared to tread, either towards peace or towards war. That Mussolini should declare his intention of negotiating in order to put an end by agreement to an intolerable situation which had arisen through the past violence of the State was in itself a mark of substantial progress. Not less important was the knowledge that if an agreement was reached Mussolini was in a position to enforce its execution. All this in itself was not enough, and the Pope had still to decide what concessions he could make and what he could demand in exchange for them. Here the daring of Pius XI, not far removed perhaps from rashness, came into play. He had no hesitation in abandoning the claim to temporal power which his predecessors had so stoutly upheld. In the light of recent events, from his experience above all of the ineffectiveness of Belgian neutrality, he did not even insist on the international guarantee which Pius IX, and after him Leo XIII, had considered indispensable. He saw too clearly that its value was illusory. He adopted the words of Benedict XV when he declared, through the mouth of Cardinal Gasparri, that he looked for a fair settlement with the Papacy only to "the triumph of a broadening sense of justice in the hearts of the Italian people." There was reason to think that Mussolini had resolved to work for that triumph and to make it more complete than anything for which the Holy See had dared to hope. In place of those derisive phantoms, temporal power and the international guarantee, he offered the Pope realities of sub-

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stance—a restricted but effective sovereignty, a considerable monetary indemnity, and above all, a Concordat which would bring the Italian people once more under the sway of the pontifical crosier, from which false shepherds had sought for so long to lead it astray. It was true that the horizon held one large black cloud—the claim of Fascism to the exclusive control of education, and behind that claim, as its inspiration, the half mystical worship of the State and the Nation. With true Italian adroitness, throughout the discussions the Fascist negotiators and Mussolini himself sought to make light of this difficulty and to represent Fascism as a purely political doctrine with no particular metaphysical or theological affinities. And thus, it would seem, the final doubts of the Pontiff were overcome and so effectually indeed that when on February 11 the Lateran agreements were signed, the act found the Sovereign Pontiff moved not by a spirit of resignation, but by a joyful enthusiasm which found expression in his description of Mussolini as “the man of Providence.” As for the Fascists, they appeared to be ruled by the conviction that the understanding between the two powers had been built for the future on unshakable foundations.

And yet before many weeks had passed serious disagreements came to light, and a polemic in the press soon led to a warfare of resounding oratory between the Dictator and the Pope.

V. THE QUARREL BETWEEN FASCISM AND CATHOLICISM

THE Lateran agreements are in three parts : a political Treaty, a financial Agreement, and a Concordat.

The political Treaty sets up a small sovereign State, the Vatican City. This city covers little more than 100 acres, and has only 400 subjects, but it has its own jurisdiction and is to be endowed with all the material means to free communication with the outer world. Besides this, the

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Papacy obtains a kind of moral mortgage over the capital of Italy. It is provided that the civil power shall respect, and enforce respect for, the sacred character of Rome. The Holy See for its part recognises the kingdom of Italy under the dynasty of Savoy with Rome as its capital.

The financial Agreement provides a considerable capital sum (1,750,000,000 lire) for the Holy See, which is thus for the first time put in a position to frame a regular budget.

The Concordat makes Catholicism the official religion of Italy, and at the same time frees the Italian Church from the guardianship of the Italian State and places it under the sole authority of the Holy See. The existence of the monastic orders and the rights to ecclesiastical property are recognised. The Church is not only set free within the nation, but becomes an organ of the State in so far as concerns the religious ceremony of marriage, which is to have civil validity, and the teaching of religion, which will be compulsory both in elementary and in secondary schools except by the express wish of the parents.

In accordance with the honoured traditions of diplomacy, the Lateran agreements, in spite of their apparent lucidity, contain much that is ambiguous and much, too, that is perhaps intentionally misleading.

The first dispute arose over the connection of the political Treaty and the Concordat immediately the documents had been signed. During the negotiations the Pope had insisted strongly on the close connection between these two instruments, and on the dependence of the Treaty on the Concordat. He ascribed such importance to the Concordat, he declared, that he regarded it as in itself sufficient to justify the Treaty. It is easy to understand the reasons for the Pope's attitude. When he renounced his temporal sovereignty over Rome, the Pope aspired to extend his spiritual dominion to the frontiers of Italy. By virtue of the stiffening of his authority over Italian Catholics, the Italians, while still bound by their allegiance

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to their King, would become God's people and would inherit the part which the French had thrown over. At that point the other Catholic nations might be expected to grant the Vicar of Christ the same privileges, and if they did not he might without qualms of conscience reserve all the favours of the Church for the most faithful of her daughters and the most devout of worldly rulers. This was the line of thought which M. Maurice Pernot, a writer particularly well versed in Roman matters, had in mind when he stated recently that what the Pope had obtained, he had obtained as the head of the Italian Church, whereas what he had conceded he had conceded as the head of the Church Universal.

However, the reasoning which influenced the Pope had no validity for Mussolini. In the first place, he was primarily interested in politics, and the political value of the Treaty was far beyond that of the Concordat. Apart from this, whatever might be his own strength, he could not disregard the fact that Fascism was by its origin a movement of the Left and that the anti-Catholic or anti-clerical elements in it, which were still numerous and powerful, were certain to be profoundly hostile to any extension of the influence of the Vatican or of clericalism over Italy. On these grounds he showed from the beginning a very distinct tendency to the view that of the two diplomatic instruments, the first (the Treaty) was the only one that mattered, the only one that must remain inviolate. On this point, however, Pius XI would admit no compromise whatever. In the end he had his way and obtained a solemn recognition, in the protocol of the exchange of ratifications on June 7, that the Treaty and the Concordat were inseparable, and must stand or fall together.

On several other points, however, discussion and controversy have merely revealed or even aggravated the divergence of views.

For instance, a clause of the Concordat provided that the religious ceremony of marriage should also bind the

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parties in the eyes of the law. The Pope had understood this clause to mean that anyone who had been baptised in the Catholic faith would be required by the State to adopt the religious form of marriage. He was gravely disillusioned when Mussolini made it clear, in the ratifying instrument, that any subject of the State is at liberty, according to the dictates of his conscience, to adopt either the religious or the civil form of marriage, and when Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis were recognised as marriage officers in their churches and their synagogues by the same warrant as the priests.

If we take a more general point, the Pope had read in the most literal sense the recognition in the Concordat of Catholicism as the State religion in Italy. In other words he had interpreted the clause in the Catholic sense, as excluding freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, and the right of propaganda. Yet, by a separate law, promulgated immediately after the Concordat, religions other than the Catholic religion were actively encouraged (rather than, as before, merely tolerated) on the one condition that they caused no breach of the peace. By the same law the children of non-Catholic parents were exempted from attendance during religious teaching in State schools, and the most complete liberty of conscience and freedom of public discussion were authorised. The Pope at once protested in an open letter to Cardinal Gasparri. Mussolini stood his ground, and declared in Parliament that "while the Concordat gave to the Catholic Church freedom to exercise its spiritual power and even placed that Church in a position of special prestige by making the Catholic religion the official religion of the State," none the less there had not been and could not be any interference with "the full freedom of worship extended by the State to other recognised religions, or with the equality of all citizens in the eyes of the law, whatever religion they may profess."

The cleavage between Fascism and the Church on the

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subject of education seems even more serious. In conformity with Catholic doctrine, the Pope maintains that the education of the young is mainly or even exclusively the business of the Church. He seems to have inferred from the recognition of Catholicism as the State religion of Italy that the whole apparatus of education would pass in the ordinary course under the control or under the management of the religious authorities. Mussolini quite brutally corrected this impression. He claimed, indeed, that the State must have unrestricted powers over all teaching, even over religious teaching, on the alleged ground that no other authority than the State was in a position to fit religion into its proper place in the educational system.

This might at a first glance seem to be a mere dispute as to functions or personalities without special significance for the substance of public instruction. In fact, it goes far deeper and affects the whole theory of education. Mussolini has no objection to Catholic education in so far as Catholicism forms an integral part of Italian civilisation and traditions. He accepts it to the extent that Catholicism teaches the citizen discipline and self-sacrifice. He will not hear of it at any price where it teaches the doctrines of pacifism, where it threatens to sap the nation's courage or relax its warlike ardour. The Duce has expressed his views on this subject with unmistakable precision. In his speech in the Senate on May 25 last he used these words :

If the modern world were not the world of ravening wolves which we all know it to be, we might abandon that form of education, which with our hatred of hypocrisy we will call by its proper name, education for war. We need not be alarmed by the term. The training of men to be fighters is a necessity for Italy, for the reason that for centuries the warlike qualities of the Italian people have found no scope. The war of 1915-1918 was the first since the wars of the Roman Empire in which the Italians as a nation fought their way to victory. With interests of our own to defend, with our national existence in daily peril, we must reject the lure of universalism.

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It is a creed which I can understand in nations that have accomplished their destiny, but I can find no room for it in a nation whose fate lies in the future.

We can all see that this is the morality of Zarathustra as opposed to that of Jesus Christ ; or, to be more accurate, it represents a duality of conscience analogous to that which we saw not long ago in Germany as a result of the development side by side of the Lutheran religion and Germanic nationalism—Christianity for the citizen in his private life, *Faustrecht* (might is right), Imperialism, in his public existence. We know where this system led Germany ; and the Pope has good reason to take alarm at the dangers of the same doctrine to Italy and the threat implied in that doctrine to the peace of the world.

The last of these disputes between Fascism and Catholicism goes even deeper, for it affects the whole conception of the nature of the Church and of that of the State. No one will have forgotten the scandal caused amongst Catholics throughout the world by Mussolini's ironical and arrogant observations in his speech in the Italian Chamber on May 13 on the decisive part played by Rome in shaping the destinies of Christianity.

This religion (he said) was born in Palestine but became Catholic in Rome. If it had been confined to Palestine it would in all probability never have been more than one of the numerous sects which flourished in that overheated environment, like that of the Essenes or the Therapeutæ. The chances are that it would have perished and left no trace of its existence.

Such was the feeling aroused by these words on the lips of a Prime Minister who claimed to be a Catholic that in addressing the Senate a few days later Mussolini attempted to explain them away and to reduce them to terms of orthodox religion by drawing a distinction (on the authority of Monsignor Duchesne) between the historical and the dogmatic points of view.

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But the defence was not thought to be very effective, and the Pope's views at least are clear from his letter of May 30 to Cardinal Gasparri.

We had opened our hearts (His Holiness wrote) to the highest hopes during these negotiations, which were protracted and often difficult, and least of all did we expect to have to listen to the language of heresy, or worse than heresy, applied to the very essence of Christianity and Catholicism. An attempt has been made to explain away these expressions, but in our view without much success. Distinctions such as seem to be suggested between statements of historical facts and statements of doctrine are nothing but modernism in its worst and most reprehensible form.

We are confronted here to all appearance with a rooted antagonism of ideas as to the nature of the Church. It would seem that the Pope has not yet clearly appreciated the existence of an equally irreconcilable antagonism as to the nature of the State. The Catholic doctrine regarding the State represents it as an organism made by men for men. Its duty is to pursue the welfare of the community in the temporal sphere and in all else to submit to the moral and spiritual guidance of the Church. Fascism regards the State as an emanation from God, with its own morality, its own spiritual force, and if it is to find room for the morality and the spiritual force of the Church it can only be by annexing and subordinating them to itself. "The Fascist State," so Mussolini proclaims with his usual clearness, "claims the full recognition of an ethical character of its own. It is Catholic, but it is Fascist, and in essence, and to the exclusion of all else, it is Fascist. Catholicism is its coping stone. We are not ashamed to say it, to lay all the cards on the table."

Perhaps the new and radical elements in the conflict of authority between Fascism and Catholicism will now be plain. When Philippe le Bel, Louis XIV, or Napoleon himself engaged in a struggle with the Holy See, the conflict was always between a representative of the temporal

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and a representative of the spiritual power. Between Mussolini and Pius XI the conflict is between the representatives of two spiritual powers, one of them backed by an impressive force in the temporal sphere, the other without a shred of temporal authority. It is true that the spiritual power of the Pope extends far beyond Italy, to the very confines of the civilised world. But if the "war of religion" latent in the disputes between these two powers, Priesthood and Empire, were some day to break out, he would be a rash man who would venture to predict its end.

We may leave these considerations to note that barely three months after the conclusion of agreements greeted by the Vatican with a perfect outburst of joy, the Pope himself was driven more than once to speak of them in terms of the bitterest disillusionment.

"If it were necessary in order to save or to protect from worse evils a human soul," so he wrote to Cardinal Gasparri, "we should not shrink from driving a bargain with the Devil himself." A far cry, we may well say, from "the man of Providence." A few days later, in another letter to the Cardinal, the Pope alluded to the possibility of the Treaty and the Concordat falling together, and bringing down with them the Vatican City and the State built round it, and he applied to himself in the spirit of the Stoics that phrase of Horace, *impavidum ferient ruinæ*. Yet he felt it possible to end on a re-avowal of his trust in the loyalty and goodwill of men and his faith in Divine support. This unshakable optimism is not without a note of the conventional on the Papal lips. Certainly it can have found little nourishment in the subsequent course of events; and the increasing number of suspensions and sequestrations of Catholic newspapers, or the tone of Fascist polemics, daily more acrimonious, are scarcely favourable omens for the cordiality and permanence of peaceful relations between Fascism and Catholicism.

Lateran Agreements and the Catholic World

VI. THE LATERAN AGREEMENTS AND THE CATHOLIC WORLD

OUR reply to expressions of anxiety on the part of other Catholic nations as to the danger of an exaggerated Italianisation of the Vatican is implicit in what we have already said.

So long as there is a conflict of *principles* between Fascism and the Holy See, there is little cause to fear this danger, more particularly so long as the Papacy continues in other ways by all the resources at its command to emphasise its universal and international or supra-national character.

It is true that it would not be difficult to imagine a situation in which this conflict might end—if Fascism were to disappear, for instance, or if, without disappearing, it modified its mystical absolutism and its claims to the whole loyalty of its adherents, and if this happened after the Catholic system of education had had time to bear fruit amongst the younger generation of Italians. Then, no doubt, too close a union between Italy and the Vatican might come about. The Holy See, as a tiny enclave in the heart of a great country, might easily take on the appearance of an Italian protectorate, while the Italian nationality of the representatives both of the Quirinal and the Vatican in foreign capitals might tend, even against their will, towards an identity of views and interests of which the other Catholic nations would be justified in complaining.

If this situation ever arose, it would be the duty of Catholicism at large to suggest and, if necessary, to impose whatever correctives seemed proper. It would not be difficult to find them, one would think, either in an increase of the number of non-Italian members of the Sacred College, on the lines of the suggestion already put forward by Monsignor Strossmayer immediately after the Vatican

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Council, or by raising prelates of non-Italian origin to the throne of St. Peter.

Reforms in this spirit are bound to come sooner or later. The indications are that Rome will exert all her genius for temporising in order to postpone them as long as possible, but she will certainly not hold out indefinitely against firm and persistent pressure by the whole body of Catholics, still less against the threat of a schism which would split Catholicism into a number of national Churches and would confine the Empire of the Holy See within the frontiers of Italy.

PROGRESS OF PROHIBITION

I.

BADLY as Governor Smith may have been beaten when he ran for the Presidency last fall, and far from the public eye as he may now be, he made in that campaign at least one notable contribution to American social life: since then, a full and frank discussion of the prohibition problem has been both possible and respectable. It can hardly be said, however, that the people of the United States have embraced the opportunity. The "Drys" still talk earnestly, but mainly to each other: the "Wets" talk heatedly, but mainly to each other. The Governor gave everyone an opening for an exchange of opinions, but he was unable to invent a satisfactory language for them to use. Nor has there been any appreciable change in the social situation: the "Dry" districts remain about as dry as formerly, both in word and deed, while the "Wet" districts are certainly no less wet. If there be a change during the past four or five months, it is more in the temper of the partisans than in the bare facts of the case. As the lily-white lady of prohibition rolls along in her Juggernaut, the obeisances are deeper and the curses are louder—and the number of human sacrifices is greater. But where the lily-white lady will end up, none can tell.

It will be remembered that Mr. Hoover, during the campaign, offered no solution for this national problem. But he did promise that he would appoint a commission to

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investigate the subject of law enforcement in the United States, and that this commission would consider the relation of prohibition to the violation of law. For an overwhelming majority of people this was a satisfactory promise, and Mr. Hoover was elected. It was probably a minor tactical mistake to wait so long after his inauguration before announcing the names of his commissioners. And it may have been a departure from wisdom and the best administrative practice for him to appear in April in New York before the Associated Press, some weeks before the investigators had been appointed, and assert that only eight per cent. of the crime in the United States was traceable to prohibition. But if these were errors, they were cured when the personnel of the commission was finally announced. Its chairman is Mr. George W. Wickersham, Attorney-General under President Taft. He is to be supported by ten men—all distinguished lawyers—and one woman, the President of Radcliffe College. It will be both surprising and disappointing if this body confines itself to a mere finding of facts or to perfunctory suggestions or to a little of both. Something imaginative and constructive is desired on all hands. The Drys hope for certain ingenious suggestions looking to the successful enforcement of the law as it stands at present, while the Wets insist that the commissioners must find out whether the law is really enforceable, and upon concluding that it is not, make recommendations for its modification.

The President himself has not made it plain precisely what he expects the commission to do: though he has talked about narcotics, smuggling, the jury system, and police and court procedure. There undoubtedly is a need for an expert and searching study of these topics; but they are being examined. There are, for instance, various bodies such as the Chicago Crime Commission, the Baltimore Criminal Justice Commission, the Crime Commission of Los Angeles, the Kansas City Law Enforcement Association, the Cleveland Association for Criminal Justice,

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the Missouri Association for Criminal Justice, the San Francisco Section on the Administration of Criminal Justice, the American Crime Study Commission, the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, the Society for the Prevention of Crime, the Baumes Commission, the New Jersey Crime Commission, and numerous committees of the Bar Associations. Obviously there is not much point in re-threshing straw which has already been flailed many times, and the country expects the President's assessors to go straight to the question of prohibition enforcement.

Among all the uncertainties of the terms of reference, two things are clear. The survey is expected to take two years, and it is expected to cost \$400,000. On this basis, the report ought to be epoch-making. And perhaps it is necessary to consume that much time and money to impress the American people with the importance of the undertaking and to evoke a popular sanction for the commission's eventual findings. Meanwhile, till 1931, practically everybody can do practically nothing—except hope for the best.

II.

THAT is to say, very little can be done nationally and conclusively. But pertinent things do happen, nevertheless, while the citizens are awaiting a solution which the chosen minds are expected to evolve. Thus, on April 18, 1929, the following items appeared in the *New York World* as news:

1. The output of sugar alcohol is large and is increasing. . . . The number of stills in thickly populated centres is growing and corn sugar is ideal for alcohol manufacture. (*Seymour Lowman, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.*)

2. La Marr H. Smith, former customs border patrol inspector, was convicted to-day of accepting bribes from rum-runners and sentenced to two years in jail. . . . He was the ninth of twenty indicted

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inspectors either to plead guilty or be convicted on similar charges. (*Associated Press despatch from Detroit.*)

3. The Jones Act, instead of helping to enforce prohibition, will tend to clog the wheels of justice, in the opinion of United States District Judge W. H. S. Thomson. "Prior to the passage of the Jones law 95 per cent. of the defendants would plead guilty and pay their fines. Now they hesitate to send any one to jail for a long imprisonment if he is not a hardened criminal." (*Despatch from Atlantic City.*)

4. The Wisconsin Assembly, with little debate, to-day voted 56 to 33 to repeal the State Dry Act and wipe out the State Prohibition Commission. (*Despatch from Madison.*)

5. The Illinois House Committee on Judiciary to-day approved by a vote of 18 to 15 the Green resolution directing Attorney-General Carlstrom to open a court battle to establish State's rights in the regulation of medicinal liquors, sacramental wines, industrial alcohol and non-intoxicating beverages. (*Despatch from Springfield.*)

Such a flood of contraband liquor flows into the United States over the Canadian border, that the press, in the month of May, began to call attention to it. In an effort to stamp out this particular abuse the Government, on June 6, undertook to deal with the lands and waters around Detroit. Airplanes, fast motor boats and a vast force was concentrated in and around the city comprising the coast guard, together with customs men and prohibition agents of the Treasury Department. Yet the result of this concentration has not been entirely successful. Very little diminution of the flow of liquor has been observed in spite of the fact that during the first ten days of guerilla warfare three citizens were killed by prohibition agents. One of these was a decent citizen of International Falls, Minnesota, who was driving his wife and two children home at night in a motor car. Apparently, he did not stop the car promptly enough when commanded, so twenty-six buckshot were fired from sawed-off guns into the back of his car. They killed him. There was no evidence that there was any liquor in the car, nor that the man had ever been a bootlegger. Two bootleggers were shot in the back elsewhere. One, named Gordon, was killed at Plattsburg, N.Y., on

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June 13, and his body was left at a hospital by two prohibition agents who refused to give their names.

When the news of these killings reached Washington, there were no more cheers from those Congressmen who had applauded similar announcements previously, and the Administration seems to view with some alarm the shooting of citizens by its enforcement agents. That semi-political body, the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, indeed, felt it appropriate (perhaps even advisable) to issue an official denial that they rejoiced in the death of the people who had been killed. Even tender of the lives of bootleggers they seem to be; and in a frame of mind not unlike that of British government officials toward the militant suffragettes who went on hunger strike. Under the law, and reasoning therefrom, if anyone wished to starve in jail, no one could be held responsible for the consequences except the prisoner. Yet extraordinary efforts were made to continue life in these hunger strikers, for fear that their death might have serious repercussions. "Taking one consideration with another, the policeman's lot is not a happy one."

That's a silly and smart comment. At least the people of International Falls, Minnesota, would have good reason to think so. For when one of their townsmen was killed—the one mentioned above—they addressed a petition to the President himself. They recited the ways in which prohibition agents had usurped the civil authority, and they enumerated a long series of indignities:

The unprecedented abuses have included the promiscuous and uncalled-for use of riot guns, commonly called sawed-off shotguns, the risking of innocent lives by the unwarranted discharge of pistols, the usurpation of our police authority in matters wholly unrelated to prohibition enforcement, the bullyragging of pedestrians and motorists on our streets, and even threats to murder or do bodily injury to various of our policemen, including our police chief.

They had "many times" appealed to the "superior of

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these heartless ruffians." When their pleas had been ignored, they had vainly sought redress from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Now, "in our helplessness, terror and distraction, we are at last resorting to you, President Hoover, and to the authority you are capable of invoking . . . For God's sake, help us."

Yet the cry from the Minnesota border town is not so impressive in some quarters as the concerted action taken by legislatures and other bodies in several of the States. By a majority of 284,697, the citizens of Massachusetts have expressed a desire that the Eighteenth Amendment be repealed. Montana has refused to reinstate a local enforcement law; Maryland has refused to pass one. The Lower House in Illinois has repealed theirs. So far as liquor cases are concerned, Michigan has repealed the penalty of life imprisonment for four convictions of crime. Wisconsin has done away with its enforcement law, and is now trying to put the State into the liquor business, on the rather astonishing theory that the Eighteenth Amendment cannot affect the sovereign States, as legal entities, but only the individual citizens. Tennessee, recognizing the facts as they are, has coolly put a tax on the malt used in making beer: while in New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Washington, eminent lawyers have organised to defend without fee worthy persons accused of liquor offenses which are penalized by the new and drastic Jones Act.

In all this maelstrom, the President has, on the whole, the confidence of both sides. The appointment of his Law Enforcement Commission gave general satisfaction, and other appointments which he had made have rather disarmed those who voted against him on Election Day. His Attorney-General, Mr. Mitchell, and his Solicitor-General, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, Junior, may turn out to be the two best officials of the Department of Justice during this generation. The President, furthermore, has undertaken to transfer the enforcement of prohibition law from the Treasury Department, where it has been for historical

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reasons, to the Department of Justice, where it properly belongs. It is proper that the one should collect the revenues of the country, and that the other should put law-breakers in jail; and the idea of raising revenue by having law-breakers plead guilty upon the complaint of the Treasury Department and pay their fines into its strong boxes, has never been a satisfactory one to logical minds. Not only has the President made excellent appointments within the Department of Justice, and given to it its proper functions, but he has dispensed with the services of certain members of the bureaucracy which he inherited from President Harding and President Coolidge. In this dispensation went Mrs. Willebrandt, the Assistant Attorney-General. During the Presidential campaign she rode the whirlwind of moral indignation, and led church groups into a political contest as church groups, in a way that was calculated to exploit religious antagonisms. Besides her, a host of inefficient office holders have been swept out, on such a grand scale that it may be inferred that Mr. Hoover promised the members of his Cabinet a free hand in dispensing with such incompetent bureaucrats as they inherited from the administration of President Coolidge.

And yet, though all these steps are greatly to be praised, they do not strike at the root of the matter. Even the President, perhaps, will have to bide his time until his commission reports in 1931.

III.

AS a topic of conversation and as a subject of interest, the prohibition question still eclipses all other political themes. Yet, as we have said before, the Wets talk to the Wets and the Drys talk to the Drys, but they rarely talk to each other. But it is more than mere partisanship that keeps them at arm's length. They differ profoundly in their views of God, of law and of life. So they don't talk about the same things, because they can't.

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It was Leslie Stephen who wrote of John Wesley (and thereby of all his spiritual descendants): "For the immediate purpose of stirring the stagnating currents of religious emotion, no man could have been more admirably endowed. . . . His aim is to stamp out vice; to suppress drinking and debauchery, and to show men the plain path to heaven, and force them into it by intelligible threats and promises." And Lecky adds, in his own *English History*, "There was something extremely repulsive in his tears and groans and amorous ejaculations, in the coarse anthropomorphic familiarity and the unwavering dogmatism with which he dealt with the most sacred subjects, in the narrowness of his theory of life and his utter insensibility to many of the influences that expand and embellish it, in the mingled credulity and self-confidence with which he imagined that the whole course of nature was altered for his convenience." Yet Lecky confirms Leslie Stephen's recognition of Wesley's power; and it would be a foolish fellow indeed who minimised the power of the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals in the United States. The Wets, however, (and there are a considerable number of ecclesiastics among them) hold other views of the will of God for mankind—how it is to be ascertained, and how it is to be done.

The factions differ, too, in their conception of the nature of law. Dean Pound, of Harvard Law School, is a member of the President's commission. He has in mind the differences, for some years ago he wrote:

Where the analytical jurist thinks of an authoritative precept as established and enforced by some agency of politically organised society, the historical jurist thinks of a customary precept, with an origin wholly independent of politically organised society, recognised and given effect in a course of judicial action. The former sees chiefly the force and constraint behind legal rules. He conceives that the sanction of law is enforcement by the judicial and administrative organs of the State and that nothing which lacks that direct and immediate backing of organised force is law. The historical jurist, on the other hand, sees chiefly the social pressure behind legal rules.

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He finds sanction in habits of obedience, displeasure of one's fellow-men, public sentiment or opinion, or the social standard of justice.

And a group of lawyers, one of the Committees of Lawyers organised to rally sentiment against the continuance of present conditions, has pointed the theory of the "historical jurist" toward this moment in American life:

We submit that society is an organism and not the creature of man's brain; that its nature is not changed when men assume a conscious, but limited control over it; that the control of men must be in aid of the fundamental laws governing the nature of society and not in superseding them.

We do not assume to appraise the social value of total abstinence, nor to impugn the motives of those who are responsible for the Eighteenth Amendment and its enforcement Act, nor to question the legal power to proceed to these measures; but we submit that to exercise this power irrespective of the consequences is to reveal an ignorance of the nature of government and an indifference to the limits of sovereignty which must give us pause.

For a statute which cannot be enforced is subversive of all government—whether it be a levy for ship money, or a tax on tea, or a fugitive slave Act; and a Government which spends its strength in *ultra vires* functions suffers the same consequences as a man stretched on the bed of Procrustes. For nine years this land has been bedevilled with tumult and shouting; the Government has incurred the ill-will of good men and true; crime and corruption have been financed on a scale unparalleled in history. Decent men have stood by aghast at this spectacle but reluctant to subject themselves to the vilification apparently attendant on any attempt to restore law enforcement to its proper sphere. The only solution offered by those in office is to devise more searching inquisitions and more severe penalties for those who will conform; and the evil consequences which arise on attempts to enforce the statutes are viewed as consequences of the forbidden practice rather than of the attempt to suppress it. Thus perjury, bribery, gang war and murder are bred; and the Government itself is not the least of the offenders.

Surely the time has come to put aside pretenses, and fearlessly and honestly regard the pass to which this particular solution of this problem has brought us. We hold no brief for the liquor traffic. We have only respect for the total abstainer. But the insensate insistence on the employment of force, and more force, to the end of temperance is the mark neither of wisdom nor of patriotism. All too obviously the legislation lacks the popular sanction essential

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to law, and the attempts to enforce it have sunk to the level of the nursery and the kennels. To continue in the present course is to invite further and more serious disorders.

A statement like this is entirely unconvincing to the Drys. It is regarded by them with the same indignation that higher criticism of the Bible is regarded by fundamentalists, or as an old-time Hobbist would have regarded a denial of the divine right of kings. They cannot believe that the great and powerful Government of the United States cannot enforce one of the articles of its organic law. They repeat again and again that the people have spoken and that the matter is no longer open for discussion.

From the Dry side to-day there is less urging of people not to drink because it does them physical or moral harm. The talk is rather of enforcement and more enforcement, and "whether the American people can afford to be beaten on this issue," and the extent to which productivity and savings bank deposits, and imports and exports, and watts and ergs have increased. This is the line of argument which Mr. Henry Ford and Mr. Thomas Edison employ. And the Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick, who is too much of a metropolitan preacher not to follow economics pretty closely, follows suit: "Look at the increase in productivity; read the reports of the savings banks; watch the access of purchasing power among the people." To whom Robert Louis Stevenson might have replied out of *The Amateur Emigrant*: "He did not know what you meant by the word happiness. He had forgotten the simple emotions of childhood, and perhaps never encountered the delights of youth. He believed in production, that useful figment of economy, as if it had been real like laughter."

There is every evidence that during the campaign, and at least until his April speech in New York before the Associated Press, the President accepted the "Dry"

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point of view. A law was there to be enforced, nothing else, and life was to be lived in terms of productivity. That is an attitude, on both counts, which one might expect of a man trained as an engineer. He had carried a handbook in his pocket all his life, and whenever he was confronted by a problem involving stresses and strains he was accustomed to look for the answer in the handbook, and get on to the work of putting it into effect. The law was, of course, the formula, and like all engineering formulas, it was right, and needed only to be applied. One notices, however, in his more recent public utterances, less assurance regarding the solution than before. Perhaps he is leaving the matter in the hands of his commission; perhaps some of the searching discussions which were related to his appointments to the commission, drew his attention to certain human factors which he had not sufficiently taken into account. At all events, he has set his commission on its way, and thereby for the time being removed himself from the picture.

IV.

SOMETHING will eventually have to be done to modify the present situation. It is all very well to say that the Drys have their statute, and the Wets their drinks, but both are fairly unhappy at the present time. For it is no particular fun to be an unconvicted felon; and that is what some fifty per cent. of our citizens are to-day. Neither is it any particular fun to have been put to a lot of trouble and expense to get moral yearnings inscribed on the Statute Book and then to have them flouted by large sections of the country. The Drys have their law, but they are holding on to their majority in Congress by refusing to re-apportion the Congressional Districts. The country is still divided according to the 1910 Census, although the Constitution prescribes re-apportionment every ten years.

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If and when it takes place, there will be an accretion to the Wet ranks because of the much larger representation of the cities in Congress. This is bound to come sooner or later, and the longer it is put off, the greater the danger that the Wets will actually obtain a majority. But, of course, whatever may happen in Congress to modify the Volstead Act, there is no possibility of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, for which the Volstead Act is the enabling arm. Since the amendment must be repealed by the vote of the States, as such, less than six per cent. of the people, if properly located, could prevent the repeal. This they undoubtedly will always do. Not even the most extreme Wets entertain other hopes.

Still, various solutions have been proposed. The only ones which have been tried, however, are the inventions of the Drys, which is as it ought to be, for the Wets usually prove to be Greeks when they bear gifts. By an ingenious expedient the right of trial by jury, guaranteed by the Constitution, has been circumvented. Jury trials are long and expensive proceedings in a country which has been accustomed to regard litigation, and especially criminal litigation, as a kind of free drama, and it was soon found in attempting to enforce the prohibition law, that in many sections of the country juries would not convict, no matter what the evidence might be. In May, 1929, for instance, two hostesses of night clubs were finally indicted by a grand jury of the crime of conspiring to violate the prohibition law, and they were actually brought to trial in New York County. The trial of one of these, Texas Guinan, lasted a week and cost the Government not less than \$10,000. It was a rollicking piece of horse-play with "Tex" Guinan baiting the Judge. Yet she was acquitted by the jury almost immediately on their retirement to the jury room. She was photographed in court and her photograph with those of the jurors appeared next day in the papers. She was triumphantly carried from the courthouse on the shoulders of an admiring and enthusiastic crowd. A week

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later the Government undertook to try Miss Helen Morgan, whose technique in court differed from that of Miss Guinan in that she wept copiously for seven days. The result was equally satisfactory from the popular point of view, for she was triumphantly acquitted by the jury in the face of overpowering evidence, and her exit from the courthouse was marked by an even more enthusiastic demonstration than the one Miss Guinan enjoyed. In fact, it is absolutely impossible to secure convictions in cities like New York, except in the case of bootleggers who have grown so rich in pursuit of their calling that the members of the jury feel that they must have been charging the public too much.

Confronted by this situation in the large cities, the Government has for all practical purposes abandoned the attempt to secure convictions through juries, and has resorted to the equity procedure provided in the Enforcement Act. In this way, on the unsupported affidavit of a government employee, a Federal Judge may issue an injunction, without notice, against continuing to use a designated place for the sale of alcoholic beverages. After this, it is only necessary for a government agent to purchase a drink on the enjoined premises to secure an injunction against the use of the premises for any purpose whatsoever for the period of one year. Since the procedure is in equity there is no jury, and the punishment, of course, may amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars through loss of the use of the property for a year. In such cases, the bootlegger who has been running the restaurant usually disappears, and the whole loss falls on the landlord, till then blissfully unaware that his property is being used for an unlawful purpose.

The effect of this procedure is to dragoon unwilling landlords into the Federal Police service, and in this respect, the law is most successful. Further possibilities of the process are obvious. Thomas and Vincent Murphy were criminally tried for maintaining a liquor nuisance, *i.e.*,

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using their property as a speakeasy. A New Jersey jury, as usual, acquitted them. Thereupon the United States Attorney, on the same facts, applied for and secured an injunction. At the injunction trial, the defendants proved that they had been acquitted in the previous trial, but this was of no avail, Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court remarking that the "Government may have failed to prove the appellants guilty, and yet may have been, and may be, able to prove that a nuisance exists in the place."

Another interesting development results from the searches and seizures conducted by the Government. The law, in ordinary instances, is that no place can be searched except upon probable cause, or in pursuance of a search warrant obtained on affidavit. It has been found that when the prohibition agents enter a restaurant, buy intoxicating drinks and then proceed to search the place, having reasonable cause but no search warrants, the news spreads to all the adjacent speakeasies, which thereupon close and block their doors. The custom has grown up, therefore, of sampling the drinks around a neighborhood in advance and then swearing out warrants against each of the violators. The warrants are served simultaneously by gangs of prohibition agents who are protected from the populace by the local police, with the result that a crop of injunctions is obtained in the manner described above. There is no longer any serious attempt to secure criminal convictions by jury trial : and about the only problem with the new system is to prevent the news of the procuring of the warrant leaking out to the speakeasy before the warrant can be served.

When this system is applied to automobiles, there are obviously much greater difficulties in the way of the Government. The attempt was first made to hold up all automobiles which were under suspicion and to search them, and if any liquor was found in them, to arrest the occupant. The difficulty about this particular solution of

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the problem was that the Supreme Court finally ruled that evidence obtained by theft, or illegal entry, or without probable cause, was not available for use against the defendants at the trial. Accordingly, it is now necessary under the Enforcement Act either to have a search warrant in order to hold up an automobile, or else to have, beforehand, probable cause to suppose that liquor is being transported. The subsequent discovery of the liquor in the car is not available as evidence of having probable cause beforehand. This decision of the United States Supreme Court is the only thing that stands between any motorist and an indiscriminate search by enforcement officers at the pistol point, and it is regarded by the extreme Drys as proof of the antediluvian character of the justices of the Supreme Court. One wonders whether it is good law.

To meet this difficulty the government agents resorted to an old revenue law, passed in 1866, which declared that whenever any goods or commodities on which taxes were imposed are "removed or deposited or concealed in any place with the intent to defraud the United States of such taxes," such goods and commodities shall be forfeited, and every "carriage or any conveyance whatsoever . . . and all things used in the removal or for the deposit or concealment thereof, respectively, shall be forfeited." This theory of forfeiture is quite different from the theory of forfeiture provided by the Enforcement Act, because no previous criminal conviction is necessary, and because the rights of innocent owners and lienors may be ignored. The vehicle itself is personified, and the proceeding is against the vehicle, and whenever a vehicle is discovered, with or without the consent of the owner and with or without probable cause, to have liquor contained in it, it can be seized and forfeited without a jury trial.

The unfortunate owners of the vehicles have protested that they are very willing to pay any tax which may be due on liquor found in their car, but that the Government

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refuses to accept taxes on liquor, refuses to sell stamps, or to provide any machinery for the payment of tax. The vehicle, whether a motor, or motor boat, must be forfeited, even though all the occupants of it are acquitted by a jury in a criminal action arising upon the same facts.

In cases where the prohibition enforcement agents have committed crimes such as shooting and killing suspected persons, tapping telephone wires, selling liquor themselves as stool pigeons, and various other offenses for which they are often indicted in the State courts, the Enforcement Act provides that the trial of the case may be removed from the State court to a Federal court, and, thereafter, the State court may not proceed with the case. In the Federal court the prosecutor is, of course, the United States Attorney, and instead of prosecuting the criminal enforcement agent, he appears to defend him. This has resulted in the acquittal of every enforcement agent who has been subjected to it, so that it may be assumed with some reason that crimes may be committed with impunity by an enforcement agent, provided the acts complained of are done in performance of his duty as a national officer.

If these and many similar devices for safeguarding the officers of the law and for making sure of the conviction of offenders were employed for the purpose of dealing with murderers or counterfeiters, it is doubtful whether any one in the land would take the slightest interest in the matter. As the case stands, however, there is a very general dissatisfaction with the situation, the exact cause of which is difficult to formulate. It is complained, for instance, that to prosecute a bootlegger for failing to pay his income tax on the profits that he makes from his profitable vocation (because juries will convict a rich bootlegger for this offense though they will never convict him for violation of the Enforcement Act) is somehow unfair; and yet, if this same procedure were invoked against a dealer in narcotics, probably not one lonely voice would be raised in his defence.

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It really is important that the solution, when found, should be one which will save the face of good government. It could be provided, for instance, that the Judge should pass first upon the guilt or innocence of the accused and that thereafter the jury should discharge its function by determining the sentence to be imposed. Under the present system, the Judge is put in the ridiculous position of sitting through a long, expensive trial of a prisoner whom everyone knows is just as guilty as he can be, gravely ruling on points of evidence, keeping order in his courtroom and listening to the same old story of the stool pigeons. He then takes the trouble carefully and minutely to instruct the jury as to their duties, only to have them almost immediately acquit the prisoner. The jury, too, ought not to be put to the necessity of violating their oaths in order to register the sentiment of the community in these cases. If the Judge could legally find the prisoner guilty, he would have a feeling of self-respect and duty properly done, while the jury could then suspend sentence on the offender without any twinge of conscience as to the discharge of its own obligations.

V.

THE problem is not so much what to do, as how to do it. Again and again as enforcement approaches efficiency, the clamor increases and the Government relaxes its efforts. The leadership of the Drys has been largely left to the Methodist clergy, and it has been very bad leadership. Until 1920, the leadership of the Wets was left to the liquor interests, and that was worse leadership. The prohibition law being now riveted into the Constitution, the question is befogged with irrelevancies about patriotism which make a dispassionate consideration of the problem doubly difficult, while the enormous monetary revenues available to bootleggers have financed the under-

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world on a scale unparalleled in history. No one can regard without concern the vast wealth and power of the criminal class since prohibition: the criminal law was never made to cope with antagonists such as these. On the other hand, the frantic efforts of the Government to deal with the situation are causing distortions in the bill of rights which are equally a cause for anxiety.

It may be that some Dry Mussolini will arise to drive dissenters into exile and crush opposition by persecution. This seems very unlikely. It may be that a Wet John Hampden will arise who, by his disinterestedness and integrity will lead a peaceful rebellion which will result in something resembling local option. This also seems unlikely. The most probable outcome is the practical nullification of the amendment in large sections of the country. This has been the case with the Fifteenth Amendment; it may be the case with the Eighteenth as well. And though the solution will give complete satisfaction to nobody, it may make life fairly tolerable for every one.

The United States of America.

July 1929.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVE'S POINT OF VIEW

(FROM A NATIVE PEN)

I. THE TWO SCHOOLS

THE burning question of South Africa to-day, as it was yesterday, is the problem of the relations between white and black. It is a problem that overshadows all others in magnitude and gravity, and it has baffled and is still baffling South Africa's great minds. The question of the black man, his future and his place in the economic and national life of the country are a constant theme with the white man, and his daily preoccupation.

The question came into existence when the two races met at the Great Fish River near Grahamstown over a hundred years ago. At that time the black man was developing along his own lines. He was contented with his own life in his own villages, with his own society and his separate institutions. He had no desire to come within the ambit of the white man's life. He wanted to live his life untrammelled by forces and influences foreign to his way of thinking. He tended his cattle and sheep and cultivated his lands so as to produce sufficient to satisfy his few wants. His alternative occupation was fighting, and that fighting was prompted in many instances by the desire to capture the cattle belonging to other tribes. When he had nothing else to do he drank his beer and basked in the sunshine of Africa.

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Now this sort of life was naturally condemned by Europeans as a life of laziness which could not be allowed to continue, as it was considered a menace to the very existence of the white race in South Africa. For in those days the African jungle had to be cleared before towns and cities could be built, before roads and railways could be made, before diamond, gold and coal mines could be sunk and before the land could produce maize, tea, sugar, cotton, and fruits. The white man in those days was averse to using his muscles; he looked down upon manual labour because he thought he belonged to the "chosen race" which was permitted by Providence to exploit the labour of the black man, whom he regarded as a descendant of Ham, Noah's cursed son. Consequently the unwillingness of the black man to supply his labour or to come under the control of the white man constituted a serious menace not only to the existence of the white race but also to the transplantation of Western civilisation on to this southern end of the African continent. The white farmers, or more precisely the pastoral white farmers, needed labour on their farms and men to look after their cattle and sheep, and the townspeople wanted labour for their domestic service, for their stores and other establishments. Then came the mines and other industries. These could not be undertaken without labour, and the person to supply that labour was the black man. His unreadiness to supply the labour without which South Africa could not have made the progress that she has made in economic and commercial development constituted a grave problem in the handling of which two schools of thought among Europeans were created.

The two schools were agreed upon the principle of teaching the black man the dignity of labour; but they differed as to what was to be his place in the political and national life of the country. The missionaries and some of the British colonists maintained that the black man, as a human being, was entitled to human rights and

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to a place in the sun. Their views were supported by people in England who held that in the eyes of the law all British subjects were equal irrespective of their race, colour or creed. The other school, composed mostly of men of Dutch descent, maintained that by Divine decree the black man was created to be a servant and that his place in the life of the South African nation was to be that of a servant and nothing else. In short, he was to be kept in his place. This was the issue between these two schools of thought; it was a clash of ideals and in the interpretation of certain passages of the Bible. "Of one blood God made all the nations of the earth," declared the one school. "No, no," said the other emphatically, "the black man, as the descendant of Ham, is predestined to occupy a subordinate place to that of the white man." The outcome of this difference of ideas and principles was a misunderstanding and quarrel between the British colonists and the Dutch settlers.* Eventually this led to the Great Trek which is, fundamentally speaking, responsible for the complexity of our inter-racial problems.

While this quarrel was going on among the whites, the black man was becoming aggressive and troublesome. That is to say, he continued on his southward movement and thus encroached upon the territory occupied by the Europeans on the western side of the Great Fish River.† Truly speaking he was developing along his own lines and so he wanted to drive the white man into the sea, as he neither wanted to be his equal nor his servant. He was

* The quarrel was not between the British and the Dutch colonists. A great many of the British colonists, especially in the frontier districts of the Cape Colony, took (and take) the same view of Native affairs and the place of the native on or off the map as did (and do) the bulk of the Dutch. The quarrel at the time of the Trek in the late 'thirties was between the frontiersmen and the authorities at Cape Town and their philanthropic supporters on both sides of the water.

† The author omits to state that the Europeans were aggressive too and tried to continue their movement north-eastward. It was a clash of two streams of migration. In the end the Bantu were pushed back a fair distance.

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not concerned with what God decreed or did not decree about him. He wanted his own way of life. So not only did he refuse to supply his labour* but also protested against the white man's encroachment upon his life. The white man, he argued, had no right to be in Africa; he came from the sea and back into the sea he should be driven. The struggle which followed is so well known that there is no need of any recapitulation here. Suffice it to say that it widened the gulf between the two schools of thought among the whites, and culminated in the defeat of the black man and the disintegration of his tribal life and organisation, and gave birth to a new people and new problems.

As for the whites, they were now not only divided into two schools of thought but also divided into two groups of States as the result of the Great Trek. There was the British group and the Dutch group, pursuing two different kinds of Native policy. In the British States, i.e., the Cape Colony and Natal, the black man was being educated and brought into the ambit of the white man's civilisation. Sir George Grey, as Governor of the Cape, had adopted† a policy that was destined to bring to an end the Kaffir wars, as his policy in New Zealand ended the Maori wars of independence. This policy recognised the Bantu people not only as British subjects but as citizens of the Cape, entitled to British liberty and justice. It gave support and encouragement to the evangelisation and education of the Bantu by missionaries; it realised that the destiny of the Bantu and that of the Europeans were one, and that the solution of the problem of the relation between white and black lay in the recognition of the

* This is put too absolutely. Numbers of Bantu took service on Cape Colony farms in the early 'forties.

† Sir George Grey built on foundations that had already been laid: (i) the Kaffir wars had really ended before he came by the breaking of the Cape frontier tribes by two disastrous wars between 1846 and 1853; (ii) the Cape had recognised civil equality for all, irrespective of colour, by a series of enactments between 1828 and 1853. But Grey has the credit of carrying on the process.

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identity of their interests and in giving them equal opportunities for improvement and equal rights in the eyes of the law. In Grey's time, representative government had just been granted to the Cape in 1853 and the franchise rights had been extended to the Bantu people of the Cape. Since then the Cape has entered upon an era of peaceful development in which both Europeans and Bantu co-operated as fellow citizens.*

But in the Dutch States, *i.e.*, in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, a different policy was being pursued. The Voortrekkers, as we know, left the Cape chiefly as the result of the misunderstanding between British and Dutch on the question of the treatment of the native people.† Their attitude towards the native was clearly defined in the declaration issued by their most noted leader, Piet Retief, to the effect that while they would not permit slavery in the country to which they were going, nevertheless they would make laws which would uphold the authority of masters over their servants. It is quite clear that the Voortrekkers looked upon themselves as the natural masters of the black peoples. Consequently the policy which they inaugurated in the Dutch States was that of "keeping the black man in his place" as a hewer of wood and drawer of water for the white race. "The people," so declared the constitution of the Dutch States, "shall not admit of equality between white and black in either State or Church." This policy refused to recognise the Bantu people as citizens of the State; it deprived them of any title to landed property and of any claim to liberty and justice. They could only live in the State as servants, and so long as they knew that the white man was their master they were kindly and sympathetically treated.

It is needless to refer to the oppressive conditions under

* The author should have noted that the Native policy of Natal differed from that of the Cape Colony. Roughly speaking, it came midway between that of the Colony and that of the Republics.

† Rather say "between the British authorities and themselves," etc.

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which the black man was taught the dignity of labour. Suffice it to say that in spite of all this he learnt not only the dignity of labour but the fact that in the economic life of to-day he could only live by the sweat of his brow. He realised that he was defeated and helpless, and that whether he liked it or not he was forced to submit to the white man's rule and become his servant.

II. THE PROBLEM SINCE UNION

BRIEFLY this was the position when the Anglo-Boer war broke out in 1899. And when the end came in 1902 no change was made. The northern colonies, namely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were allowed to retain their policy of repression; they were allowed to continue to refuse franchise rights to the Bantu people. In the meantime the prejudices of the Dutch people were spreading to the British in the new colonies; so much so that at the time of the unification of the four colonies in 1910, it might safely be said that the majority of Europeans, both Dutch and British, were violently anti-native in their attitude. The Union, they said, was to be a union of white men only, whose existence was threatened by the presence in their midst of an overwhelming number of natives just emerging from a state of barbarism. So that when the National Convention met in secret at Durban and Cape Town to consider the important question of the unification of the four colonies, the northern colonies had definitely adopted the Native policy of the late Dutch States. There was no question but that the issue was between the North and the South, between the liberal policy of the Cape and the repressive policy of the North. The struggle was tremendous, the South putting up a brave and noble fight; but it was on the defensive. Its policy was vigorously attacked not only by the Dutch but also by British in the North, who had now been con-

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vinced, rightly or wrongly, that the natives should be kept in a position of subordination for all time as they constituted a serious danger to the supremacy of the white race.

The outcome of this struggle was a compromise over the Cape native franchise by which it was agreed that the Cape native franchise should not be extended to the northern provinces but that it should not be taken away from the Cape except by the decision of a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament sitting together. The last proviso clearly shows that it was the intention of the Convention, or more precisely that of the majority of the delegates, to destroy the foundations of the Cape and to build the Union of South Africa upon the foundations of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. That the North had gained an advantage over the South in the compromise no student of South African politics can deny. The compromise definitely laid it down that no one unless he was of European descent might become a member of Parliament, and that the Parliament of the Union of South Africa would have the right to disfranchise all the Bantu people; provided, of course, that the consent of the white people as a whole were secured. There can be no doubt that those who proposed this compromise were influenced by the fact that white opinion, particularly in the North, was gradually but surely growing in favour of the repression of Bantu aspirations and progress. They were confident that the day would come when a white South Africa would agree to deprive the Cape natives of their franchise rights.

The teaching of the black man the dignity of labour, as I have already pointed out, resulted in his learning the fact that in the economic conditions of the country he could live only by the sweat of his brow. And finding that in the depression which followed the Anglo-Boer war he suffered with the rest of the community he decided to seek employment both on the farms and in the towns. On the farms he found a class of white farmer known as the

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bijwoner, *i.e.*, white men who leased farms from their owners and cultivated them on the condition that the latter, as owners, should share the products. Generally the bijwoners belonged to the poor white class, and being unable to cultivate the land themselves they in turn leased portions of it to natives, on the same conditions. As a result many natives, particularly in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, took to farming and made good.

Those who went to the towns discovered that they were not destined to be a race of servants, and that, as citizens, they had the right to acquire land ; so they formed in the Transvaal a Land Owners' Association, which enabled them to test the validity of the law which prohibited natives from buying and owning land in the Transvaal. In the case of Tseu *versus* the Registrar of Deeds, the Supreme Court of the Transvaal declared the law *ultra vires*, and the way was opened for natives to acquire land anywhere in the country. Companies were formed and farms were bought while townships were established with marvellous rapidity. There was no question but that the black man had discovered the value of land and was determined to possess himself of it. He had been called out of his old life and brought by the Europeans into the new life much against his will, and now he was going to adapt himself to it.

There was no doubt that the new Bantu had come into existence and a new problem was created. It was no longer the question of teaching the black man the dignity of labour but of preventing him from competing with the whites on the farms and the whites in towns. His laziness was no longer a menace to the existence of the white race but his industry and progress were ! " Make South Africa a white man's country," was the cry heard from all sides. The Government was urged to take drastic steps to prevent the " indiscriminate buying of land by natives in the Transvaal, and stop the pernicious system of allowing natives to plough on half-shares in the Free State." The country was stampeded into the belief that unless the Government took

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action the Europeans would be ruined and the country would become the black man's country. The beautiful cities of South Africa, it was argued, would share the fate of Zimbabwe and other ruined cities of Southern Rhodesia, and all that would remain of the white race would be the blood running in the veins of the "brown children that would be found playing upon the ruins of the Union Buildings." The effect of this propaganda, which was conducted and preached by some of South Africa's leading statesmen and politicians, was to create an anti-native feeling that was as unreasonable as it was unsympathetic.

General Hertzog, who was then the Minister for Native Affairs in the Botha Ministry, came upon the scene and proclaimed that he had discovered a scheme which would solve the native problem. The scheme was that of the territorial separation of the races. In their own areas natives would own land, govern themselves and develop along their own lines; they would be as free as the Europeans in their own areas. On paper the scheme appeared to be attractive and practical, and so it secured a certain measure of support even from the best friends of the Bantu people among the Europeans. But General Hertzog was not destined to put his proposals into operation, for as the result of his independence policy (which aimed at secession from the British Empire) he was expelled from the Ministry and was superseded by the late Mr. Sauer.

Whether or not Mr. Sauer would have succeeded in carrying out the scheme is a question for speculation to-day. The impracticability of the scheme is now generally recognised. It was, however, tried. A Bill for the territorial separation of land ownership was introduced in 1913 and passed through the House of Assembly with lightning speed. Its main provisions were (1) the demarcation of South Africa into European and native areas, (2) the restriction or prohibition of natives from buying and leasing land in European areas without the express consent of the Governor-General, and *vice versa* the prohibition of Europeans from

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acquiring land in native areas, and (3) the stoppage of the cultivation of land belonging to European farmers by natives.

On paper the scheme appeared to be a fair settlement of the land question ; but when the demarcation of land came it was soon found out that a great injustice had been done to the Bantu people, for only 13 per cent. of the land was allotted to nearly 5,000,000 natives, and this was mostly unsuitable for habitation and cultivation. In justice to the Commission that was appointed to demarcate the land, let me say that they would have set aside large tracts of land on the lines of the Transkeian territories but this was found impossible owing to the unwillingness of Europeans to part with their farms. Thus the Natives Land Act failed to separate the races ; but instead it imposed disabilities upon the Bantu people by stopping them from purchasing and leasing land from Europeans* while it made it possible for Europeans to acquire land in potential native areas. The irony of the situation is that, immediately after the passing of the Act, those parts of the country which had been indicated as suitable for natives proved to be rich and capable of producing either sugar, cotton, or fruits. Consequently Europeans invaded these areas and bought all the land available. To-day more than half the native population of the Transvaal, the Free State and Natal live on European-owned farms, because the reserves which had been allotted to the various tribes before the Anglo-Boer war are overcrowded and are thus unable to maintain their populations.

The effect of the operation of this Draconian law was to render hundreds of native families landless and homeless, particularly in the Free State which is essentially a white man's country with but one native reserve near Harrismith. Some of these unfortunate people perished, together with

* The Courts decided that they could still acquire it in the Cape Colony. Elsewhere the force of the law was somewhat mitigated by administrative action.

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their livestock, on the roadside, searching for places of refuge. As the result of this sudden interference with the conditions of native life in the rural districts there was a general migration of natives to the towns (in many cases doubling and even trebling the urban population) for the purpose of securing better working conditions, better wages and places to live in.

The outcome of this migration of native families to the towns was (a) the lowering of native wages, (b) the creation of a native unemployment problem, (c) the creation of slums in the cities, (d) the increase of lawlessness among natives and (e) the increase of competition between white and black workers in industry. These social problems naturally caused a great deal of concern among Europeans; so much so that a cry was raised that unless drastic steps were taken to stop native migration to the towns civilisation would be ruined.

Meanwhile the *bijwoner* who lived on land which he hired from the big landowners and which he farmed by means of the above mentioned half-share system, found himself unable to carry on his farming operations, and in consequence he followed his native "servants" to the towns. This migration of poor whites to the urban areas aggravated the situation and made the problem of urban natives assume a new phase. These men being without any industrial training were unable to secure employment. The result was that some of them resorted to dishonest ways of earning a living. They took up the trade of illicit liquor selling. That is to say, they bought liquor from the bottle stores and sold it to natives at exorbitant prices. The inevitable result of this was the social mixture of the races which was detrimental to both, since it was not the meeting of the higher but of the lower strata of both the European and Bantu societies. The degradation which followed is a tragedy which has no parallel in the social history of any nation. The white man and the black man were drowning in an ocean of poverty, evil and vice.

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It was the working out of the laws of changeless justice which "bind oppressor with the oppressed." And this, as I have already pointed out, caused a great deal of concern among the Europeans. The Government was, therefore, urged to make a law which would bring about the solution of the problem of the urban natives. So serious indeed was the agitation that the Smuts Government was compelled to introduce in Parliament a measure dealing with the situation. This was the Natives Urban Areas Act of 1923. The main purpose of the Act is (a) the residential segregation of natives from Europeans in towns, (b) the elimination of the slum areas, (c) the housing of natives in areas set aside for them, and (d) the control of native ingress into the towns.

It is now nearly six years since the enactment of this measure and yet the problem of urban natives is as menacing as it was five years ago. The fact is the natives are still coming to the towns on account of the operation of the Natives Land Act. And unless the land question is seriously tackled so as to provide more land for natives in the rural districts the problem of urban natives will never be satisfactorily adjusted. In the Free State where there is but one native reserve, native population in urban areas is increasing to an alarming extent. Bloemfontein has a native population of 25,000 souls whose labour cannot be absorbed by local industries. Consequently the local authorities are confronted by a problem which is beyond their capacity to solve. They have repeatedly approached the Government for more powers to control the native influx, but it is doubtful whether with such powers at their disposal they would be in a position to bring about the solution of this burning question. It is not more powers but more land which will prevent the influx of natives into the towns.

So far I have dealt with the policy of segregation in relation to land ownership and residence in the towns, and have endeavoured to show how under the economic conditions of to-day this policy has become impracticable.

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Now I propose to deal with the policy as it affects the administration of Native affairs. In 1927 the Government introduced and passed through Parliament the Native Administration Act. The purpose of the Act is to effect the control of Bantu life, for it provides for (1) the constitution of the Governor-General as the supreme chief of all natives with the powers and functions that were exercised by a Bantu paramount chief in the olden days, (2) the appointment of native commissioners, who shall be white, to administer native law and custom, (3) the application of Bantu law and custom except when the principles of civilisation are violated, (4) the appointment of chiefs instead of hereditary chiefs, and (5) the creation of native appeal courts manned by Europeans only.

It must be admitted that so far as the backward natives, those who are still under tribal organisation, are concerned, the Act is suitable and necessary. It enables them to preserve their institutions, their customs and traditions, and helps them to outgrow their tribal conditions without disruptive disintegration. But its fault is that it does not recognise Bantu progress, for it applies to both the civilised and the uncivilised. Although there are people who think that the Act aims at preserving the national life of the Bantu people, yet it is quite plain that the real motive behind it is not to encourage the Bantu people to develop along the lines of their race genius, but to provide the Government with machinery for their control. The application of the Act to both the civilised and the uncivilised alike shows clearly that the intention is to check the development of the Bantu people along the path of Western civilisation.

General Hertzog, who is a staunch advocate of the policy embodied in this Act, has repeatedly told white South Africa that because it took the Europeans two thousand years to reach their present stage of development the Bantu people could not be expected to reach it in a hundred years. The natural inference, therefore, is that the native must

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go through practically the same period before he can claim equal treatment, equal opportunities and equal rights with the European. To prevent the possibility of his making rapid progress it is, therefore, essential that the native should be "encouraged to develop along his own lines"; but the white man must control these lines of development!

The policy of segregation applies also to native taxation and native education. Under the Native Taxation and Development Act of 1926, every male native over the age of eighteen years is required to pay a poll tax of one pound sterling to the general revenue of the country. If he lives under the tribal system he pays ten shillings more, which is used by the Government for the making of roads and bridging of rivers and the like in his reserve. One-fifth of the general tax is earmarked for native education and development. This means that native education is not financed from the general revenue of the country, and it may be said without exaggeration that it is financed by the natives themselves. The money earmarked for native development and education is about £225,000 per annum. Out of this sum the Government intends to establish agricultural schools for natives, to give grants to missionary schools and colleges and to pay teachers.

There are very few government native schools in the country. Most of the schools and colleges which are catering for the native are under the various churches that are operating in South Africa. In fact it is no exaggeration to say that the Bantu people owe what progress they have made in education to missionary efforts. The Government came in simply because it had to or, more precisely, because it wanted to control and direct native education. This system of financing native education has had the effect of retarding its development. Three-fourths of the Bantu children of school age are to-day without school facilities. That is to say, there is no money in the Native Development Fund to support new schools which are

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springing up in the country. Under this policy of segregation the only way in which the Development Fund could be augmented is to levy another tax on natives; but the wages paid to them cannot bear any further taxation. It will be seen, therefore, that the system is not beneficial to Bantu progress in matters of education.

III. THE ONLY WAY

THE trend of legislation since Union has been to differentiate between white and black in every sphere of life. This policy of differentiation is based on the theory that the two races, being different in colour and in different stages of development, cannot be regarded as forming one nation with identical interests. But what our politicians and statesmen fail to understand is that South Africa cannot, in the economic life of to-day, be either a purely white man's country or a black man's country. It is the country of both, and as no two objects can occupy the same space at the same time, so no two nationalities and no two civilisations can be developed in the same country at the same time. Whether we like it or not, the two races form one political nation and their destiny is one.

To my mind this policy of differentiation will encourage racialism and create a Bantu nationalism whose slogan will be "Africa for the Africans." For Bantu nationalism, like the nationalism of any other people, will naturally revolt against foreign control and seek a separate State wherein to realise its destiny. The idea that the Bantu people will remain the servants of the white man is misleading. We were created in the image of God to contribute our share to "the gathering achievement of the human race." Consequently we must either be regarded as citizens of South Africa with full human rights or we must be given a chance to develop along our own lines in a separate State, which will be politically independent of the European State. But we all know that in

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the economic life of South Africa this is impossible. This being so what, then, should be the policy which South Africa should pursue ? The policy of repression is bound to fail, and the policy of differentiation is impracticable.

The only practical policy is that of recognising that the political and economic interests of the two races are one and not two, and that the solution of our inter-racial problems lies in the recognition of the fact that South Africa is the common heritage of both races and that its security lies in the uplifting of both.

Since 1921 broad-minded men and women on either side of the colour line have realised that "the history of the Native question in South Africa has been the history of failure ; failure to recognise that the interests of the two races are one and not two ; failure to recognise that the Native question and the industrial problem are the same thing." This group of men and women are, of course, few in number, but the number is growing. The policy which they are pursuing is the only policy that will save South Africa from endless racial strife, and that is the policy of inter-racial co-operation which has found expression in the Joint Council movement. The basic ideas for which this movement stands are :—

(a) That Europeans and natives are integral parts of the South African nation, and that the opinion of both natives and Europeans should be sought in all national questions ; (b) that the matters in respect of which European and native interests coincide are far more important than those in which they differ ; (c) that the better we all understand one another the greater is the hope for a peaceful and prosperous South Africa ; and (d) that the future progress of South Africa is inseparably bound up with the economic prosperity of all sections of our South African population.

White South Africa has to choose between this and the policy of repression, and South Africa's prosperity will depend upon the decision which is made.

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GREAT BRITAIN : THE GENERAL ELECTION

I. FIRST THOUGHTS

THE recent general election was generally regarded during its actual progress as one of the "dullest" in our history. In spite of an almost ceaseless flow of oratory in every part of these islands ; in spite of an unprecedented expenditure, incurred equally by all the great parties, upon "propaganda" of all kinds—the pamphlet, the hoarding, the loud-speaker, the advertisement columns of the press, nevertheless no great issue, stirring the depths of public feeling, either arose from natural causes or was created by artificial means, which will serve to give a name to the struggle and make it memorable in our political annals. The Home Rule election of 1886 ; the Khaki election of 1900 ; the Free Trade election of 1906 ; the War election of 1918 ; the Russian election of 1924—all these are remembered with bitterness or shame or triumph or cynical amusement. But they are remembered. The election of 1929, baffling, incoherent, obscure, may perhaps go down to history, if at all, as the "Safety First" election.

As we suggested in our last number might prove to be the case, the electorate rejected the slogan of "Safety First" but achieved the result. With the uncanny good sense (or perhaps good fortune) of the British people, the electors have, in however blind and groping a fashion, produced a parliamentary situation almost exactly suited to the

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present needs of the country. In spite of the anomalies and even absurdities of our electoral system, it may be doubted whether so satisfactory a conclusion could have been reached by any other method.

It certainly cannot be denied that, with three great parties in the field, this system is open to serious logical objections. The mere fact that the Socialist and Conservative parties, each polling over 8,000,000 votes, obtain some 290 and 260 seats respectively in the House of Commons, while the Liberal party, with over 5,000,000 votes, only achieves the representation of 60 constituencies, is, of course, a strong theoretical argument in favour of reform. Put in another way, whereas the Labour party has one Member of Parliament for every 29,000 votes cast for them, and the Conservative party one Member for every 33,000 votes, it has taken 90,000 votes, on the average, to return a Liberal. Had the seats been allocated in proportion to votes cast, the Conservatives would now have 231 seats, the Socialists 226, and the Liberals 144.

It may, however, be observed that each party in its turn has reaped advantages from this system and has not been unduly troubled by its unfairness when that unfairness was favourable to itself. In the pre-war days, Labour was undoubtedly under-represented. In the election of 1924, the luck of the three-cornered contests favoured the Conservatives. And if the Liberals are now the victims of what Mr. Lloyd George has called "the dictatorship not of the democracy but of the croupier," he must remember also that the British people are not enamoured of logic, have a great fondness for a gamble, and some contempt for those who, when beaten in a game, blame the rules or the umpire. At the same time, there is no doubt that the present electoral system will be subjected to searching enquiry in the near future. Already the new Government has agreed, under Liberal pressure, to appoint a Parliamentary committee to review the whole situation, under the chairmanship of Lord Ullswater, who, as Mr. Speaker Lowther,

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presided over the committee in 1918 which resulted in a vast extension of the franchise, including the grant of the vote to women. This committee, on which the three parties are to have equal representation, will begin its labours in the autumn, and although the Government has made an oblique attack upon the Liberal, and, to some extent, the Conservative party also, by insisting that the enquiry should extend to all aspects of electoral law, with particular regard to the use of central party funds, yet the fact that the combination of any two parties could dominate the committee and thus frame whatever report they might agree upon, has interesting future possibilities, which no doubt the leaders of all parties will not be slow to observe. It may be, indeed, that this question will dominate the politics of 1930-31, and lead eventually to a completely new political situation, coupled with a radical change in the alignment and emphasis of present political parties.

All this, however, belongs to the future. Meanwhile, we return to the view, already expressed, that even under the present illogical system of representation, the nation has no reason to be dissatisfied with the result of the recent election.

In the first place, Mr. Baldwin's Government has disappeared, and with its fall a host of difficulties are removed. Although the last Government will rank high in our history; although its record of achievement is a notable one; although, as the Government that faced the general strike of 1926 and by its firm stand destroyed for a long time, perhaps for ever, the foolish methods of "direct action" and "unconstitutionalism"; although by its reform of the rating system and more especially its radical re-casting of our whole system of local government it can claim to have accomplished two tasks of the highest importance, yet in spite of all these merits the people judged rightly when they expelled it, at least temporarily, from power. It was an old Government. It was a tired Government. It was, above all, a Government out of touch with the electorate.

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Mr. Baldwin gave the people the impression of being an exhausted and somewhat dispirited leader. The party which he led had no clear vision of the future, and seemed to have no ambition to direct or control our development in any particular direction. And when the late Government definitely decided to abjure a policy of any kind and stand upon its record, it was already doomed.

Secondly, nothing could be more satisfactory, from the national point of view, than that the Labour-Socialist party should be forced, once again, to accept the responsibilities of office. The short Government of 1924 was not a fair or a sufficient test of Socialist capacity. It could easily be represented that it was brought down by an unscrupulous intrigue; it was even suggested that the forger had been called in to help an agonised bourgeoisie, and that the Zinovieff letter had been the instrument of a modern Titus Oates. Mr. MacDonald's new administration gives the Labour party a fresh opportunity, and an opportunity which he can use in the most favourable conditions. The fact that he still has no absolute parliamentary majority is a safeguard both for himself and for the nation. No Government of recent times has taken office amid more general expressions of favour and good will.

Thirdly, the almost complete disappearance of Socialist extremists, at least from official quarters, represents a real gain. Already we see the sobering effect of office, even upon such men as Mr. Lansbury and Mr. Shinwell. Already we are being reminded, in almost tearful accents, of the "inevitability of gradualism." And when Mr. Thomas has been engaged for another six months in "curing unemployment," we shall no doubt find that even his exceptionally buoyant spirit will be considerably subdued.

Fourthly, the steady movement in British industry towards what is generally called "rationalisation," is likely to receive a considerable impetus from the new Government. It has long been clear that the problems of cotton and coal, of iron and steel, and of shipbuilding, cannot, or

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will not, be solved without some measure of administrative and legislative interference by the Government of the day. The extraordinary hold which some of the more antique and reactionary directors still maintain upon the basic industries can hardly be shaken by any other means than coercion. The last Government was always very reluctant to use even the most tentative measures of compulsion. Indeed, in its attitude towards industrial questions it was dominated by a strongly Cobdenist theory wholly out of keeping with traditional Tory principles. It is already noticeable that the coal owners, under the distant threats of Socialist interference, are hastily adopting all those means towards a more efficient management of the industry—amalgamations, selling agencies and the like—to which no Conservative Government was able to persuade them. What for three years they have passionately resisted, becomes all at once the obvious and desirable course.

In other of the basic industries also the new Government have a real chance of scoring marked success. They have made a good start; and if they are not unduly hampered by past pledges or the presence of their left wing, they should be able materially to assist the development of the new industrial system to which Britain is inevitably moving. They may even—such are the ironies of politics—go down to history as the Government that made “capitalism safe for democracy.”

Lastly—and this is the most cogent reason which leads us to believe that the result of the general election was on the whole salutary—it will be possible for a new Government to give a new direction to our foreign policy and to retrieve some of the blunders of recent years. It cannot be doubted that one of the main causes of the Conservative party's defeat was the universal distrust, far transcending mere party divisions, of Sir Austen Chamberlain's diplomacy. The splendour of his early successes—the admission of Germany to the League and the signing of the Locarno

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treaty—had long been dimmed. The failure of the Geneva Naval Conference, followed by Lord Cecil's resignation, was a much more serious blow to the late Government's prestige than was recognised at the time. And the apparent inability of the late Foreign Secretary to achieve any result in the field of Anglo-American relations—the dominating problem of the world, in which the British public is vitally and even passionately interested—told heavily against Conservative chances at the polls. Everywhere the suspicion existed or was sedulously created that we were heading for a fresh outburst of naval rivalry, comparable to the Anglo-German contest during the years preceding the war. This the electors were determined, at all costs, to prevent. And since they believed that the eclipse of Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Bridgeman would prove an excellent method of avoiding this calamity, they were cheerfully prepared to risk the somewhat misty dangers of Socialism (of which they had no practical experience) rather than enter on a path which might ultimately lead to the horrors of war (of which they had only too bitter and too recent memories).

This rather crude judgment was, naturally, somewhat unfair to the late Government. Nevertheless, the need for a change in the sphere of foreign policy was real and pressing. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has the chance of a lifetime. It is to be hoped that he will make the best use of his opportunity.

II. THE TROUBLES AHEAD

AT the same time, there are formidable dangers in the path of the new Government, some of which may easily prove fatal. The inherent difficulty of any "Government of the left" is that it has generally achieved office by an ambitious and often spectacular electioneering programme. It has, while in opposition, sedulously fostered the wildest hopes in the minds of the electors, and it comes into power

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with the grave disadvantage of having excited too many and too lively expectations. Above all is this true of the present Socialist party. The doctrines of Socialism, still supposed to represent its declared faith, are easily expanded. But they are not so easily put into practice. And when the chief priests of this strange creed have already largely "lost their faith," they find the innocent credulity of the devotee something of a nuisance. In countless homes up and down the country humble folk cherish a naive belief that somehow or other the very fact of a Labour Government being in power will ease all the difficulties of life, and cure, as if by a magic formula, the oppressive burdens of poverty and disease. The millennium, if indeed it is not to be expected in the very first session of a new Parliament, can scarcely be delayed beyond the early days of the next. The fantastic denunciations of what is called "the present system" have led these supporters of "Socialism" to entertain a pathetic hope that another "system" will shortly and speedily be organised. And the more eloquent the perorations of Ministers in the past, the more ambitious the visions which they have dreamed, the more splendid the castles in the air which they have allowed themselves to design, the greater will be their malaise and the disruption of their party, as month follows month and year succeeds year without, perhaps, any noticeable or startling change in the social and economic order having been actually accomplished.

This underlying difficulty of all advanced Governments is not always fatal. It is sometimes possible to cultivate the particular in order to distract attention from the general. It may be practical to attribute the delay in bringing about "Socialism" to the artifices and wiles of the bourgeois parties, still actually commanding a majority in the House of Commons. It may be a way out of larger difficulties to stimulate the fading enthusiasm of a disappointed electorate by a spectacular attack upon a special class. This was the plan adopted by Mr. Lloyd George, with

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conspicuous success, in 1909. And for similar reasons many experienced observers believe that the new Government will follow the same precedent, and that the budget of 1931, if not that of 1930, will be used to regalanise the Labour forces into loyalty and enthusiasm by a policy of vindictive taxation. If the Conservative party were to fall into the trap, and by a violent or ill-directed opposition come to be regarded as the recognised protagonists of the super-taxable class, it might easily find the election of 1931 even more disastrous than that of 1929.

Meanwhile, however, apart from the vague and general expectations raised by the Labour Government, there are the specific pledges. Election pledges are always dangerous. They can indeed often be evaded, particularly if they affect the electorate as a whole. But when, as in the case of the pledge to the miners, they have been given to a powerful and well-organised interest, commanding over forty seats in the House of Commons, the matter is not so easy. At the present time there is no certainty as to what course the Government proposes to pursue regarding the repeal of the eight hour day. But there is no doubt at all that a reversion to a statutory seven hours would have a disastrous economic effect upon the coal-mining industry. It might even lead to an increase in the numbers of unemployed, so large as gravely to embarrass the Government, pledged as it is to the "cure of unemployment." At the same time, the very definite promise to repeal the Eight Hour Act cannot altogether be disregarded. The delegates of the Miners' Federation, at their annual meeting at Blackpool, while agreeing to leave the matter for the moment in the hands of their executive, made it clear that they would not tolerate neglect or evasion. And unless the general situation in the chief coal exporting districts alters radically during the next few months, it is difficult to see by what means Mr. MacDonald proposes to reconcile his categorical pledge with what he knows to be the economic necessities of the situation.

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But coal mining is not the only industry with serious difficulties before it. Already the dispute in the cotton trade has caused nearly half a million workers to be idle. Even a Labour Government has not been able to avoid this calamity. There is perhaps some hope that the special committee of enquiry which has been appointed may be able to frame a scheme for the reorganisation of the industry on modern lines. But rationalisation or reorganisation is a long and laborious process. Meanwhile Lancashire has had to submit to the crude method of strike and lock-out.

Similar considerations apply to the wool trade, and, in a lesser degree, to iron and steel, and heavy industries. Altogether, the industrial outlook is not very encouraging, and the difficulties that may be expected will naturally react upon the popularity and stability of the Government.

Above all, there is the perennial question of unemployment. This obstinate problem has already embarrassed four administrations in recent years, and contributed to their fall. The telling figure of "over a million unemployed after five years of office" was a grave weapon against the late Government at the polls. No doubt, the same phantom haunts the minds of its successor. Mr. Thomas has indeed made a gallant start. He has appointed committees and persuaded Parliament to authorise loans. He has talked and appealed and cajoled and travelled. But all the time formidable difficulties are in his path. In the first place, it is still very uncertain whether those orthodox economists may not after all be right who aver that the raising of specific loans for relief works and the like in the end increases rather than lessens unemployment, by depriving industry of the financial resources which would otherwise be available. Secondly, the exceptionally high rates of interest ruling in New York, coupled with the export of gold to Germany and France, may lead to an increase in the bank rate, with an immediate and discouraging effect upon employment. Thirdly, any tendency to

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increase outdoor relief or make it easier to obtain, and any relaxation of the conditions under which unemployment benefit may be drawn under the insurance scheme, will certainly have the effect of increasing the figures of the registered unemployed. Mr. Greenwood, by the abolition of the guardians appointed by Mr. Chamberlain in West Ham, Bedwellty and Chester-le-Street to bring some order into those districts, has made a significant gesture which will not be lost on certain boards of guardians in other districts. Miss Bondfield, the new Minister of Labour, has up till now succeeded in temporising with the question of insurance benefits. But the Labour party is so definitely pledged on this point and has conducted so violent an agitation upon the question in the constituencies during recent years, that it is difficult to see how the pressure can long be resisted. It is more than probable that in the autumn a measure of relaxation in the conditions qualifying men and women for benefit will be introduced, and possibly also increases will be made in the amounts of benefit in certain cases. But all experience shows that such a course will tend to increase the numbers registered as unemployed by encouraging that marginal body of persons, not indeed large in proportion to the whole mass of the insured population, but yet quite sufficient to swell considerably the statistics, who mysteriously find work if sufficient pressure is put upon them to do so, but join the ranks of the unemployed if relief or benefits are available.

Lastly, if the Government should be forced by these and various other concessions to the raising of large amounts of additional taxation, and if, as seems probable, that taxation is of a somewhat punitive character upon the richer classes of the community, there is a real danger of a sense of apprehension and insecurity in the business and investing community very dangerous in the face of the strained credit situation and leading to a still greater depression of trade. While nothing like a "flight from the pound" has yet occurred, such might easily be the result of too

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violent an attack. And this in its turn would swell the figures of the unemployed by the restriction of credit and the increase in the rates for money which would be the only counteracting measure available to the Bank of England.

For all these reasons, therefore, it does not appear that the new administration will have an altogether easy task. The dangers that beset it are real, and may prove obstinate. At the same time, the opportunities are great, and the men chiefly concerned in solving the problems, partly, indeed, of their own making, which beset the Government, are men of courage and intelligence. Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. Graham, all have determination and capacity. If they can overcome the difficulties just outlined, they will prove themselves possessed of rare political genius.

III. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

MEANWHILE, neither of the Opposition parties finds itself in an altogether happy situation. The Liberals, after an unexampled expenditure of effort and treasure, succeeded in winning only some sixty seats in the new Parliament. Moreover, owing to the somewhat unexpected numbers of the Labour party, the Liberals are not really able to hold the balance in the manner which they had hoped. They are not able to offer the Conservatives the possibility of a stable Government, and for that reason all immediate chances of a coalition are ruled out. At the same time, the quality of this small party is very high. Apart from Mr. Lloyd George, who in a few weeks has recovered all his old mastery of the House of Commons, men like Sir Herbert Samuel, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. E. D. Simon add distinction to the new Chamber, and will undoubtedly, in the next few months, prove them-

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selves parliamentarians of marked ability. Mr. Lloyd George, incomparably the most interesting figure in contemporary politics, has already shown himself the dominating personality in the new House. After a temporary eclipse from 1924 to 1929, when the huge Conservative majority made his position almost impossible, he is now listened to with attention and respect. Nor can there be any doubt that he holds the key of the political situation, and that his decisions during the next two years will prove the decisive factors. At the same time, the Liberal party finds itself subject to all the inherent weaknesses and difficulties of a centre position. It is almost equally divided into two schools of thought, the one with Conservative, the other with Radical leanings. In the event of a complete re-alignment of parties, half the Liberals would go to the right and the other half to the left. It will need all Mr. Lloyd George's skill to maintain the separate entity and unity of his party. Already he has suffered a serious defection. Sir William Jowitt dealt him a severe blow by deserting to the Socialists within a week of his election as a Liberal. Further secessions may easily follow, since it is clear that the prospects for ambitious men, conscious of their own talents, are but poor and uninspiring so long as they remain wedded to Liberalism. Men who have already made their mark and held high office in the State may remain faithful. But the opportunities and expectations are not so enticing for younger men.

The Conservative party is at the moment distracted by feuds and factions. Apart from the natural disgruntlement which follows any defeat, there are at work forces wholly opposed and disharmonious within the party. While Mr. Baldwin still maintains a strong hold upon the affection and respect of the party, there is an undoubted movement hostile to his leadership. He is accused, in certain quarters, of being without the vigour and combative qualities essential to opposition. He is regarded as somewhat indolent and even supine. Nor has he the personal attributes necessary

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to lead a dispirited and disunited party to fresh and more strenuous endeavours. On the other hand, Mr. Churchill is thought to have displayed almost too feverish an anxiety to attack. By nature more prone to the policy of the assault than to that of the siege, he has already opened the trenches. His conduct during the first few weeks of the new Parliament has displayed to the full both the strength and weakness of his character. As far as can be seen at present, he is as far as ever from the leadership of the party, and still evokes, in certain powerful quarters, feelings of uneasiness and distrust.

Mr. Neville Chamberlain has meanwhile given indications of a return to his father's political philosophy, and is engaged in an attempt to restate an Imperial economic policy on modern lines, which he hopes may prove the salvation of his party. But he had already been outbid by Mr. Amery and Lord Beaverbrook. Amid all these discordant notes, the party is puzzled and distraught. A by-election at Twickenham has demonstrated the confusion in the Conservative ranks. Sir John Ferguson, standing as a Conservative, was officially repudiated by the Central Office, on the ground that he was advocating a protectionist policy of a character unacceptable to the leaders. He was supported by many private Members and certain influential ex-Ministers, as well as by the whole force of Lord Beaverbrook's powerful press. Nor is it at all clear whether an official ban may not have proved more helpful to him in his campaign than an official blessing.

It will thus be seen that the Conservative party is going through one of those recurrent periods of distraction which beset it from time to time. The same symptoms appeared after the defeat of 1906. But it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to these difficulties. A party of the right is always liable to them, but Conservatism is an essential feature in any political system and the Conservative party generally recovers its equilibrium, not so much owing to its own virtues as to the

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mistakes of its opponents. Nothing will do more to revive the Conservative party than a serious menace to property and economic stability from the Socialists. Under such a threat, the ranks will be closed and the rally begin.

IV. THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL SITUATION

RECENT months have not been unpromising, from the industrial point of view. The production of iron and steel has increased; the output of coal has been greater than in the corresponding quarters of 1928; the statistics of shipbuilding tonnage show improvement; the seasonal summer rise in unemployment has been less marked than usual. Price and credit movements have, however, been disquieting, and make the outlook uncertain. The recrudescence of industrial disputes this summer coincides with the return of the Labour Government, but has only indirect connection with the change that has come over the expectations of Labour. Four important movements are in progress as we write, in textiles, coal mining, engineering and shipbuilding, and railways, but it is hard to attach them to a common thread.

In the two textile trades of cotton and wool the employers have renewed their demands for wages reductions, and in Lancashire have carried them to the point of a general lock-out. In both industries average wage rates show a greater proportionate increase over 1913 than in the other staple exporting industries; but in both the problem of recovery from nearly ten years of depression is more one of reorganisation than of wages costs.

The cotton stoppage began on July 29 on the expiry of the employers' notices. They had never moved from their position that a wages reduction must take place, and the utmost concession they would make was that the amount of the original demand for one of 12½ per cent. might be modified. The operatives had begun by refusing

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any reduction and by asking that the question should wait until the Government inquiry has reported; then they suggested arbitration by the Industrial Court. On the eve of the stoppage division appeared among the unions. Those on the spinning side of the industry, the Spinners and Cardroom Amalgamations, recognising that the employers were unmovable, were prepared to negotiate a reduction. Those on the manufacturing side, headed by the Weavers' Amalgamation, held out for arbitration. A last-minute hitch among the cardroom operatives ended what seemed a promising chance of a peaceful settlement between the employers and the spinning unions, and a general stoppage took place, which was virtually complete among the federated firms. Once the stoppage had begun, feeling among the operatives hardened, and the spinners' leaders, after a vote of the branches had been taken, were denied negotiating powers. The deadlock was now complete; the parties were without common ground, and the only alternative to an obstinate struggle was arbitration. The manufacturing employers were favourably disposed towards it, but the spinning employers, who have never taken kindly to trusting outsiders, stuck out until August 13, when, after the Prime Minister had made a persuasive personal appeal, they accepted the principle, and a way out was at last open.

A general reduction of the size first demanded would have pressed hardly on the poorer paid workpeople, especially on the weavers, in whose case, it was generally admitted, a flat rate reduction would operate inequitably. The operatives' resistance gained in strength from their feeling that the troubles of the industry were not of their making, that the employers were "taking it out of the workpeople" instead of applying themselves to reorganisation, and that the effect of the reduction on the economic position of the industry would be exceedingly small. The operatives had long advocated a public inquiry, and it was in fulfilment of its pledge to them that the Government,

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on July 31, appointed a subcommittee of the Committee of Civil Research

to consider and report upon the present condition and prospects of the cotton industry, and to make recommendations as to any action which may appear desirable and practicable in order to improve the position of this industry in the markets of the world.

The part which the State can play in the revival of the cotton industry is limited, much more limited than in the coal industry. The inquiry may be valuable in stimulating action within the industry and in suggesting practical measures of Government assistance in the shape of trade facilities and export credits. Lancashire has been talking rationalisation and reorganisation steadily for the last five years, but progress has been disappointing. The actual condition of the trade has grown worse. A fifth of the American cotton spinning section is permanently closed down; another fifth is idle; the greater part of the remainder is working at a loss. The Egyptian cotton spinning section, after a long profitable period, is suffering from over-production and internal competition.

The two main problems are, first, the elimination of the cut-throat competition within the trade by the creation of large-scale amalgamations, particularly of spinning mills; and second, the increase of the volume of trade, which involves radical changes in marketing methods and improvements in technical efficiency. The most promising amalgamation scheme, that of the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, is only slowly getting on its feet. It may soon comprise some thirty mills, and it aims at embracing 10,000,000 spindles (rather more than a sixth of Lancashire's total) together with a larger number of looms than has been yet brought under one ownership in this country. It is now clear that one of the worst results of the recapitalisation "bubble" was that it has made the combination of badly financed companies much more difficult than that of sound companies. A merger of fifteen Egyptian

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cotton spinning firms is passing through much less trouble than is being met with by the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, which is mainly amalgamating mills spinning American cotton. The main obstacle in the way of the Corporation has been its insistence on calling up unpaid capital, and it has met with stubborn resistance from the directors and shareholders of the bankrupt mills, in spite of the pressure exercised in its favour by the banks. Many other amalgamation projects are in the air, and some may mature.

The industry has already strong combinations in fine spinning, bleaching, calico printing and dyeing, but each of these enjoys some monopoly advantages, and is mainly horizontal, thus maintaining the stratification which has long been characteristic. The new amalgamations in spinning and, it is hoped, later in weaving, will also be in the main horizontal ; but much is being made of the possibilities of co-operation between such combined sections, especially in organised marketing, and the planting of bulk productions in foreign markets where the undercutting of Japan, Italy, and the United States is most acutely felt. One of the most interesting of Lancashire's problems is how to combine the advantages of the present horizontal stratification with those of the vertical method adopted by some of her keenest competitors. Successful co-operation based on large-scale units would bring the English industry to a stage of development not reached by its foreign competitors.

Much useful work is being done by the Joint Committee of Cotton Trade Organisations, covering all sections of the trade, including the operatives. It has produced reports on costs of production, financial reorganisation of the spinning section, technical efficiency and adaptability in the weaving section (in which Lancashire has fallen behind), and specific methods of meeting competition. One of the Committee's proposals reached the stage of practical experiment a year ago ; spinners, manufacturers,

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dyers and merchants joined in sharing the risk of putting on the China market a cloth in competition with a well-known Japanese line. It is too early to say whether the form chosen for the experiment will be permanently successful, but the same principle of co-operative marketing is about to be extended to other fields in which Lancashire has lost ground in her export trade.

Like the cotton industry, the wool and worsted industry has been for nearly two years on the edge of a stoppage over wages. The wages agreement was ended in November, 1927, and the Industrial Council fell out of gear, but the claim for reductions was not pressed hard, and the unions obtained a respite last year by supporting safeguarding. This spring, even before the tariff was refused, the employers moved again for a reduction. After sporadic stoppages, the Industrial Council was revived, and on July 26 the two sides nearly reached agreement on the amount of the reduction—the employers asking for one of 9.09 per cent., the unions being ready to concede one of 7.25 per cent. A final settlement has not been reached at the time of writing. Although the fundamental problems of the West Riding industry are much like those of Lancashire (except that the legacy of bad finance is smaller), even less advance towards rationalisation is perceptible.

If there is to be another of our recurrent coal crises this year, it will not come until the autumn. The district wages agreements in two-thirds of the coalfields expire or are terminable about the end of the year, and the Miners' Federation has decided to make this the occasion for trying to win back the national agreement and the national minimum wage that were lost in 1926. The Government is pledged to the miners to reduce their hours. To return to the seven-hour day would, on the coalowners' estimate, add between 2s. and 3s. a ton to the cost of production, and compel either severe contraction of output with intense unemployment, or drastic counterbalancing wages reductions. The miners' conference on July 25, for lack of a

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clear lead from its executive (although Mr. Cook was this time on the side of moderation and caution), adhered to its demand for immediate repeal of the Eight Hours Act. The decision is not, however, final, and the Federation will be reluctant to force the Government's hand. The Government is attempting to find a way out by persuading the miners to accept a small reduction of hours, and the owners to improve the ability of the industry to bear this burden by developing organised marketing.

The President of the Board of Trade announced on July 23 a programme of voluntary co-operation among the owners, backed by the threat of legislative compulsion. The owners have responded quickly; the existing district marketing schemes, two of which were moribund, are being overhauled; districts without schemes, notably the north-eastern fields, are creating them; and the first steps are being taken towards the formation of a national co-ordinating committee. It remains to be seen whether the divergences in principle between the largest scheme, that of the Central Commercial Collieries Association, which covers the Midlands, and is bound up with an export subsidy, and those of the other districts, which are more concerned with maintaining minimum prices, can be reconciled.

The Government also promises measures to facilitate colliery amalgamations and to nationalise minerals. Neither measure will arouse the old opposition, and opinion in the industry has largely swung round to the view of the Samuel Commission that State ownership of minerals may be a powerful means towards securing closer organisation.

The outlines of the coal problem will be clearer in a few months, but it is already evident that it will severely tax the statesmanship of the Government and the industry if it is to be solved without economic disturbance.

In the depressed industries of engineering and ship-building the unions continue, rather half-heartedly, their efforts to raise wages. The forty engineering unions, after

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abandoning the idea of selective approach to the more profitable sections, fell back on a national application, the consideration of which the employers have deferred to the autumn on the ground that they must know first what effect the Government's policy will have on industry. The shipbuilding employers, faced with a similar multiplicity of unions, have offered to establish a national standard time-rate for craftsmen of £3 a week and for unskilled men of 41s. a week. This is probably an advance towards more rational organisation, but it seems to be as little likely to win early and general acceptance by the unions as other recent proposals of the employers for overcoming the sectional differences and conflicting policies of the unions.

Acting under pressure from the rank and file the three railway unions have given notice to end, on November 13, the agreement of last year by which all grades suffered a wages cut of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. The companies' reply is that they still need the sacrifice and that it is too early to judge of their success in meeting road competition, to which end they have just acquired extensive interests in road transport companies. In the interests of the trade unions themselves, there is much to be done in levelling up wages in these competing services.

Although the Mond-Turner Conference, and, still more, the ideas behind it, will stand out as a landmark in industrial history, it has had few positive results. Some trade union enthusiasm evaporated when the Federation of British Industries and the National Confederation of Employers Organisations turned a cold and sceptical eye on the Conference's first report. But realising the danger of mere negation the employers have set up a joint committee with the General Council of the Trades Union Congress to discuss means of co-operation. The committee did not get to work until July, and it may be some time before any proposals emerge. Meanwhile, since its report on unemployment in March, the Mond-Turner Conference has been

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quiescent. From the beginning certain large sections of industry have been lukewarm, if not hostile, towards the underlying principle of national co-operation. It is a commentary on the state of British industry that the unrest of the summer of 1929 is mainly displayed in these sections, and that in each the root problem is that of rationalisation, the promotion of which the Conference put in the forefront of its programme.

IRELAND : EVENTS IN THE FREE STATE

I. POLITICAL

NOTHING more clearly indicates the change which has taken place in our political point of view than the equanimity, amounting almost to indifference, with which Irish public opinion now contemplates an English general election. Most of us can remember the thrill with which we followed each of these contests in the past as the struggle for Home Rule waxed and waned. In those days even English by-elections filled us with excitement. Now the swing of the pendulum and the most thrilling orations on unemployment leave us entirely cold. The Free State was much more interested in the result of the Sligo-Leitrim by-election than in the fate of Mr. Baldwin's Government, which is indeed quite as it should be. This contest was a straight fight between the Government party and Fianna Fail and was a real trial of strength between the parties, for it was the first time that Mr. de Valera's ramp concerning the payment of the land annuities* had been submitted to the verdict of a typical rural constituency. In the result the Government candidate, General Sean MacEoin, won by a majority of nearly four thousand votes and actually increased the party poll. It is true, of course, that General MacEoin (better known perhaps as the Blacksmith of Ballinalee), whose heroic and chivalrous exploits in the

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 74, March 1929, p. 379 *et seq.*

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Anglo-Irish struggle have given him a legendary and almost mythical fame, was a very strong candidate, but this by no means explains the failure of the electorate to rise to Mr. de Valera's bait, even though in order to increase its attractiveness he had undertaken to devote £2,000,000 out of the £3,000,000 land annuities which he proposes to appropriate to a scheme for derating agricultural land, and to apply the remaining £1,000,000 to other grandiose schemes for the benefit of the farmers. The Fianna Fail party was indeed foolish enough to raise the question by a motion in the Dail, which gave Mr. Hogan, the Minister for Agriculture, a splendid opportunity of riddling Mr. de Valera's position both legally and morally. Mr. de Valera's argument is that the only authority for paying the land purchase annuities to the English National Debt Commissioners or the Bank of England is Section 12 of the Free State Land Purchase Act of 1923 which authorises the payment of the annuities over to a British fund, with the implication that if that section were repealed the Free State Government would be bound to retain the annuities, as they would have no legal authority for paying them elsewhere, and that in any event as the agreement of December 1925* between the English and Free State Governments cancelled all our obligations to bear a portion of the British National Debt, as provided by Article 5 of the Treaty, land stock being a part of the public debt, there is no longer any obligation to pay these annuities. Mr. Hogan aptly and conclusively answered that if Section 12 had never been inserted in the Land Act of 1923 the land purchase annuities could not be legally retained because all the Land Purchase Acts from 1891 to 1909 specifically set out that these annuities shall be paid over by the Irish Land Commission to the Land Purchase Fund or Account for the purpose of transferring the interest to the stockholders and creating a fund to redeem the stock. The effect of Section 12 of the Land Act of 1923 was not to

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 62, March 1926, p. 352 *et seq.*

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authorise for the first time the payment of the annuities to this fund—that authority was already given in the previous Acts—but to provide that the annuities should be paid to this British fund not by the Land Commission, as provided by the previous Acts, but by the Free State Ministry of Finance. As regards the argument based on the agreement of December 1925, Mr. Hogan points out that public debt is a debt in respect of which the taxpayer is liable, and in respect of which he has no remedy and no security. The land annuities cannot come within this definition because they are debts due by private citizens who had borrowed the money to purchase their land, and it is only for the purpose of paying interest and sinking fund to the National Debt Commissioners that land stock can be treated as a national debt. The essence of the transaction is in reality perfectly simple. The Irish farmers wanted to buy their land but they had no chance of getting the money, even at an exorbitant rate of interest, without security. They were able to do so owing to the fact that the British Government, or, in other words, the British taxpayer, went security for the payment of the purchase money. The purchase was financed accordingly and repayment spread out over a large number of years at $2\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. interest. For forty years this bargain has been honourably carried out on both sides, until now when the Fianna Fail party suggests that although the loan must be repaid to those who lent the money it must be repaid not by the Irish farmers who borrowed it but by the British taxpayer who went security for its payment. No doubt we can pass legislation refusing to pay either the capital or interest of this legitimate debt, but, as Mr. Hogan caustically remarks, such a decision would inevitably lead to a discussion, if not on the validity of the Eighth Commandment, at least on the contentious issue of whether the sovereign people have a right to do wrong. Moreover, it is not improbable that in this event the Irish farmer, having been set such a dishonest headline, might legitimately ask by what moral authority the Free

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State was entitled to pocket the annuities or to enforce their payment. The whole of this agitation against the land annuities is another unfortunate illustration of Mr. de Valera's political weakness. The question was first raised by *An Phoblacht*, the organ of extreme Republicanism, and Mr. de Valera immediately followed suit, because he is in the unfortunate position that he has not courage enough to ignore the whip of any infinitesimal body of extremists who shout louder than himself. Moreover, he has apparently no clear views on the subject, because at first he stated that the farmers should not pay annuities calculated to compensate the landlord but rather a land tax graduated in accordance with their ability to pay. And although he now states that he is not in favour of the repudiation of debts, he apparently considers that they should not be paid by the debtor but by the surety. But Mr. Hogan was really flogging a dead horse, because any public interest that Mr. de Valera's pronouncements on the subject aroused died a natural death when it was discovered that whatever the ultimate destination of the land annuities his scheme in its final form provided that the Irish farmer should continue to pay them as usual. The really serious aspect of the whole matter is rather the fact that the second party in the State should deliberately father such an immoral project.

Another matter which has created violent controversy is the Juries' (Protection) Bill, which, as its title denotes, has been introduced by the Government to protect jurors in political cases against assassination and terrorism.* This drastic measure provides amongst other things for the secret empanelling of juries, majority verdicts of nine out of twelve, imprisonment for refusal to recognise the court, exclusion of the public from certain trials, prohibition of the publication of jurors' names, the service of jury summonses by post, and penalties for the intimidation of jurors. In its original form this measure was intended to be

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 75, June 1929, p. 594.

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permanent, but the Government has now wisely decided to limit its operation to two years. Whilst there is much to be said for some of its provisions, and whilst it may be agreed that the principle of a substantial majority verdict is sound, there does not seem to be much point in preserving the form of trial by jury when the vital elements of the system are eliminated. Nor does it seem possible, whatever system is devised, to secure absolute secrecy. It is not much satisfaction to a juror to be shot by number instead of by name. Although the Bill will undoubtedly be passed with some minor amendments, the debates in the Dail and Senate show that it has aroused little enthusiasm, and there can be little doubt that public opinion generally would have favoured a more drastic measure substituting a special judicial tribunal of two or three judges for trial by jury in cases of a political nature. The small gang of fanatics who have done their best to kill trial by jury through terrorism do not deserve to have the system maintained for their benefit, nor can jurors be legitimately asked to expose themselves to serious risks for the purpose of preserving what is now little more than a mere formality. Mr. de Valera, with his usual unconscious humour, having complained that the Bill was an outrage on Magna Charta, proceeded to demonstrate that it was really the continuity of British government in Ireland. His party tabled more than one hundred amendments to the Bill, whereupon the Government retorted by imposing a rigid time limit for the various stages of the measure, which was duly carried. Had Fianna Fail dealt with the Bill in the ordinary way by a reasonable number of relevant amendments they would undoubtedly have been able to put up a more effective opposition, instead of frittering away more than half the time allowed to the committee stage in a series of useless divisions which only gave additional point to the Government's contention that opposition to the measure was really based on vexatious obstruction undertaken to please Mr. de Valera's real taskmasters outside.

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The Economic Committee* has issued interim majority and minority reports on the question of a subsidy for wheat. The majority, consisting of the Government members of the Committee, are against a subsidy, and the minority, representing Fianna Fail, are in its favour. The majority contend that it is uneconomic to turn our farmers from their present methods of farming which are profitable, to the cultivation of crops like wheat which can only be made to pay if the whole people, including the farmers themselves, are taxed to subsidise them. It is not surprising that, owing to the impossibility of arriving at any agreement on questions of importance, this committee has now decided to dissolve. The experiment it involved was worth making, but it was almost impossible that it should succeed. Fianna Fail would erect Bishop Berkeley's brass wall around the country if it could, and by a policy of stiff protection try to produce everything here regardless of expense or efficiency. The more impossible the project the more likely it is to find favour in the eyes of Mr. de Valera's party. For these reasons it favours a subsidy on wheat, alleging that our food supply would be endangered by a blockade, as if wheat were the only food stuff produced in Ireland. A good example of the pitfalls inherent in such a policy is to be found in the fact that the Government has already had to revise the recently imposed woollen tariff by raising the limit of exemption for cheap imported cloth from 1s. 6d. per square yard to 2s. 6d., the Irish woollen manufacturers having admitted that they will not for some time ahead be able to supply cloths of that value and that consequently the ready-made clothing trade, which is also protected, would not be able to carry on their business at a profit. Mr. de Valera's motion that the flour milling industry should be protected by imposing a tariff on all imported flour, save flour admitted under special licence for biscuit manufacture, gave rise to an interesting debate on another aspect of the same subject. The Tariff

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 74, March 1929, p. 276.

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Commission* had already advised against such a tariff, which is demanded by the flour millers on the grounds that they are subject to unfair competition through the dumping of English flour. The Tariff Commission considered that no circumstances exist to prevent an efficient mill in the Free State, working at full capacity, from being able to produce and market flour at a price capable of competing successfully with British flour, if British flour is sold at rates which give a reasonable return to the producers. A tariff, in their view, would only increase the price of flour, and consequently the price of bread. Moreover, it would only lead to additional employment for some 150 persons. Mr. McGilligan, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, pointed out that the real remedy was to rationalise our flour milling industry by concentrating the manufacture of flour in large port mills efficiently managed.

Various estimates of an interesting nature have also been discussed in the Dail recently. Particular mention must be made of Mr. McGilligan's statement in his capacity of Minister for External Affairs, a department in which considerable development has recently taken place. The total of this vote is now £59,796, and Mr. McGilligan pointed out that, whilst we are only spending something less than 3s. out of every £100 of national expenditure on foreign representation, Finland spends 17s. and Norway 24s. He pointed out that our membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations is that of a completely independent State freely associated with other member States and co-equal in status with them. The supreme executive authority in every exclusive concern of this country was exercised on the sole advice of the Executive Council. Our contribution towards the formation of new constitutional doctrines within the Commonwealth was positive, persistent and decisive, and had been directed to removing anomalous legal forms, securing the discontinuance of practices that have no place in modern democratic life and

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 72, September 1928, p. 827.

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no justification in present constitutional theory. Our purpose was that whatever remnants there may be of the old order of Imperial control should be removed and the last legal vestiges of the organisation now superseded swept away. The free co-operation which is the basis of the Commonwealth idea, the instrument of its usefulness, and the expression of the individual sovereignty of its members, would be clothed in forms which would reveal rather than conceal its reality. We had sent representatives abroad, and were sending more representatives abroad, primarily as part of our contribution to the organisation of peace as the world's most impressive need. We have fulfilled our traditional national policy of taking our place amongst the nations of the world, and if our influence was to be increasingly felt in the promotion of progressive causes and if our efforts were to be thrown more and more into the balance of forces working for the peace and harmony of the world, our new responsibilities must be solemnly understood and seriously undertaken. After this declaration of policy Mr. McGilligan stated that the Government were about to establish diplomatic relations with France, Germany and the Vatican. This latter step has given great satisfaction not only in Ireland but to the Irish race all over the world whose traditional spiritual allegiance to the Chair of Peter has now found definite expression. The first Minister Plenipotentiary appointed to Rome is Mr. Charles Bewley, K.C., a distinguished member of the Irish bar who speaks Italian and is in every way a most suitable representative. It is interesting to note that this appointment was decided on without any consultation or discussion with the Irish Catholic bishops. In this, as in other matters, the Free State Government, whilst maintaining a perfectly correct attitude, has shown itself entirely free from clerical influence. For instance, quite recently a parish priest in County Galway, who assisted illegal manifestations of the agitation against the payment of the land purchase annuities, received and served a sentence of

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six weeks' imprisonment amidst general approval. But although these various representatives abroad will fulfil the useful purpose of "showing the flag" and establishing political contact with the world, their commercial value must naturally remain slight. In that respect the office of the High Commissioner in London must remain the most important and is doing constant good work by arrangements for the exhibition and supervision of Irish produce, the settlement of commercial disputes, and reports on the movements of markets and prices.

An unfortunate situation, which has fortunately remained internal, has recently arisen concerning our national anthem and given rise to one of those political storms in a tea-cup in which we delight. In order to understand its implications it is necessary to explain that the official anthem of the Free State is "The Soldiers' Song," a rather poor piece of doggerel verse set to indifferent music which was a popular ballad of the I.R.A. during the Anglo-Irish struggle. It was obviously adopted by the Government not because of its inherent qualities but because it would otherwise have been appropriated by Mr. de Valera. Being in its nature frankly political rather than national, it has naturally unpleasant associations for many people. Unfortunately there is no other alternative tune but "God Save the King," which in Ireland at all events is not so much a prayer for the King as an expression of the old Unionist ascendancy spirit and as such is unfortunately also both partisan and irritating to nationalist sentiment. The recent controversy arose through the refusal of the Governor-General to attend the Trinity College sports—one of the principal social events in Dublin—unless he was received with "The Soldiers' Song" instead of "God Save the King." The committee in charge of the sports endeavoured to arrange a compromise by offering to play both tunes, but to this the Governor-General, acting with the approval of the Government, refused to agree. In the result the Governor-General did not attend the sports,

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which were consequently boycotted by outside clubs. The attitude of the Governor-General and the Government would seem to be that "God Save the King" is the English national anthem and that in the Free State the King's representative as head of the State should be greeted with the Free State anthem only. This is, of course, a further development of what one might call the policy of maximum separation within the terms of the Treaty of 1921, and whilst it can be logically defended it is also extremely regrettable, because in the long view insistence on relatively trivial rights of this kind does not placate the Republican element and definitely retards the possibilities of reunion with the North. One feels that in such matters the Government is guilty of allowing itself to be influenced by extremist opinion in the very way it properly accuses Mr. de Valera of acting. What we really require is a new national anthem, entirely devoid of political antecedents and expressing the love and pride of all Irishmen in their common country. But we must leave that ideal solution to the combined and healing forces of time, good taste, and common sense.

II. ECONOMIC AND GENERAL

NO better proof of our economic progress can be found than the fact that during the last year, for the first time, our emigrants to the United States have failed by seven thousand to exhaust the allotted quota. This proves that both the desire and the necessity to emigrate are alike diminishing, and it may well be that the materially reduced quota which soon comes into force* will satisfy our necessities. The trade statistics continue to show continually improving results. The external trade turnover of the Free State for the twelve months ended May 31, 1929, reached £105,784,000, or almost exactly £3,000,000 more

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 75, June 1929, p. 604.

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than for the previous twelve months. Both imports and exports increased, imports by £1,314,000 and exports by £1,675,000, whilst the adverse trade balance is down by £361,000, to £13,554,000 as compared with its former figure of £19,000,000. The post-war slump in prices unfortunately coincided with our civil war and made the years 1922 and 1923 disastrous ones for our agricultural industry. But since 1924 and the steady development of our agricultural exports on systematic and efficient lines, the general economic condition has steadily improved. The recent figures show that agricultural exports continue to develop. We have now a much larger number of cattle and sheep per hundred persons than any of the other European countries. The supply of pigs is greater than in any other European country except Denmark. We sell more cattle and beef to Great Britain than any country except Argentina, more sheep and mutton than any countries except New Zealand, Argentina, and Australia, more pigs and pig products than any country except Denmark, more eggs than any country except Denmark, and twice as much poultry as France, our strongest competitor. The Free State now ranks fifth as a purchaser of British goods and tenth as a supplier of goods to British markets. The United States last year purchased British produce and manufactures to the value of £46,624,000 compared with £35,136,000 worth purchased by the Free State. Denmark, our greatest competitor in the British markets, purchased only £9,763,000 worth of goods from Great Britain although she sold to her goods valued at £53,056,000. The Irish Free State imported 78 per cent. of its consignments from Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and 22 per cent. from other countries, whilst it sold 96 per cent. of its exports to Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and only 4 per cent. to all other countries. Our export trade is strongly seasonal in nature. Exports are always low in March and April and usually reach their maximum in September and October. Imports fluctuate

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in a more irregular manner. In every one of the last five years imports increased from January to March (the month of maximum imports), fell from March to August, rose again from August to September, and fell from October to January. This seasonal trend in exports gives its general character to the trend of the balance of trade, which usually reaches its highest point in March-April and its lowest in late summer. Everything goes to show that this year we may expect an abundant harvest and this, combined with the successful advertisement of Irish produce in Great Britain, is bound to improve our trade figures for the second half of the year. The activities of the Empire Marketing Board, the floating exhibition of Irish produce in the steamship *Killarney* which has recently visited the principal English ports, the Irish exhibit at the North-East Coast Exhibition, and the recent visit to Ireland of representative English business men, are all steps in the right direction and can only increase that economic co-operation between the two islands from which both have so much to gain, and out of which the most fruitful and natural kind of union in both interest and policy must eventually grow. This year it is also estimated that the revenue from tourist traffic will be at least £3,000,000, a welcome addition to our national income, largely due to the efforts and organisation of the Irish Tourist Association which has certainly justified its existence. This traffic can be still further increased given efficient service on the part of the hotel proprietors and effective advertisement of our national beauties and sporting facilities.

The report of the Free State Land Commission covering its work for the last five years has just been published. This gigantic undertaking has already involved advances for land purchase amounting to £99,790,519, and will require about £30,000,000 to complete. Nor do these figures include some £3,795,984 advanced by the Land Commission to rural district councils for the purchase of small plots under the Labourers' Acts. Under the last

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Land Acts 1923-27, which completed by compulsion the purchase of all agricultural land in the Free State, land bonds amounting to £4,029,239 have been issued in satisfaction of the purchase price. Land purchase, whilst it has not worked all the wonders which its advocates predicted, is bound in the long run to establish the Irish farmer on a firm basis of prosperity and independence and to place him in a favourable position to cope with those problems of organisation and rationalisation which agriculture must face in the near future. The Agricultural Credit Corporation,* whose special function is to make long term loans repayable on an annuity basis to farmers, creameries, and agricultural enterprises generally, has completed its first year's work. During this period 2,555 loans have been issued to borrowers, totalling £322,000. Applications for loans totalling £811,000 are at present in process of issue or investigation. Recent developments have included a scheme for the erection of new creameries and an arrangement for making loans to members of creamery societies through the societies themselves. The co-operative movement is also being helped by the Corporation through loans for the purchase of machinery and schemes for the financial reorganisation of the weaker societies. To meet the increasing demands on its funds the Corporation has recently made a public issue of £250,000 in the form of mortgage bonds guaranteed by the State. It has powers to borrow under State guarantee up to a total of £7,500,000. It is interesting to note that a similar organisation is now being established in England.

The Shannon hydro-electric power works are rapidly nearing completion. The headrace or power canal extending for seven and a half miles from Parteen Villa, where a large dam or weir about 320 feet in length is being constructed across the Shannon, to the power station at Ardnacrusha near Limerick, is now nearly finished and the power station

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 66, March 1927, p. 349, and No. 71, June 1928, p. 608.

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itself is already far advanced. The amount originally voted for the work was £5,210,000, and this has now been increased by a further sum of £450,000. Reports of an alarmist kind were recently circulated concerning the collapse of one of the huge embankments erected in connection with the scheme, but these were grossly exaggerated. What really happened was that about two hundred yards of an embankment, erected near the dam across the Shannon at Parteen Villa, in order to raise the level of the river about twenty-five feet above the dam, subsided about twenty feet owing to the foundation clay becoming soft through the diversion of a small stream in the vicinity. It is now proposed to reconstruct the embankment by removing the soft portion of the foundation, or, if this fails, to build a new embankment in the immediate vicinity where a satisfactory foundation of red boulder clay is available. This subsidence, although it has proved unexpected and irritating, should not delay the completion of the works and the supply of current beyond next spring, and occurrences of the kind are almost inevitable in a scheme of this magnitude. The Electricity Supply Board under its statutory powers has already taken over the most important municipal electricity undertakings, but so far has not been able to come to terms with the important company which supplies electricity for the lighting and tramways at Cork. The rates of charge already announced provide that electricity used for lighting and domestic purposes in private dwelling houses will be charged for at a fixed amount dependent on the poor law valuation of the house, plus 2d. per unit of electricity consumed. The fixed charge will vary with the valuation on a sliding scale. Factories which agree to take a supply from the Board for power purposes will be supplied with electricity for lighting purposes at 6d. per unit, and public institutions will be charged at the same rate. The Board is supplying fittings and appliances on a system of easy payments, and will also undertake to wire premises on the hire-purchase system.

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Great interest has been aroused by the announcement that Mr. James Drumm, a young scientist connected with the National University of Ireland, has succeeded in inventing a new form of electric storage battery which is capable of being charged and discharged in a few minutes. A company has been formed to develop the invention, in which the Free State Government has acquired a controlling interest. At the moment experiments are being undertaken on the Irish railways, and it was owing to a premature disclosure of this fact, and the announcement of the Government's financial interest in the matter, contained in the annual estimates, that the matter became public. There is no doubt that laboratory tests have been carried out with success, and if the invention survives the practical tests which are now to be made on the railway, there can be little doubt that it will give rise to world-wide developments. For one thing, the electrification of our railways would become a simple task, and according to the estimate it would cost less than £100,000. Furthermore, such electrification would provide an enormous and continuous market for the current from the Shannon scheme. But indeed this would be only the beginning of the wonders which would be worked by such a battery, for it would undoubtedly solve other problems of transport on road, water, and, above all, in the air, which have so far eluded the greatest engineers. We might even envisage a situation in which the profits from the part ownership of such an invention would relieve the citizens of the Free State of all taxation. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that some of the greatest inventors have been seeking to solve this problem for many years, and so far, although success has often been claimed, no results have justified the claim. In any event, it is a matter for congratulation to find that we have young scientists capable of tackling such problems and a Government wise enough to encourage them with financial assistance.

By the death of Senator Mrs. Alice Stopford Green,

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the eminent Irish historian and widow of John Richard Green, the English historian, Ireland has lost a great and distinguished citizen. For many years her house in London was the salon for all who wished to help Ireland, and after the Rebellion of 1916 and the execution of her friend, Roger Casement, she abandoned her influential position in London and took up her abode in Dublin, where, in spite of much persecution by the "Black and Tans," she continued to carry on her work. Subsequently she became a strong supporter of the Free State, and was nominated as an original member of the Senate, to which she presented a beautiful casket of Irish workmanship to hold a list of the original members. A woman of unique charm and gracious personality, with an intellect of rare quality, she lost no opportunity of supporting any movement for the cultural development of Ireland, and her house in Dublin remained till the end a centre of fruitful intellectual activity. Her historical work is a vehement patriotic protest against the assumption that the native Irish, before the English came, were savages without commerce or culture, and though all her conclusions may not stand the test of criticism, she has certainly killed for ever the old anti-Irish method of writing our history. Her little primer on *Irish Nationality* will long remain the most moving and eloquent summary of Ireland's story, and, as she liked to remember, it was as popular with the Irish soldiers in Gallipoli and Flanders as with the Sinn Fein prisoners in the English internment camps. All who knew her will treasure the memory of her personality and of her work for Ireland.

Catholic Ireland has this summer been celebrating the centenary of Catholic Emancipation with appropriate thanksgiving. The ceremonies, which were exclusively of a religious nature, were marked by a degree of quiet devotion and efficient organisation that reflected credit on the whole nation. Some 500,000 people attended a Pontifical High Mass in the Phoenix Park, Dublin, and it

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may be doubted if so great an assembly of people has been seen in Ireland since the days of O'Connell's own Repeal meetings. They came from all parts of the country, and for the most part arrived, assembled and dispersed within the space of fourteen hours. There was no disorder or intemperance of any kind. Altogether, the demonstration proved not only the loyalty of the people to their faith, but the spirit of order and progress so characteristic of the new Ireland. It is pleasant also to note that, in the words of a prominent Catholic prelate, the celebrations were carried out "in no spirit of revenge, or with any desire to rekindle the feuds and animosities of the past," and to find both the Church of Ireland and the other Protestant sects joining with their Catholic fellow-countrymen in deploring the penal laws. We can rejoice also that the great principles for which O'Connell fought, freedom of conscience and equality of civic rights for all, have now been enshrined in the national constitution of the Free State and are the heritage of every Irishman, be he Catholic or Protestant.

Irish Free State.

August 1929.

CANADA

I. THE CANADIAN DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

THE development of a Canadian diplomatic service became inevitable when the Dominion began to take over control of its international relations. Control, without satisfactory machinery to exercise that control, would be as useless as a licence to drive without a motor car. That machinery is now being developed in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa and in the establishment of legations abroad.

Prior to 1909, that part of Canada's foreign relations which was not administered directly from Downing Street was entrusted to the care of the Canadian Secretary of State. No department devoted exclusively to international relations was considered necessary. But in 1909 the Government decided that the Dominion had attained a position of sufficient importance in the world to warrant the establishment of such a department. As the most important of Canada's relations with other countries were at that time, and still remain, those with Great Britain, the designation Foreign Office was obviously unsuitable. Hence the name, Department of External Affairs.

It was not until 1912, however, that the new department was given a Minister of its own. In that year, by statute, the Secretaryship of State for External Affairs was joined, and remains joined, to the office of Prime Minister. The newest among Canadian government departments hence acquired the prestige of having its destinies guided by the

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leader of the Government. In the future, as Canada's external relations gain in volume and importance, it may not be considered wise that the head of the Government should by law be forced to accept the added burden of the departmental work associated with external affairs, but at present the arrangement seems to work admirably.

The work of the department has naturally grown as the Dominion has more and more accepted the responsibility for conducting its external relations. That growth has been greatly accelerated during the last few years by the opening of Canadian legations abroad and its natural consequence, the opening of foreign legations in Ottawa. But the most striking evidence of the development of Canada's control of her external affairs, and the one which has caused the greatest controversy, is the growth of a distinctively Canadian diplomatic service—if indeed the diversely organised group of Canadian representatives abroad should at present be termed a diplomatic service. A distinction must be made at once in the service between those who represent the country in other parts of the Empire, and those who represent it in foreign capitals. Indeed, there is also a third class : those who are attached to the Canadian advisory office at Geneva. A Canadian Minister is, of course, accredited by the King to the head of a foreign State, and the High Commissioner by the Canadian Government to the British Government ; the political advisory officer at Geneva is technically accredited to nobody. But in spite of formal distinctions, the work of all three is, or should be, essentially the same, and all may be considered, in practice, to form a part of Canada's diplomatic service.

The first in seniority and importance of Canada's representatives abroad is the High Commissioner in London. The first appointment to this post was made as far back as 1880 by Sir John Macdonald. Sir John is enthusiastically remembered by his followers to-day for his " British subject I was born, British subject I will die " sentiments ; but it

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should not be forgotten that he was a staunch believer in a sane but steady development of Canadian nationalism : and so we find him a determined upholder of the dignity and quasi-diplomatic status of a Canadian High Commissioner a long fifty years ago. The Conservative party in Canada is traditionally the buttress of the British connection and the exponent of Empire patriotism, but there is enough evidence to support the view that it has always stood for the development of a national spirit—not that there is or need be any contradiction between the two.

The duties of the High Commissioner as laid down in the Act of 1880 establishing the office are substantially the same as they are to-day. The importance attached to the office of the High Commissioner is shown by the calibre of the men who have filled that post : Sir Alexander Galt, Sir Charles Tupper, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, Sir George Perley and the Hon. P. C. Larkin. The London appointment is, and will remain, the keystone of the diplomatic arch. Indeed it is bound to become of even greater importance than at present, for its possibilities as a channel of approach to the British Government in political matters, as well as a source of information to the Canadian Government on British problems and the British attitude towards Canadian problems, have far from reached the limit of their development.

There was also before the war a representative of the Canadian Government in France, appointed as an agent-general in 1882 and between 1911 and 1928 known as the Commissioner-General. Recognition of the increased importance of this office was made last year when it was raised to the dignity of a legation and its incumbent for the last eighteen years, the Hon. Philippe Roy, became a Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty. Mr. Roy, as Minister, is now given officially and of right that recognition by the French Government which previously had been accorded merely by courtesy or by virtue of the good offices of the British Ambassador. It would seem proper that

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Canada's varied and important relations with its first mother country should be conducted through a representative in Paris who has the dignity and status conferred by diplomatic rank.

The first Canadian legation to be established, however, was that in Washington. The idea of Canadian diplomatic representation in Washington, and indeed in other capitals, goes back much further than is generally realised. As long ago as 1892, Sir Charles Tupper, a Conservative leader in the Canadian House of Commons, moved the following resolution :—

It is expedient that communications be opened with His Majesty's Government in order to bring about such fuller representation of Canadian interests at Washington and at the capitals of other countries in which such other representatives may be found desirable as may be consistent with the proper relations which should exist between Great Britain and Canada.

Sir Charles was thinking of a Canadian attaché at British embassies. Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Liberal leader, supported the resolution, but added that he would have gone further in the direction of separate representation :—

It is manifest (he said at that time), and it must become more and more obvious, that the interests of Canada and the interests of Great Britain are of necessity, on account of their respective positions, distinct and separate upon many things.

Sir John Thompson, during the same debate, warned the House of the futility of accepting as the Canadian representative at Washington "any person who is to be a mere servant in the British Legation there."

Even in those early days, then, there was the conviction that separate diplomatic representation for Canada at Washington was desirable, and also the feeling that this representation should be in some degree at least independent of, though co-operating with, British diplomacy. The question, however, was allowed to slumber for years,

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till in 1919 it was brought up again in a more advanced form by Sir Robert Borden. There was to be a separate Canadian legation in Washington, a separate Dominion Minister for purely Canadian as distinct from Imperial affairs. Any difficulties as to what was Imperial and what was Canadian could be solved by consultation between the Ambassador and the Minister, or by referring particular questions to the respective Governments. When the British Ambassador was away the Canadian Minister was to act for the whole Empire.

The American Government was willing to receive the Dominion Minister, the British Government gave the plan its blessing, though not without some misgiving, but the proposal was suddenly allowed to drop. Possibly the domestic political situation in Canada was responsible. In 1926 it was taken up again by a Liberal Government. This time action followed. A legation was opened and the Hon. Vincent Massey appointed Minister. But nothing was heard of the plan that the Canadian Minister should be a sort of second-in-command in the British Embassy. That suggestion was, for obvious reasons, allowed to drop.

That the Washington Legation in its two and a half years of existence has justified itself must now be apparent even to its most prejudiced opponents. Nor has the Empire been shattered by its establishment. Its value and even its necessity are now clear. It is doubtful if there are more than two or three countries that have more varied and more important contacts with the United States than has Canada. With the Dominion the greatest customer of the Republic; with a St. Lawrence Canal project in the offing, and with other problems arising from time to time, Canada would be unwise to continue to ask the British Embassy, which is fully occupied with other matters, to bear the increasingly heavy burden of conducting her relations with the United States.

It is not being ungrateful for the service performed by that Embassy in the past, efficient, valuable and gratuitous

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service, to quote the words used by Sir Richard Cartwright, forty years ago :—

More than that, I say what is known to every member here, what is known to every man of common sense in Canada, that it is utterly impossible that an English ambassador, notwithstanding the fact that he may have enjoyed many years of experience, can possibly know as much as one appointed by ourselves, either of the wants and necessities of the people of Canada, or of the particular feelings and prejudices which actuate the people of the United States.

Mention should finally be made of the opening in the present year of a legation in Tokio with the Hon. H. M. Marler as the Minister.

The circle is complete. We are represented at the capitals of our nearest neighbours, to the south, to the east and to the west—the north, at present, may safely be ignored. But can the process be stopped here ? Ottawa has declared a halt, temporarily at least, in the search for further diplomatic fields to conquer, but her declaration took no cognisance of the fact that other countries might like diplomatically to conquer Ottawa. It is both necessary and desirable, of course, that we should receive representatives from those countries where we ourselves have opened legations. A British High Commissioner in Ottawa is also welcomed as filling a long-felt need. If other countries, however, should express a desire to open legations in the Dominion, can their requests be refused, or acceded to without reciprocation on our part ? China, it is rumoured, has announced her intention of giving her Consul-General to Canada the rank of Minister. Germany and Italy may not desire to remain at Ottawa in a position inferior to France. Within ten years, it has recently been prophesied, all the great countries may well be represented by Ministers at the Canadian capital, with corresponding Canadian legations in their own.

The diplomatic service of Canada will, then, in all probability grow. How will it grow ? How will it be organised ? The parent British service has supplied the

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model for a good many countries. Fifty years ago its social exclusiveness and the fact that it was open to one type of Englishman only would have made it no model for Canada in spite of its undoubted efficiency. To-day it has retained that efficiency but lost its class consciousness. Entrance is limited only by ability to pass a severe intellectual and personal test, and it is possible to rise in it to the very top without a private purse or party popularity, though in the United States foreign service, both seem necessary to win the greatest rewards. The United States is herself indeed becoming aware of this and other weaknesses in such an important part of her governmental machinery and the whole foreign service is undergoing a process of reorganisation. Canada can find much that it will be wise to follow in the experience of the United States in this field, but she will be well advised to base the traditions and organisation of her diplomacy on London rather than on Washington.

But, however it may be organised, the new service must expect opposition. In the past this opposition has seen in any Canadian diplomatic service merely a useless, even a dangerous, gesture on the part of ardent nationalists possessed by a feverish desire to exhibit to the world on every occasion the Dominion's cherished equality of status, irrespective of the necessity or advisability of such an exhibition. Though the proposal for separate diplomatic representation was first made by the leader of the Conservative party, that party has since been lacking in enthusiasm for the idea. It can only see in this new departure a blow aimed at Imperial unity, and it feels that every Canadian representative abroad is a possible source of conflict with Great Britain; that there would always be the danger that a British Ambassador and a Canadian Minister in some foreign capital might be found urging different courses, thereby presenting to foreign eyes the unpleasant spectacle of Imperial want of unity.

Mr. Bennett, the present Conservative leader, has

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carried on this policy of opposition, though in a modified form. His position now seems to be that the establishment of Canadian legations in Washington and Paris is understandable, both because of the importance of our relations with those countries and because they themselves are sufficiently conversant with the peculiar constitutional nature of the Empire and its people not to misinterpret the new development. But there is no justification, he holds, for legations in Japan or in any other country, because such legations would undoubtedly be considered to be an assertion of complete Canadian independence. They would create a situation fraught with the greatest danger to Canada and to the Empire.

Some have opposed a Canadian diplomatic service because of the needless expense connected with it. "A good practical trade agent is all we need in foreign countries" is the burden of their argument. Others have looked with suspicion upon this adventure in gold lace and knee breeches as undemocratic. Not only has the Labour group in the Canadian House been suspicious of "this ambassadorial business," but a Conservative member of that stronghold of dignity and formality, the Senate, has also declared that he didn't believe in "all this gold braid stuff." Another member of Parliament put it even more picturesquely when he asserted that it would take "more than pink teas and 10 o'clock dinners in Washington to make Canada a nation."

If the desire for national development within the Commonwealth, a desire which cannot now be denied, finds it impossible to express itself in separate diplomatic representation without endangering the principle of Imperial co-operation, then that co-operation does not mean much and would soon disappear anyway. But it has often been insisted that the Crown must speak as one voice in foreign capitals. As one voice, yes, but not necessarily with one voice. If the only voice was that of the British Ambassador, before that voice could be used in any ques-

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tion of general Imperial interest, or with Imperial implications, every Dominion would have to be consulted. If any one objected to the words proposed they would not be spoken. What difference then does it make whether there is one voice, or two, or three, when in matters of common interest they say the same thing, or say nothing?

Probably no better defence can be offered for the development of a Canadian diplomatic service than that embodied in the words of the present Prime Minister of Canada, spoken in the Canadian House of Commons on January 31, 1928:

May I conclude, Mr. Speaker, by saying that it has been solely from a desire of meeting the responsibilities of Canada as one of the sister Dominions of the British Empire, to play our part with respect to Canadian affairs as we believe we should play it in foreign relations as well as in domestic relations with a full consciousness of our responsibilities, that we have been led to take the step we have taken with regard to representation in Europe and in Asia, and of which we hope this House will approve. In other words, our desire in these particulars as regards our country in its relation to other parts of the British Empire is expressed by the three words: equality, co-operation and responsibility. We believe in the equality of the British nations within the Empire; we wish to co-operate in a friendly and helpful way with all parts of the Empire, and we wish in co-operating to assume to the full the responsibilities which as a nation within the British Empire we believe are ours in Imperial and international affairs.

II. THE TOURIST TRAFFIC

THE tourist is, of course, no new phenomenon in Canada. Even in the days of New France there were visitors who might be described as tourists, and their number has steadily increased since then. Not a few travellers wrote accounts of what they had seen, and tourists' guides to Canada became common in the nineteenth century. But the early tourists had to be prepared to face discomforts which effectually kept down their numbers. Even in the middle of the nineteenth century

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there were few hotels worthy of the name, and most of the country inns were crude in the extreme. Canada, too, is a country of great distances, and it was long before any effectual means of surmounting this obstacle disappeared. The railway, of course, meant a great advance in speed, comfort and economy; but the railway has distinct limitations for the purposes of sightseeing. The present tourist traffic is new because of its great volume, and it seems clear that the change depends for the most part on the development and distribution of the motor car and the building of roads. The comparative ease and cheapness of travel to-day would have astounded the hardy traveller of the nineteenth century, bumping over corduroy roads, moving with more comfort but less speed in the heavy river boats.

The tourist traffic is made up of Canadians and foreigners. The former add, of course, to the total volume, but their numbers are comparatively small and their influence somewhat different. It is with the foreign tourist that this discussion is concerned. Foreign tourists, who may enter Canada by boat, rail, or motor, represent a number of countries. Probably about two-thirds of them are motorists, while an overwhelming majority are from the United States. Thus the significant feature—and it is significant—of the present tourist traffic in Canada is the great number of American motorists. This fact, which may be readily established by reference to official figures, is equally apparent to any one who cares to watch the cars on a main road.

The number of foreign cars which entered Canada during 1928 was 3,645,455, an increase of 500,000 over the previous year, and fifteen times greater than the figure for ten years ago. Estimating the number of persons per car as 3.5 it will be seen that some 12,750,000 visitors entered Canada by motor during the past year. If to this number be added the visitors entering by boat and railway (the total of which is uncertain), there appear to have been some 15,000,000 or more visitors to Canada during 1928. In

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other words, the number of tourists during the year was one and a half times as great as the resident population of Canada.

The records kept by both Dominion and provincial authorities make it possible to examine these figures in some detail. Slightly over two and a half millions of the foreign cars which entered did so on permits that permitted them to stay not more than twenty-four hours. The greatest number of such permits (no less than 1,419,000) was issued at points on the Niagara river where tourists have always been anxious to see both the Canadian and the American sides of the Falls. Nearly a million cars were entered on permits that were good for sixty days. This class would include the majority of visitors on ordinary motor trips of varying lengths. The remaining cars were admitted on permits good for six months. Over four million persons therefore—and most of them citizens of the United States—made more or less protracted stays in Canada during 1928. It is significant that the number of cars entering for this longer "vacation period" has steadily and rapidly increased in the last ten years. Though the majority of these cars come from such neighbouring States as New York, Michigan, Ohio, etc., Canadians are accustomed to seeing licence plates bearing the names of every State in the Union. New England, Southern or Mid-Western accents may be heard in every Canadian city. The long frontier enables tourists to cross at a variety of points; the records show that cars entered at 144 ports of entry during 1928.

The distribution of tourists in Canada is necessarily uneven. Ontario, which is close to great industrial centres in the United States, receives considerably the largest share of the traffic; but the greatest proportional increase in 1928 was in the province of Quebec, while the traffic in the maritime provinces has also increased proportionately more than in Ontario. This tendency will probably continue, since both Quebec and the maritime provinces offer greater contrasts to the American tourist than do the more accessible points of Ontario and the prairie provinces.

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All manner of cars and people compose the motor tourist traffic from the United States. Ancient cars strive to keep up to the minimum speed now being imposed on crowded highways, and the latest and most expensive cars to keep within the maximum allowed. Some cars contain a surprising number of children ; others only two or three adults. Rich and poor come alike. The average daily run has greatly increased. A recent inquiry in the United States indicated that it was 234 miles as compared with 100 miles ten years ago. Although the average is probably somewhat less in Canada, a similar change has taken place, especially in Ontario and Quebec which contain most of the paved highways. The Department of Highways of Nova Scotia has estimated that the average stay of tourists in that province is eleven days with an average of 637 miles covered. The reasons for the increased daily run are not hard to discover, improvements in cars and roads being the chief. The obvious and most important result is, of course, that the tourist is able to cover great distances in a comparatively short time.

Though according to one estimate 80 per cent. of the motor tourists stayed at hotels, the use of motor-camps has become general, and many cars may be seen carrying tents for use at night. Scores of towns and villages have free municipal camps, many of them equipped with conveniences, such as electricity for lighting and cooking. Private camps vary in comfort and cost from a field where one may pitch a tent for 25 cents per car to a fully equipped camp at \$2 or more. The camps are, of course, a great boon to those who cannot afford hotels or to those who wish to avoid staying in cities. They are usually inspected by the provincial authorities and have become an accepted institution. Their existence helps to explain the great increase in tourists in the last few years.

Why do people tour in motors at all, and in particular why do they come to Canada ? The great majority of motorists crossing into Canada have undoubtedly come for

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pleasure. The motor tour has here as everywhere become an accepted form of holiday, and continues to increase in popularity. No doubt many Americans come to Canada from interest in a foreign, though readily accessible, country; others because of the great opportunities for hunting and fishing; others are attracted by the Canadian summer resorts. The popularity of Canadian cities as centres for conventions of all kinds seems to be owing in part to the absence of prohibition, but this would apply in a much lesser degree to motorists.

Whatever may be its causes—and they are naturally diverse—the effects of the tourist traffic are of great importance. The economic effects are the most obvious and the easiest to estimate. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics estimates the value of tourist traffic from the United States, including both motorists and others, at \$250,501,000 for 1928—an advance of nearly \$35,000,000 over the previous year. More than two-thirds of this revenue comes from motorists. The Bureau further estimates individual expenditure as follows: for 24-hour permits, \$7 per car; for 60-day tourists, \$156.35 per person; and for six-month permits, \$560 per person. An American firm of specialists in hotel accounting has made a still more detailed study of tourist expenditure with a view to finding out how the “tourist’s dollar” is spent. Though these calculations were made after a study of American cities, the results would be very similar in Canada. The average expenditure they divide as follows: hotels, 23 cents; restaurants, 18; retail stores, 31; garages, 10; theatres, 8; miscellaneous, 10. All these figures are, of course, open to criticism, and can only be based on estimates. Certain forms of business receive direct encouragement from the tourist trade. Hotels, for example, are prospering in spite of the many camps; and, at least at Montreal and Toronto, large new hotels have been built, chiefly because of the tourist trade. Then, too, ingenious persons have invented a form of hospitality which is neither a camp nor

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an hotel, but a series of cottages or huts which take something of the character of both. Garages, of course, receive direct profit. But in addition to these, it is easy to see that all business is stimulated. It has been estimated, for example, that the consumption of food products by tourists in Ontario in 1928 was equal to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of that by the resident population. In estimating the net economic value to Canada of the tourist traffic, however, one must remember that there is a considerable counter-account. The figures of the actual foreign expenditure of outgoing Canadian tourists are difficult to arrive at; \$100,000,000 annually has been suggested. If this is at all accurate the balance in favour of Canada would still be about \$150,000,000, a sum that would go far towards providing the annual interest payments on Canada's foreign indebtedness. Certain it is that the tourist traffic constitutes an "invisible" export of the greatest importance. Of Canada's exportable commodities the only two that rank with it in value are, to take the year 1927, wheat, \$353,094,940, and printing paper, \$116,993,256.

Road-building is at once a cause and an effect of tourist traffic. But it may at least be said that the great additional traffic caused by foreign cars makes possible the building of roads on a scale that could otherwise not be considered. All these roads are available to the resident population for business and pleasure. Dominion, provincial, and local authorities have all been increasing their expenditure on roads, and the argument that good roads attract the tourist has been a powerful motive behind this activity. The Canadian countryside has seen revolutionary changes with regard to roads in recent years. Of the total road mileage of 424,014 some 50,000 miles have a gravel surface, and some 7,000 miles have a paved, or other highly improved, surface. Paving is being pushed forward yearly on the main highways, especially in the eastern provinces, and although progress sometimes seems slow it must be remembered that by far the greater part of the total road building

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hitherto accomplished has been crowded into the last seventy-five years, which have also seen, for example, the building of 40,000 miles of railroad. The sparse population in many parts of the country, the great distances, and the effects of the winter months on road surfaces have made the problem of road development a difficult one. There is as yet no all-Canada highway from coast to coast—a considerable stretch through northern Ontario has still to be completed—but undoubtedly the use of the automobile will hasten this project which otherwise would have been postponed indefinitely.

There are other effects of the great tourist traffic which are much more difficult to define. How is the population of Canada influenced by contact with ten million or more Americans every year? Is there any real cultural or political effect? To answer these questions it would be necessary not only to have some idea of how far the tourists mix with the resident population, but also to estimate a kind of influence which seems intangible. On the whole it is perhaps safe to say that the visitor to a country is more likely to be impressed than to impress; and if this be true, we may look for a better understanding of Canada by citizens of the United States. Motor travel with its speed probably encourages superficial observation, but visitors by motor usually learn more of the local communities than those who travel through towns and villages by train, and the motor car has made it possible for thousands of Americans to visit Canada who otherwise would never have done so at all. The very rare summer tourist from the south still comes with a fur coat, but his species will soon be extinct. The fear is bound to be felt that the tourist traffic will lead to, or accentuate, the "Americanisation" of Canada. Fifteen million people visiting nine million! The great expenditure of money by these tourists may be thought to lead to too great an influence. In answer it can only be said that such an influence cannot be seen to any dangerous extent. Superficial evidence must not be

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taken too seriously. The American flags put up along the road beside the Union Jack indicate an interest in "the tourist dollar" rather than a wavering loyalty, and it is probable that the chief effect of them is to arouse a resentment against the practice in the minds of a host of Canadians. Canada may in one sense be becoming a playground for the United States but there is little evidence that this is leading to a servitude of any kind.

There are those who deprecate the annual invasion of Americans. Fortunately, however, the "stage American" is not typical, and in general there is politeness and good feeling on both sides. True, Canadian roads are made crowded by American cars; but the existence of those roads is due in large part to these same cars. To many Canadians the worst by-product of the tourist traffic is the invasion of quiet parts of the country; and the plastering of "hot-dog" stand signs, and cheap camps on either side of the main roads. These evils would, however, be found, though in lesser degree, if no Americans entered Canada, and they are evils for which a self-governing country must assume the responsibility of finding its own cure. There are attractive nooks and by-ways which are suffering from the tourist invasion, and one cannot but regret this, but there are also in Canada regions which have suffered economically from the lack or disappearance of industries; and in some cases these regions can now hope to live on their own merits. Places noted for their beauty or good sport have only to become known to be visited. The tourist traffic is now too profitable to be disregarded. Rather the annual invasion is actively encouraged by governments, motor leagues, and private agencies of all kinds. Good or bad, the tourist traffic has come to stay. Once a subject of humour or abuse, it has now become an important factor in the economic life of the Dominion.

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I. THE FEDERAL CHRONICLE

The Timber Workers' Strike

IN December 1920 Mr. Justice Higgins reduced the hours for timber workers both in the country and the city from 48 to 44 per week. After this decision Parliament so amended the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act as to provide that the standard hours in an industry could only be altered by a majority of the full Court of three judges. In the exercise of this jurisdiction the full Court in September, 1922, restored the 48-hour week to most branches of the timber industry, leaving the hours at 44 in the remainder. In 1923, and again in 1928, the employees moved the Court to have the 44-hour week declared a rule common to all bound by the award. The employers on each occasion sought to have the standard hours fixed at 48. In 1923 the full Court refused to make any change. In 1928 it decided that the standard hours for the whole industry should be 48. This decision was embodied in the award relating to the timber industry made by Judge Lukin on January 23, 1929.

In this award the judge also discontinued the allowance of 3s. per week granted by Deputy-President Webb in 1923 to the timber workers in country towns and the bush. He further reduced, in a few cases, the margin between the wages of the unskilled and more skilled workers; inserted clauses to prevent action by the union against the institution or the operation of the system of payment by results; increased the proportion of youths who might be employed from one

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in eight to one in four, and reduced the rates of pay of such youths by amounts ranging from 5s. to 15s. per week. Certain reductions in wages (in Victoria, for example) were also brought about by a readjustment of the basic wage consequent upon a more accurate observance of the Government Statistician's index figures by Judge Lukin. Longer hours, less pay, piece work, substitution of youths for adults—such an award naturally excited apprehension in the trade union world.

In arriving at conclusions so unwelcome, the full Court and Judge Lukin were guided by the specific provisions of the statute under which they worked, by carefully ascertained facts relating to the general economic position of the timber industry, and, in the case of Judge Lukin, by a close personal study of the circumstances in which the work was performed, and of the degree of skill requisite for each of the different classes of employees. According to section 25 D of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act,

The Court shall, before making any award or certifying any agreement, and in proceedings for the variation or cancellation of an award, or agreement, take into consideration the probable economic effect of the agreement or award in relation to the community in general, and the probable economic effect thereof upon the industry or industries concerned ; provided that this section shall not affect the practice of the Court in fixing the basic wage.

In the course of an elaborate judgment, Judge Lukin traced the history of the industry since 1914, noted the results of "an exhaustive, painstaking, and careful examination by an expert accountant" of the balance sheets of representative firms in all the States except Tasmania and Queensland, and concluded that "throughout Australia the timber industry generally is now at the worst it has ever been in its history." The full Court was of the same opinion. This depression was attributed to high costs of production, the use of substitutes for timber, competition from overseas, high freights on local timber, the regulation and restriction of timber getting by the Forestry Depart-

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ment, inefficient methods of marketing timber at home and abroad, the excessive number of mills, and, in Sydney, to ruthless competition.

By comparing the timber workers' wages and conditions with those of other wage earners for whom it had made awards, the Court also found that, "comparatively speaking, the timber workers have been exceptionally well treated in the past, particularly since the making of the Higgins award." "It would appear," said Judge Lukin, "as if the marginal men in the timber industry have been, comparatively speaking, a favoured class in industry." Aware of the decline in the industry between 1920 and 1928, mindful of Mr. Justice Higgins' dictum that the Court would reduce rates "awarded by it in exceptional times and under exceptional circumstances which have passed away," and confronted by section 25 D enacted by the Legislature a few months before, Judge Lukin agreed with his learned brethren that four hours should be added to the working week of city yards, and revised the minimum rates payable to certain classes of employees.

In determining the base rate, Judge Lukin adhered to the practice of the Court as declared by it on April 30, 1923.* He was unable to find in the judgment of Deputy-President Webb the circumstances which justified the 3s. added in 1923 to the basic wage. Such reductions as he made in margins were due to his conclusion that, as the result of improved machinery, much of the work which was classed as skilled in this industry was labourer's work or little better. He also found that, whereas in the United States and Canada the proportion of men in the timber industry on the labourer's wage varied between 50 per cent. to 60 per cent. of the total employed, in the Australian States subject to the Webb award the proportion varied between 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. Space does not permit of further analysis of Judge Lukin's judgment, but in view of current criticism it is necessary to note that, while pro-

* See 17 Commonwealth Law Reports, p. 376.

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viding for piece work, he introduced safeguards to prevent any abuse of it. So, too, while satisfied that more boys could be properly employed in the industry than the Webb award allowed, he gave either side access to the Court if by reason of any special circumstances it was thought that the number of unapprenticed boys employed should be increased or reduced.

The timber workers in Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide refused to abide by an award which was as distasteful to them as was that of the late Mr. Justice Higgins to the employers in 1920. On February 1 they downed tools. Despite the use of volunteer labour and almost continuous efforts towards a settlement, the unionists in Sydney and Melbourne still remain on strike at the date of writing, some twenty weeks later. It is understood that the timber workers' union was, even at the outset, ill provided with funds for a prolonged contest. Such a stand has been possible only because the timber workers have received continuous and widespread support from the members of other unions. The trade union world regards the timber workers as fighting a battle which all will have to fight in the near future, considering Judge Lukin's award as only the precursor of a general attack on the workers' standards. It may be, of course, that the reduction of nominal standards will, in the end, by restoring prosperity, actually raise real standards. But that is a long term view, and the unions are determined that if Australian costs must—as we hear said on all sides—be reduced they shall not be reduced at the expense of the wage earners. That is the large issue which looms behind the confused mass of detailed objections to Judge Lukin's award, and which still, after many months, keeps the northern coalfields idle in New South Wales. The timber dispute has, in fact, become a more scientific form of the "general strike." Both sides have fought desperately, and there has been, perhaps inevitably, an accompaniment of vituperation, misrepresentation and even violence.

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As was forecast in our last issue,* the strike has put the recent amending Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and indeed the whole arbitration system, to a searching test, from which it cannot be said to have emerged satisfactorily. That Act, it will be remembered, was based on the principles, *inter alia*, that "those who appeal to the arbitrator must observe his awards," and that the members of a union should not be committed by their officers against their own will to an industrial dispute. In order to secure the observance of awards, the sanctions provided by earlier Acts were revised and elaborated; in order to avoid control of a union by its officers, provisions were inserted for a secret ballot of all members. An attempt was made early in the strike to put both these principles into operation, but without any effect upon the course of the dispute. The timber workers' union was fined £1,000 for committing acts in the nature of a strike, Mr. E. J. Holloway, the secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, was fined £50 as previously recorded, for inciting others to a breach of an award.* Neither of these fines has been paid, nor, it is understood, has any attempt been made to enforce the judgments. In Sydney a number of individual timber workers were ordered by the Court to comply with the award, but the order was flouted. Such matters, in fact, pass out of the sphere of law into politics, and enforcement becomes impossible. The attempt to secure by a ballot of the timber workers an unfettered expression of their willingness or unwillingness to return to work under the Lukin award proved equally ineffective. Of some 15,000 voting papers issued, only some 6,000 were returned—5,318 of these were in the negative. This vote did not, of course, make the strike legal. The whole value of the ballot idea lay in the opportunity it was thought to offer of a genuine expression of opinion on the part of the members of a union. But it was clear in this case that no such expression had been given. The strike leaders made the

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 75, June 1929, p. 642.

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most strenuous efforts, especially in Sydney, to stultify the ballot, and the Arbitration Court, on an examination of the papers, concluded that they had been improperly dealt with. The whole incident suggests that the ballot in such circumstances is valueless as a safeguard.

It is serious enough that the events of the strike should have discredited some of the essential provisions of the Commonwealth Parliament's most recent industrial legislation. It is more serious still that, in the campaign of vilification that has been conducted, the Commonwealth Arbitration Court has been held up to public obloquy. It is most serious of all that trusted and responsible Labour leaders have soberly urged the workers to defy the industrial law of the Commonwealth. In the face of such an attitude, no system of compulsory arbitration can possibly be carried on. In these anxious days of Australia's economic readjustment, it may ultimately be of great service to the people of Australia that, as is chronicled elsewhere, the Commonwealth arbitration system as at present constituted seems to be approaching its end. For if such an attitude be deliberately adopted, sanctions are useless, and it is dangerous to keep laws on the statute book when substantial obedience to them cannot be secured. "The result of allowing such action," said the present Attorney-General (who was Minister for Industry a year ago), "would be to engender disrespect for the law, and that would have very evil effects upon the community as a whole." He might have said much more.

The Premier's Conference—Compulsory Arbitration

Among the subjects listed for discussion at the Premier's Conference, which was opened at Canberra by the Prime Minister on May 28, probably the most important related to industrial arbitration. The report of the Economic Mission, the timber workers' strike and a sharp rise in the Federal basic wage quickened political interest in a Federal activity which has occasioned endless controversy since

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the establishment, in 1904, of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.

The duplication and overlapping in the industrial field as the result of Federal and State awards have been costly, vexatious and confusing. Parties have invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal from which the more favourable decision was expected. In some cases, trade unions have secured both a Federal and a State award, and have ignored the less acceptable one. In others, industrial disputes have been created in order to bring a log before the Commonwealth Court. Recent decisions in that forum, however, have induced other unions to apply for de-registration in order to utilise the State Courts. Members of the same union are working under awards of different Courts. State Ministers, who distinguish between the Government *quâ* employer and other employers, resent the control now exercisable by the Federal Court over industrial matters. "It can be truthfully said," recently observed the President of the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers, "that the passing of the Federal Arbitration Court will remove the most fruitful source of industrial upheaval with which Australia has been burdened for a decade."

On the other hand, it is generally recognised that there are some industries so continental in their operation as to be most properly within the jurisdiction of a Federal tribunal if they are to be in any way subject to compulsory arbitration. It is equally clear that, as trade among the States under the Constitution must be absolutely free from State interference, the industries of any one State might be unequally handicapped by State industrial legislation or awards. "There is not the slightest doubt," said Mr. Bruce,* "that industrial legislation and administration should be matters for Federal jurisdiction."

To this end, in 1926, Mr. Bruce requested the people of Australia to strike out of the Constitution the words which limited the power of the Federal Parliament with

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 5, 1929.

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respect to conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes. A majority of the electors in four States and a majority of the electors in the Commonwealth refused to do this. At the Conference just concluded, he invited the Premiers to state definitely whether they were prepared to recommend to their Parliaments the reference of full industrial powers to the Commonwealth. Without hesitation they replied in the negative. He thereupon announced that, subject to transitional provisions, his Government would submit proposals to Parliament for the repeal of the existing Federal arbitration legislation, save in respect of the shipping and waterside industries. The contemplated evacuation of most of "the new province of law and order" is regarded with hostility by unificationists and by industrial advocates of the one big union; with apprehension by trade unionists working under favourable Commonwealth awards, and by manufacturers with formidable competitors in other States; and with approval by the Premiers of the several States. But there is little enthusiasm in any quarter for compulsory arbitration as such. The enforcement of awards against employers and the inability to enforce them against sufficiently large groups of resolute employees, the flouting of the Court by the timber workers, the deadlock in the northern coalfields, the conflict of competing jurisdictions, the spirit of litigation which the atmosphere of Courts seems to engender, and the obvious necessity of instructing the judges about the working of the industry whose economic life they may endanger, have begotten a measure of disillusionment and distrust discouraging to those who are anxious for peace in industry, but most heartening to the avowed destroyers of "the capitalist system." It remains to be seen whether, as the Prime Minister anticipates, the facts of the industrial situation will ultimately induce the electors of the Commonwealth to clothe the Federal Parliament with plenary powers in the industrial sphere.

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The Finances of South Australia

In 1926-27, after a succession of good seasons, South Australia had a deficit of £1,050,050—the largest in its history. Being of the opinion that this condition was partly due to federation, the State Government, mindful of the successful appeals of Tasmania and Western Australia, asked the Government of the Commonwealth for a special grant of £750,000 per annum. The Prime Minister thereupon appointed a commission, consisting of Sir Joseph Cook and Messrs. Brookes and Barton, to examine this claim and to advise as to the steps to be taken by the Commonwealth or the State to remedy such financial disabilities.

South Australia is not rich in natural resources. It is more dependent than any other State, except Western Australia, on its primary industries. It is particularly sensitive to droughts, such as were experienced in 1914 and 1918-19; and reacts swiftly to any shrinkage in the farmer's margin of profit such as has been fairly general since 1925. Only 18.3 per cent. of its total area has an average rainfall of over 10 inches. This physical fact has increased the cost of development, which has been, comparatively speaking, much greater in South Australia than in the other States.

The present unsatisfactory financial position of the State has gradually developed, but the serious deficits of the last two years are due chiefly, according to the Commission, to losses on the railways and on works of a developmental character. The total expenditure on the former from loan moneys between 1923 and 1928 was £11,444,192. The bulk of this large sum has been spent on or in relation to a rehabilitation scheme. The loss sustained by the railways over the same period was £1,536,843, and that for the current year will probably be £800,000. "If the railways could be made to pay working expenses and interest on their capital debt," observe the Commissioners, "the financial problem of the State as it exists at present would be solved." On works of development the outlay,

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during the last nine years, has increased by 121 per cent. In many cases the revenue received from such works has not been sufficient to pay working expenses. "The increase of population during the same period," Sir Joseph Cook and his colleagues remark, "was 23 per cent." "Add to this," they continue, "that large areas of this land prepared for settlement at a cost of approximately £1,500,000 have not yet been occupied, and the seriousness of the position becomes obvious."

The Commission also enumerated some of the benefits "of a most substantial character" which federation had conferred upon South Australia. They found, however, that since 1914, the State had been adversely affected by the federal connection. It has not derived from a high tariff advantages commensurate with resultant increases in the cost of production.

It needs no elaborate statistics (wrote the Commissioners) to prove that those States whose industries are primary and agricultural and whose staple products depend largely upon the price ruling in the world's markets must feel the burden of this general protective policy more acutely. South Australia fulfils these conditions more fully perhaps than any other State and feels the burden correspondingly.

The Federal Arbitration Court and the Navigation Act have also contributed to the State's financial undoing. The awards of the former affect the States by imposing burdens on their revenue, and are enforceable irrespective of the will of the legislature of the State concerned. The latter has led to a sharp rise in the cost of coal and timber, two necessary commodities lacking in South Australia.

To meet its liabilities the Government of the State increased taxation in all directions. "We have been greatly impressed," observed the Commissioners, "by the spirit in which the people of South Australia have faced their problems. No State of the Commonwealth has a finer record in the face of natural difficulties." But at the end of the last financial year, the budget disclosed a deficit

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of £275,000. The Commission therefore recommended that a special grant of £500,000 per annum should be paid by the Commonwealth to South Australia for a period of two years, and that, during the same period, the Commonwealth Government should refrain from enforcing the conditions of the Federal Aid Roads Agreement Act which requires South Australia to provide 15s. for every £1 contributed by the Commonwealth. They also suggested that during the currency of those two years the position should be reviewed by a permanent commission appointed to make a continuous study of the financial relations of the Commonwealth and the States. The Prime Minister has announced "that the Commonwealth is not in a position to make a grant to South Australia this financial year, but will fully consider the recommendation of the Royal Commission of a grant for two years when the budget for 1929-30 is being framed."

The Royal Commission on Child Endowment or Family Allowances

Following the introduction of a system of family endowment by the State of New South Wales, the Commonwealth Government appointed a Royal Commission in September 1927 to report on the general question of instituting a scheme of a similar nature throughout the Commonwealth. The commissioners' report, which appeared in March, 1929, reveals a fundamental disagreement between the majority of three and the minority of two. The majority report recommends that the Commonwealth should not attempt to institute child endowment. The minority report, expressing the views of the Labour member and the only woman member of the Commission, regards the proposed system as the logical corollary of the living wage doctrine, and a measure of justice which should not be delayed.

The question has a constitutional aspect. Counsel to whom it was submitted took different views as to the power

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of the Commonwealth to introduce child endowment. The majority report emphasises the danger of the Government enacting legislation which might subsequently be declared *ultra vires*. The minority relies upon the evidence of the Solicitor-General. The majority can see only two ways of instituting Commonwealth child endowment, *viz.*, by alteration of the Constitution, or by reference of the matter to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by all the State Parliaments. It prefers the former alternative, but thinks that in view of Australia's present economic position, no scheme should be undertaken unless its benefits patently outweigh the evils of the additional taxation involved. The most prominent features of the present economic situation are claimed to be a very large total of public debt, a heavy annual interest charge, a large and increasing total of public debt unrepresented by existing assets, or represented by assets not earning full interest on their cost, a high and growing taxation, and an absence of reasonable progress in productive activity. In view of this, the majority thinks that taxation could not be increased without evil effects, and pleads for caution in undertaking further public expenditure on child endowment. The minority thinks that the country can afford to inaugurate a moderate system of family allowances, and that such an expenditure of part of the national income would be a good investment for the community. Opinions of economists are quoted in support of the view that if more expenditure were diverted from improving "material capital" to improving "human capital," the gains would in the long run outweigh the losses.

The matter is complicated by the variation of wage-fixing machinery in different States, and the overlapping of awards which is a constant source of friction. The standard of living is defined differently, although it is generally left painfully indefinite. The family unit, to meet the needs of which the basic wage is adjusted, consists for New South Wales of man and wife ; for Western Australia

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of man, wife and two children ; and for the other States and also for the Commonwealth, of man, wife and three children. If child endowment is attempted, wages should, in the opinion of the majority, be stripped of endowment elements, and to prevent a somewhat irresponsible competition both should be placed under the exclusive control of a single tribunal for the whole Commonwealth. The minority considers it undesirable that family allowance should be made part of the system of wage fixation, or should be delayed until the Commonwealth has complete control over wages.

The general argument for child endowment is the insufficiency of wages to support a family. The majority rejects the applicability of this view to Australia, for not only have effective wages increased over recent years, but "the great majority of employees receive more than the basic wage." Moreover, organisations for social work among the poor gave evidence that, although some child distress exists, the cause is seldom the insufficiency of the wage. Unemployment, sickness, accident, gambling, extravagance, drink, want of suitable housing accommodation, excessive rent, widowhood and wife desertion were cited as definite causes. The majority considers that where special assistance to children is needed, it can best be furnished through existing agencies. As against this, the minority finds that for families of wage earners where the children number more than two, the standard has generally been lower than is reasonable, the disparity increasing with the size of the family.

The economists who gave evidence before the Commission were united in approving of the principle of child endowment in so far as it would reduce inequality of incomes, but they also pointed out that this gain might be offset through the effects upon production of the two alternative methods of raising the necessary funds, *viz.*, taxation, and a redistribution of wages. The majority prefers the second alternative. If the basic wage were reduced from

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£4 5s. to £3 4s. per week, 7s. per week could be paid by the employer for each employee, to provide a fund out of which child endowment would be paid at the rate of 8s. per week for the first child, with a reduction of 1s. per week for each additional child, but paying 4s. per week for each child after the fifth. The other 14s. per week would be "saved to industry." This except in "a few and probably negligible cases" would not mean merely an addition to profits, but a reduction in prices and a lower cost of living. Recognising the unpopularity of such a proposal, the majority suggests as an alternative a wage reduction of 7s. per week to provide for child endowment, thus yielding with reluctance the coveted "saving to industry." The Commonwealth Government might bear the cost of administration. But the minority rejects redistribution of wages as less equitable than a more heavily progressive rate of income tax, and a lowering of the exempted minimum. "The broadest backs should bear burdens carried in the interests of the community as a whole."

The Commission is unanimous on one matter only—that existing health and maternity services should be extended.

II. THE QUEENSLAND ELECTIONS

"LABOUR in Queensland," according to *The Australian Worker*, "is a record breaker. Its fourteen years of continued rule established a record unparalleled in any part of the world. And now, in the catastrophic results of last Saturday's elections (May 11) it has set up another record. It is doubtful if any party ever before sustained a defeat so overwhelming. The Government led by Premier McCormack that faced the electors with a clear majority of fourteen has staggered back from the polls with nearly twenty members missing, including several Cabinet Ministers."

Although it was thought that the swing of the political

The Queensland Elections

pendulum would probably be away from Labour, such a *débâcle* was a complete surprise. It was anticipated that the Government would be returned with a reduced majority. Speculation has therefore been general as to the causes of its defeat. "The Labour Government which Mr. McCormack led," according to the *Daily Standard*, the Labour paper in Brisbane, "had almost reached the end of its tether as a constructive force. . . . The best that it could do was to offer a staunch defence of what had been achieved and a sympathetic administration." The decline in the Premier's faith in State enterprises, his commendable prudence in the expenditure of loan moneys, and his firm handling of formidable strikes by the railway workers and wharf labourers, chilled the enthusiasm of many of his supporters and irreconcilably antagonised the left wing of his party, who ran candidates against official Labour men. The Communists also put up a candidate in two Labour strongholds, but in Queensland, as in other States, they are numerically insignificant. Their sustained vilification of the Government, however, and, to quote the *Worker*, the organ of the Australian Workers' Union, "the studied insanities," on the eve of the election, of Mr. "Jock" Garden—their most widely advertised spokesman in Australia—helped voters hesitating between two opinions to a decision adverse to Labour. The acute dissension within the Labour party was the more remarkable when contrasted with the solidity of the Opposition, whose political strength in previous elections had been partly spent in internecine quarrels. It presented a united front under the vigorous leadership of Mr. A. E. Moore, a dairy farmer of undoubted sincerity and considerable political capacity. He kept prominently before the electors the losses sustained by State undertakings, particularly railways, the relatively high *per capita* taxation of Queensland, and the extent of unemployment. A large number of workless were led by a false rumour to associate his accession to office with a liberal expenditure of borrowed money.

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It has also been suggested that the report of the British Economic Mission, which was made available to the electors at a nominal price by the political opponents of the Government, helped to bring about what has been described by a member of the new administration as a return to sanity. Finally, it must be remembered that no elector in Queensland, under the age of 35, had ever known a State Government other than that of Labour. Conceivably, therefore, many of them were responsive to the appeal to give the other side an opportunity of showing what it could do. In the result, the state of parties in the new Parliament will be 44 Country-Progressive Nationalists, 27 Labour, 1 Independent. The new administration is pledged *inter alia* to tackle the problem of unemployment, to give a free rein to private enterprise, to permit freehold tenure, to take a referendum to ascertain if the people of Queensland wish to recreate a Legislative Council, to reduce the salaries of members from £750 to £500 per annum, and to correct those glaring anomalies in the size of the electorates which were at once a source of political strength and a grave reproach to the Labour party.

Australia.

June 26, 1929.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE GENERAL ELECTION

THE results of the recent general election expressed in figures are as follows: The Nationalist party obtained 77 seats, one member was returned as an independent Nationalist, and in one constituency which was formerly Nationalist the election has still to take place owing to the death of a candidate after nomination. Assuming that the Nationalist party candidate will be returned there we shall have for all practical purposes 79 members supporting that party in a house of 148. The party has therefore a clear majority. The South African party came back with 61 members and the Labour party with 8 of whom 5 are of the section which follows Colonel Creswell and 3 of the section which has abjured his leadership. Before the dissolution the House numbered 135, and consisted of 63 Nationalists, 54 South African party members, 17 Labour and one independent. Of the thirteen new seats added by the last delimitation and the nine seats lost by the Labour party 16 have gone to the Nationalists and six to the South African party. Of the total number of votes polled the South African party obtained 159,049, the Nationalists 143,408 and the combined Labour sections 31,854. Nine South African party members were returned unopposed, so that the 159,049 votes recorded for that party are represented by 52 members while the 143,048 recorded for the Nationalists returned 77. The corresponding figures

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for the election of 1924 were 151,216 votes cast for the South African party and 113,625 for the Nationalists.

Territorially considered, the result of the election is that the South African party holds the larger towns (outside the Orange Free State) and the province of Natal, while the Orange Free State and the country districts outside Natal are predominantly Nationalist. This result is reflected in the racial allocation of the new House in that the party led by General Smuts is almost entirely drawn from the British section while General Hertzog's following is to a man of Dutch descent.

In the new Ministry Mr. Tielman Roos, whose state of health unfortunately prevents him at present from taking any active part in public affairs, is replaced as Minister of Justice by Mr. Pirow, who unsuccessfully opposed General Smuts in the election, and for whom a seat has yet to be found. Mr. Jansen, who was Speaker in the late Parliament, is added as Minister for Native Affairs, and two portfolios, instead of three as in the previous Government, are given to members of the much diminished Labour party, Colonel Creswell and Mr. Sampson. Otherwise the Ministry as regards its personnel remains the same. Politically, however, it is fundamentally different. The basis of the last Government was the so-called Pact between the Nationalist and Labour parties. To-day the Pact exists only in name. The Nationalist party has a clear working majority of its own, and the two Labour members of the Cabinet are there merely on sufferance. Their resignation would not bring the Government to its knees.

As regards the position of the political parties the result of the election is undoubtedly of far-reaching effect. The Labour party, paralysed as it is by its internal dissensions, is for the present of negligible account. But as between the two main parties the result has been, as is indicated above, to revive in a marked degree the old racial alignment of political divisions, and, unless the South African party can recover some of the ground which it has lost in the country

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districts, this most undesirable line of cleavage is bound to be accentuated as time goes on.

In any analysis of the causes which led to what is undoubtedly a striking victory for the Nationalist party the first place in importance must be assigned to its attitude on the Native question, which has for the first time appeared as an issue in party controversy. But, leaving that for the present on one side, one may discern certain minor factors in the political situation which contributed to influence electors in favour of the Government. The five years since 1924 have been years of comparative prosperity and of budget surpluses, standing out in marked contrast to the years of deflation, of commercial and industrial disorganisation, and of deficits on the public accounts which the last South African party Government had to encounter. These last five years have also been years of almost complete industrial peace, and the memory of the violent upheaval on the Witwatersrand in 1922 is still strong enough to keep alive in certain sections feelings of bitter animosity against General Smuts, whose unenviable task it was to enforce at all costs the maintenance of law and order.

But it was the Native question, and the use which was made of it as election propaganda, which were the decisive factors in the campaign. The Native question covers, of course, a wide field, but it was on General Hertzog's proposals with regard to the representation of natives in Parliament that attention was almost entirely concentrated. These proposals amount in effect to a drastic reform of the existing franchise law of the Cape Province. It is true that his Bill also provides for a rudimentary form of representation for natives in the other provinces of the Union, by allowing them to elect two representatives to the Senate. This innovation, however, was extremely distasteful to a large number of his followers, especially in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and it was sedulously kept in the background on the election platforms. The real purpose of the Bill is to reform the existing Cape

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franchise which makes no distinction of race or colour, by establishing a communal roll for natives who may become qualified as voters after the passing of the Act, and providing that, as their numbers become adequate to furnish the necessary quota, they may elect up to five European members to the House of Assembly. The existing Cape franchise, it was said, would inevitably lead in time to the Europeans on the roll being outnumbered by the natives, and lurid pictures were drawn of the Union under native domination, which the electors were told would follow if General Smuts were returned to power. This propaganda playing upon a popular psychology which is peculiarly sensitive to stimulus on anything connected with the relation of white to black produced, especially in the country districts, an atmosphere in which discussion of the question on rational grounds was impossible. What made the attack even more formidable was that it found the South African party in a position ill adapted for defence or for counter attack. A considerable section of that party, more especially in the Cape Peninsula and the so-called Western province of the Cape, is strongly opposed to any alteration of the existing franchise which would amount to an abandonment of the principle of equal rights for all civilised men. Another section, embracing perhaps the majority of the party, holds the view that the existing Cape franchise cannot be indefinitely maintained, especially if any advance is to be looked for in the direction of representation for natives in the other provinces, and that some form of communal roll for natives will have to be resorted to. Still another section is opposed, as are most of the Nationalists, to any extension of parliamentary representation to natives outside the Cape. In order to keep in line these conflicting views the party endeavoured to avoid dealing with General Hertzog's proposals on their merits, and took the ground that such a far reaching constitutional change should not be made the subject of an election campaign until the country had had time and opportunity to consider it in

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its bearings on the whole question of the relations of European and native, and until an attempt had been made by consultation with the natives to secure at any rate a measure of agreement with them. This was to be achieved by setting up a national convention or commission which should review, in all their aspects, the relations of white and black, and whose report should be awaited before any measure affecting these relations was submitted to Parliament. Probably most people would agree, looking at the matter in the cold light of reason, that this would be the way of statesmanship in approaching such a problem. But in the sound and fury of an election campaign, against the hot gospellers of a "white South Africa" it afforded no tenable battleground.

Such were the issues on which the election was decided. It is bound to have a far-reaching effect on the political future of South Africa. It gives the Nationalist party for the first time a clear parliamentary majority. It has produced a House of Assembly divided more nearly on racial lines than it has been since the death of General Botha. It has broadcast among the native peoples the impression that the white man lives in fear of them as a menace to his existence, and that his only remedy is a policy of repression.

Parliament is to meet on July 19 to enable the Government to pass its financial measures for the year. It is unlikely that any measures of general policy will be undertaken. After the session it is expected that the Senate will be dissolved and reconstituted so that when the Government meets Parliament again it will not be embarrassed by a Second Chamber containing a majority which is opposed to its politics.

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II. THE UNIVERSITY SITUATION

THE connection between our politics and education is so close that a statement of the university situation seems to follow naturally from an account of our general election. Many of our higher educational institutions owe their existence to State action, and all of them rely on the central government for anything from half to three-quarters of their revenues.

There are other reasons why a consideration of this particular question is appropriate just now. Since the last article on the South African university question appeared in *THE ROUND TABLE*, thirteen years ago,* there has been a change in the sphere of higher education in keeping with the development of Dominion status and national self-consciousness. It is a change whose significance will be more readily understood by readers in sister Dominions and the United States than in older countries, an increase in educational self-sufficiency, that *αὐτάρκεια* which the old political philosophers used to posit as one of the marks of the sovereign independent State. Before the war university staffs were normally recruited from overseas, and students had to go overseas to complete professional courses other than engineering, law and education. To-day, staffs are much more frequently recruited at home, sometimes of set policy, but quite frequently because the local applicant is really the best man in ; while students can complete in at least one and, in some cases, more than one centre in the Union fully recognised degree-courses in medicine, architecture, fine art, music and the rest.

Further, a good deal has been written from time to time in *THE ROUND TABLE* about the financial weakness of the provinces *vis-à-vis* the Union Government.† Control

* See *THE ROUND TABLE*, No. 11, June 1913.

† *THE ROUND TABLE*, Nos. 48, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 61, 71 and 73, September 1922—December 1928.

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of the educational machine is divided between the central and local authorities. The said machine is thus subject to all the friction and strains set up in a unitary constitution which is often worked as if it were a federation. One outcome of this confusion of mind and practice has recently revealed itself in the unnecessary struggle between the universities and the technical colleges, a struggle which may very easily pass on beyond its present stage of wasted time and money, and duplicated effort to that of lowering standards in a land which, based as it is on semi-servile non-European labour, already enjoys its full share of social and political make-believe.

There is perhaps one other reason for taking stock of the university situation in this number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, and that is because, in October, the University of Cape Town celebrates the centenary of the foundation of the South African College, the pioneer place of higher education in southern Africa, from which it has sprung.

To-day there are four universities in the Union. Three of them are of the usual autonomous type: the University of Cape Town itself, the University of Stellenbosch based on the old Victoria College, and the University of the Witwatersrand built up round the Johannesburg School of Mines. The fourth is the federal University of South Africa which embodies university colleges at Pretoria and Potchefstroom in the Transvaal, Pietermaritzburg in Natal, Bloemfontein in the Free State, and Wellington and Grahamstown in the Cape.

The South African College was founded in Cape Town in October 1829, half-way through that comprehensive spring-cleaning of the old Cape Colony between 1825 and 1836 that proved too much for the frontiersmen who trekked into the interior to found republics there nearer to their hearts' desire. Its enthusiastic founders hoped to see their foundation a university or something very like it in the course of a few years. They were trying to build the façade before they had laid the foundations. The

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colony, the only European settlement worth mentioning in southern Africa in those days, was far too poor, too thinly peopled and too ill-supplied with schools to carry anything so weighty as a university. Until these defects were remedied, there was nothing for it but to wait, and South Africa waited almost three-quarters of a century before it possessed anything that could be called a self-contained and tolerably equipped university college. For a teaching university, it had to wait till the last year of the great war.

The main stages of this long progress from school to university are clear enough. For the first twenty years after 1829, the South African College had the field to itself. Then came rivals: the Diocesan College at Rondebosch in the late 'forties; St. Andrew's at Grahamstown and other colleges at Graaff Reinet, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein in the 'fifties; others again at Stellenbosch and Somerset East in the 'sixties, and yet another, a women's college this time, at Wellington, in the 'seventies. All these colleges were primary and secondary schools combined. Some never got beyond that stage; others got beyond it for a time by doing some university work in addition to school work, and then fell back; others, of which the South African College and Victoria College at Stellenbosch were the most successful, undertook the higher work and then cut off their lower classes to form distinct and separate schools. The Cape Town institution, for instance, took that step in 1874, but both it and its Stellenbosch rival kept three classes below matriculation level and did not let the last of them go till 1899-1900.

Meanwhile, by reforms effected particularly in 1839 and 1865, the essential foundation of elementary and secondary schools was gradually slipped in below the collegiate superstructure. The colleges themselves from 1858 onwards had to conform to the standards set by a Board of Examiners which, in 1873, during the changes which came with gold, diamonds and responsible government,

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gave way to the examining University of the Cape of Good Hope. This university through its council and permanent officers at Cape Town did a good deal to stimulate interest in higher education in South Africa as a whole; for in 1875, in the spirit of the confederation movement of those days, it admitted candidates from the other States and Colonies to its examinations; and again in 1896-97, in keeping with a later movement towards closer union, it offered seats on its council to representatives from those communities. On the other hand, of its very nature, it combined the weaknesses of an external examining body with those of a federal university. The time came when it ceased to be a stimulus and became rather a drag on the colleges with some of whom the future of real university life lay.

During the golden 'nineties, there was talk in plenty of a teaching university. Rhodes had high hopes of a national university on his Peninsula estate at Groote Schuur where the University of Cape Town is now completing the buildings which in such large measure embody his dream; on the other hand, Hollanders at the court of President Kruger held aloof from the examining University of the Cape and sought to build up a university of their own on Continental lines in Pretoria.

Local feeling and the Jameson Raid made Rhodes's scheme impossible; the South African war ended the plans of the Pretoria Hollanders. Meanwhile, the two leading Cape colleges at Cape Town and Stellenbosch had progressed quietly and, in response to the demand for mining engineers, the South African College had developed a School of Mines in conjunction with the authorities at Johannesburg. A boom set in towards the end of the South African war, as booms will, and the South African College appealed to the public with such success that early in 1905 it was emboldened to demand a charter of its own as a self-contained university.

At the moment the South African College received no support for this revolutionary proposal. The examining

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university was up in arms at once and produced various schemes of reform of the kind that touched what Cromwell used to call "circumstantials," but left "fundamentals" unaltered; the Jameson Ministry at the Cape was much more interested in the new Rhodes University College which it had just formed at Grahamstown out of the upper classes of St. Andrew's with the generous help of the Rhodes Trustees; in the north, Mr. Alfred Beit had given the Transvaal Government an estate near Johannesburg for a Transvaal university. Two years later, in 1906, Mr. Beit died leaving £200,000 for the same purpose, with the proviso that the money must be so used before the end of 1916. Finally, from 1905 till the close of 1909, all South Africa was too deeply immersed in the post-war slump to trouble itself seriously about academic policy.

As times improved and political union drew nearer, the university question came to the surface again. The Diocesan College handed on its university work to the neighbouring South African College; the quarrels of Pretoria and Johannesburg prevented the utilisation of the Beit £200,000; on the very eve of Union, the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal created university colleges at their respective capitals and handed them on as charges against the funds of the new Union Government in 1910.

The financing of the colleges, which had latterly increased so in numbers, was part and parcel of the bigger issue of the financing of the provinces by the central exchequer. The provincial issue was settled in 1913; but the problem of the colleges was not settled till 1917. Thus for seven years after Union, the older, larger and more efficient Cape institutions had to put up with moderate State aid, while their newer rivals in the north enjoyed lavish State support. The Act of 1917 put all upon a more or less level footing, and gave the Cape colleges a measure of State aid which sent them ahead at an unprecedented rate.

The financial settlement of 1917 was largely the outcome of a more fundamental decision on university policy taken

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a year before. At the close of 1910, just after the consummation of Union, it was announced that, as a result of negotiations set on foot by General Smuts, the Beit bequest had been withdrawn from the Transvaal, and that, to take its place and to carry out Rhodes's ideal of a single national teaching university, Sir Julius Wernher and Sir Otto Beit had promised £500,000 for such a university to be built upon part of the Groote Schuur estate furnished by the Union Government.

This announcement was the signal for a logomachy which raged for five weary years, regardless of wars and the fall of empires, until every possible method for the expenditure of the half-million and the utilisation of the estate except the obvious one had been discussed and discarded. There were two main schools of opinion. On the one hand, was the South African College at Cape Town reiterating its five-year-old demand for a charter and offering to join forces with any other college that might elect to migrate with it to Groote Schuur. On the other hand, were the rest of the colleges and the examining university, which declined to lose their identities or to move their habitats, and favoured, roughly speaking, a distribution of the money and the utilisation of the site for a research institution divorced from more general university activities. At last, a broad hint from the Wernher-Beit trustees that the money would be withdrawn unless some good use were made of it impelled the Government to carry three Acts in the 1916 session. In terms of these measures, the South African College was to become the University of Cape Town, and to be possessed of the half-million and the site; Victoria College was to become the University of Stellenbosch, and the remaining half-dozen colleges were to be loosely federated as the University of South Africa with headquarters at Pretoria.

These Acts came into force in April, 1918. For three years thereafter, helped by the post-war boom and the generosity of Government and friends alike, the two

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independent universities waxed mightily, and in 1921, the Johannesburg college, relying on similar support, broke away from the federal university and became the University of the Witwatersrand. The Government, however, missed the opportunity of reducing the already superabundant number of colleges by one, and allowed a small private college at Potchefstroom to take the place of Johannesburg in the federal body.

Then, with all the swiftness of a thunderstorm on the High Veld, came the slump early in 1921. During the next three years of bad times, the Union took two steps which have led it directly into its present difficulties. In 1922, in keeping with a new and more economical system which it was applying to the financing of the provinces, it obliged the three autonomous universities to accept much smaller grants than heretofore, avowedly in order to save the weaker of the constituent colleges of the federal University of South Africa. It thus sacrificed the more promising and more self-dependent of its higher institutions to the less, and prevented itself from financing any one of them adequately for the work that had to be done.

In the following year the Union took a still more embarrassing step. For some little time past and especially during the war, the provincial administrations had cheerfully encouraged technical and similar classes. Now that lean times had come, they clamoured to be relieved of the burden. The Union was willing to oblige, but it was estopped by the wisdom of the National Convention of 1908-9 which had decreed that "education other than higher" was the perquisite of the provinces. Now, whatever else might be said about it, the work of the technical institutes was secondary work of the so-called vocational type which was already being more or less done in the ordinary secondary schools under provincial control. The only thing to be done if the Union was to finance and control it, was to call this technical education "higher education." And so it was done.

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The foisting of this piece of academic and governmental make-believe soon had the natural result that a strong commission, the Van der Horst Commission, had to busy itself in 1927-28 with suggesting some way of extricating the higher education of the country from the quagmire into which it was sinking. For the technical colleges, much more heavily subsidised than even the university colleges, were trenching deeply into the sphere of university work. In so far as the more ambitious of them aimed at becoming constituent colleges of the federal university, they threatened to overload a community which was already more than adequately supplied with such institutions. In so far as they did work which elsewhere and, hitherto in South Africa, had always been done by universities, they promised to lower academic standards.

The general effect of the findings of the Van der Horst Commission and of an Inter-University Conference which considered them in January 1929 was that no more places of really higher education be recognised for the time being ; that, in giving State aid, the Minister should take into account the powers of self-help displayed by the institution in question ; that control of the technical colleges be retained by the Union Education department but that they be recognised and treated as the secondary institutions that they are ; and, finally, that if this recognition and retention entailed a radical change in the present unnatural division of the field of education between the Union and the provinces, why, so much the better ! At any rate, we know where we are now, and all we can hope for is enough public and Ministerial virtue to make the effort that will put us on the right road.

There are, however, other aspects of the question. So far we have been concerned mainly with the administrative and financial difficulties that have attended the growth of institutions of higher education in the Union. Probably, the larger institutions at least may soon be well out of these difficulties, but there are considerations which may

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justify one in feeling a little less sanguine about the early attainment of stability in the profounder and more vital cultural sense. The doubt may be expressed in quasi-punning form by asking whether the South African spirit is as yet universal enough to inform and sustain a genuine university.

There is much in South African life to-day which, in its present form, can hardly be harmonised with the catholicity and sovereignty of Reason which must characterise the true university. In some respects provincialism of mind is more marked than ever it was, expressing itself, for instance, in a sort of nationalist rake's progress which, setting out from "South Africa first," passes by way of "South Africa alone" to complacency about the competence of South Africa to supply all her intellectual needs from her own resources.

The cult of Afrikaans is not responsible for this. In so far as there is any connection, the cult is a symptom rather than a cause, and many of the warmest advocates of Afrikaans are liberal-minded, "universal" men. Moreover, many of the population must take the first steps to universality along the pathway of Afrikaans or not at all. No honest observer can deny that the extended literary and journalistic use of Afrikaans in recent years has brought to many a release and emancipation of spirit which would otherwise have been unattainable.

But when all is said and done, the gathering of the clans of Fundamentalism is ominous. At the present moment a *cause célèbre* is working out its course in the Dutch Reformed Church upon certain doctrines held by one of its leading scholars which would be regarded as only mildly modernist by even orthodox circles in Europe. From the same Fundamentalist source has arisen a strong movement in favour of abrogating the clause in the University Acts, the so-called "conscience clause," which forbids the imposition of religious tests on candidates for university posts. This movement has been quite unequivocally

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opposed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Education, and it would probably get little convinced support from any member of the Cabinet ; but, in view of the nature of the support which has given the present Government a new term of office, one cannot, in estimating the university situation, ignore the possibilities, if Church disputes and other causes should stir *odium theologiam* into activity.

For it must be recalled that there is a strong disposition among the Fundamentalist section to blame *uitlander* influences for all their troubles, much as the Japanese blamed them in the seventeenth century. No measure is available of the exact strength of such tenets ; but where they are held, they are held with intense earnestness. Thus, in spite of a strong and growing realism among Nationalists, the future is by no means unclouded for the voice of universality and genial humanism in this land of racial cleavages.

The fortunes of the courageous pursuit of intellectual honesty lie primarily in the hands of the universities. There is every reason to believe that if they are ready to take risks and are resolved not to succumb to the temptations of a quiet life, there is a strong and deep strain of reasonableness in South African life that will rise to their support. Government, up to the present, has been liberal both in its financial grants and in its defence of *libertas docendi*, a most important consideration in view of the fact that our universities all depend more or less on public monies. Even enthusiasm for Afrikaans has so far stopped short of any real cramping of freedom. A great opportunity for leadership now lies before the universities of South Africa.

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III. THE SOUTHERN RHODESIAN EDUCATION COMMISSION

THESE uncertainties about the future of Western culture in southern Africa receive further illustration from the very interesting report of a commission which has recently conducted an enquiry into the working and prospects of the educational system of Southern Rhodesia. The chairman, Mr. Frank Tate, is well-known throughout the Empire as for many years the distinguished and stimulating Director of Education for the State of Victoria, and one of the members, Mr. F. Clarke, has in the course of eighteen years' service as professor of education in the University of Cape Town, gained a deep and sympathetic insight into the problems of southern Africa.

The report has much to say about the details of administration, but the whole of it is clearly governed by two main ideas, and these are concerned with just the same fundamental cultural problem that we have already found in the Union. They may be put together quite shortly in one sentence: The task of a Rhodesian educational system is to raise a population which, while becoming fully Rhodesian, remains genuinely European. The young Rhodesian must be trained to live a full and adequate life in and through the circumstances of his own land, so widely different from those of the Motherland. The exotic flavour of education, so inevitable in the early stages, when the older people are themselves not yet adapted, and when all the apparatus and personnel of our educational system have to be imported from without, must gradually pass away and the tree of education must root itself firmly and deeply in Rhodesian soil. If this means wide departures from much that is traditional in the spirit and practice of the homeland, the necessity will have to be faced. And if the result is to be more men of the Kingsley Fairbridge type the facing will be worth while.

Southern Rhodesian Education Commission

At the same time, the situation of a small colony of Europeans among a mass of natives twenty times its own number, consisting for the most part of docile and impressionable peoples, has its own grave dangers. The process of slipping away from the best European standards of work, of public spirit, of broad human sympathy and of moral duty is so gradual and can be so easy and even pleasant, that the danger of it must be an ever-present thought in the minds of the educators of such a community. Fortunately there is every sign that the responsible authorities in Southern Rhodesia are quite alive to it, and one gathers from the report that their efforts, so far, have proceeded along sound lines that need only to be developed.

The white population is still overwhelmingly British, though there is a strong contingent of Dutch Afrikaners who are too valuable as a stable element in the community for their claims to be ignored. Yet it should prove possible to satisfy and assimilate them educationally without impairing unduly the predominantly British character of the Rhodesian community, and still more without creating in Rhodesia a deep cultural cleavage such as still divides the Union. It is the greater homogeneity of the white community in Rhodesia, along with the fact of the far heavier preponderance of the native population, as compared with the Union that may develop in Rhodesia more strongly than in the Union the conviction that what education has to do is to preserve not so much the British or the Afrikaner type as just the European. Too narrow a view of the task may well issue in failure to save the general type. In the Union, a sentimental cult of Afrikanerism of which the Prime Minister himself sometimes officiates as High Priest, tends not only to perpetuate divisions and to hamper the growth of a common culture but, even more serious, encourages the idea that to be white and an Afrikaner is to be entitled to privileges and supports which allow one to dispense with those necessities of continuous effort and sustained moral tension that

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constitute the very life of European civilisation. This excess of eagerness to preserve the Afrikaner may only result in losing the European.

Rhodesia seems to be more alive to the danger. Stimulated and guided by the report of its Education Commission it may be expected to brace itself for the effort of self-discipline and sustained pressure that the interests of its own future require of it, and to make that careful survey and well-husbanded use of its available cultural resources which the report recommends and which the making of Rhodesian Europeans so insistently calls for. There are those in Rhodesia who are fully capable of the necessary leadership. The task is not an impossible one if they can secure the backing of a population which is prepared to impose the necessary discipline upon itself.

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July 1929.

NEW ZEALAND: THE TASK BEFORE SIR JOSEPH WARD

THE characteristic features of the past quarter in New Zealand have been the enthusiastic reception given to Sir Joseph Ward on his tours throughout the country, the astonishing freedom from party politics, and, despite the large amount of unemployment, the industrial peace that has been enjoyed here in contrast to the unrest in the neighbouring Dominion across the Tasman Sea. Except during the existence of the National Government in the war, there has probably never been a time when there was such a suspension of party politics. Sir Joseph Ward's genial urbanity, and his achievement in regaining command at the age of seventy-three, after a long period as a private member and protracted ill-health, have earned for him the goodwill of all parties and all classes. Ever since the banquet in his honour at Invercargill on March 21, when 2,000 of his constituents gave him what journalists call "an ovation," and again during his triumphal tour of the Dominion, for instance, when bands headed the processions which escorted him to his hotels, when packed audiences assembled to listen to his speeches, cheered him to the echo, and "Jolly-Good-Fellowed" him, when political opponents as well as supporters eulogised him, right down to the present time, his reception has everywhere been cordial and enthusiastic. He was not exaggerating when he said at Auckland on June 4 that he had

New Zealand: Task before Sir Joseph Ward

found strong evidences of attachment to the Government in those who had previously been opposed to it, and a desire to give it a fair trial. And given sufficient time, his Ministry will, Sir Joseph says, "deliver the goods." The country recognises the difficulties that he has to face, and is prepared to give him a fair chance of earning the title given him by the *Christchurch Sun* on May 25, of "the man who gets things done." As regards the Ministry, their actions and utterances indicate that they are earnestly striving to put the finances of the country on a sound footing, to carry out the Dominion's public works on an impartial basis, favouring neither district nor island, but carrying to completion those undertakings which they consider will best serve the Dominion as a whole, to extend our land settlement, to eliminate unemployment, to keep the government departments and the education system up-to-date, and at the same time to encourage private enterprise.

Sir Joseph has, on the whole, preserved a statesmanlike tone in his addresses, though he has at times perhaps been too apt to attribute the difficulties of the position to his political opponents, and to contrast his own hustle with their inaction. Meanwhile, the Reform party is lying low and keeping its ammunition dry until the opening of Parliament on June 27. In so far as public works, land acquisition and transport are concerned, the Prime Minister has laid most of his cards on the table, but as regards finance for 1929, he has been as cryptic as the Delphic oracle, declaring that he was "out" (meaning, of course, that he was "in") to remove the deficit of £577,000, and to do that, taxation must be adjusted so as to secure more revenue from certain quarters. Taxes would be taken off some things and put on others.

The Current Situation

New Zealand is faced with the same problems as the old world: unemployment, not only of adults but of

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boys and girls leaving school, the difficulty of traffic control and co-ordination, the competition of motor transport with the railways, the heavy loss on which, as they are State owned, falls upon the people at large, the difficulty—in this instance luckily only temporary—of making the national receipts balance expenditure, the drift from the country to the towns, the falling birth rate.

The past year has been a satisfactory one as regards production, markets and growth of pastures. It has resulted in a record production in the case of most of our staple products, and prices have continued good and the value of our exports is above anything previously attained. Still there were, in 1928, according to the latest number of the *New Zealand Journal of Agriculture*, 132,244 fewer acres in use than in the previous year.

Some tables taken from official sources and set out in the *Bulletin* prepared by the Department of Economics of Canterbury College for the Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, illustrate the position which the New Zealand Ministry has to face. Our natural increase of population, nearly 30 per 1,000 in 1876-80, has fallen to 11.07 per 1,000, a drop which led Mr. Stallworthy, the Minister of Health, at the annual meeting of the Plunket Society at Wellington, on May 28, to refer to this Dominion, capable of carrying millions of people, as a stagnant country.

The prevalence of town unemployment in New Zealand (says the *Bulletin*) points to the conclusion that the urban drift has proceeded too far, and the distribution of population has become unbalanced. While unemployment persists on any considerable scale, immigration is unlikely to increase. . . . Our problem might be solved and our progress ensured by an expanding population. Great Britain's might be greatly relieved by effective emigration. But we must first secure the appropriate distribution of our people between town and country by restoring the balance of attractiveness between town and country occupations. When that difficulty is overcome, we can serve Britain and ourselves as well by resuming immigration on the fullest scale.

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The following table shows the relative percentage of our urban and rural population :—

Year.	Per cent. of total.	
	Urban.	Rural.
1911	42·93	57·07
1916	45·82	54·18
1921	48·77	51·23
1926	51·62	48·38

Conditions in New Zealand are (the *Bulletin* points out) peculiar in that practically the whole of the output of town workers must be marketed within the country ; there is therefore a demand for town products and a demand for town labour strictly limited at any particular time. Should the urban drift proceed too far, there will be more workers available for town industries and occupations than are needed to satisfy the needs of the limited market and unemployment must inevitably result.

With regard to what the *Bulletin* claims to be an “urban drift,” the volume of agricultural and pastoral output is not apparently suffering by the reduction in the proportion of the population in the country districts, as is clear from the following figures, supplied from official sources :—

Calendar Year.	Recorded Exports.	Exports on basis of prices ruling in 1923.	Index of volume of exports.
1923 ..	£45,371,908	£45,371,908	1,000
1928 ..	£54,660,365	£53,004,252	1,168

In New Zealand agricultural and pastoral products, mainly foodstuffs, form 95 per cent. of our total exports. During the last five years, between 1923 and 1928, the total population of the Dominion increased by 124,000, or 9½ per cent., while the increase in the rural population on the same basis, as given by the *Bulletin* of the Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, was only 14,477, or 2·26 per cent. Taking the comparison on an industrial basis the actual number of primary producers between the census of 1921 and that of 1926 fell from 151,936 to 142,076, a decrease of 6½ per cent., while the proportion of primary

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producers to the breadwinners generally fell from 28·52 per cent. to 25·30 per cent. Thus, during the last five years, despite an increase of $9\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. in the total population, representing a correspondingly increased local consumption, and with only a 2·26 per cent. increase in the rural population, and an actual decrease in the proportion engaged in primary production, there was an increase of over £9,000,000 in the recorded value of *surplus* products exported, representing a 16·8 per cent. greater volume or quantity.

The way in which the depression and consequent unemployment of the past two or three years has checked immigration to New Zealand is shown by the following figures :—

Year.	Net immigration :		Nos. per 1,000 of population.
	Excess of arrivals over departures.		
1926	12,400		8·7
1927	3,809		2·6
1928	799		0·5

With the best will in the world, the present Ministry is finding these problems as hard to solve as their predecessors in office did.

Land Settlement

To take, for instance, the land question, on which Sir Joseph Ward and Mr. G. W. Forbes, the Minister of Lands, are concentrating their attention as a way of checking the drift to the towns and finding work for the unemployed. The first Land for Settlements Act empowering compulsory acquisition, was passed in 1894, so that the Act has been in operation for more than 34 years. During that period the Government has acquired 643 estates, comprising an area of nearly two million acres at a cost of £13,122,975. During the year ending March 31, 1928, 84 properties, with a total area of 171,786 acres, were considered, but only 2,233 acres, of which 1,406 were in one estate and 558 in another, were actually

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purchased, at a cost of £22,552. The report of the Land Purchase Controller to the Minister of Lands* points out the obstacles to the acquisition of lands for subdivision for closer settlement.

Some excellent sheep country was (he says) placed under offer to the State; but the blocks in question were unfortunately not economically suited for subdivision, although no doubt they had proved payable propositions when capably farmed in large areas. It was found as a general rule that even those properties which were offered at fairly reasonable prices considered as going concerns could not bear the extra charges entailed by subdivision, roading, etc., and be thereafter offered for selection at prices affording prospective settlers a fair chance of success. The extra loading entailed in the provision of new homestead buildings, fencing, roading, etc., is the chief obstacle to the acquisition of lands for subdivision for closer settlement, and it is only on comparatively rare occasions that suitable land can be bought at prices that will allow of a reasonable return on the capital outlay plus the necessary additional charges.

That there is a land hunger is shown by the fact that when the Westella Station was subdivided, there were 169 applicants for 12 sections.

A policy of subdivision, if feasible, would be welcomed. The land purchased should in the main be suitable for dairying, "an industry of small farming and a wide demand for labour," as the *Napier Daily Telegraph* pointed out on April 17, but as it goes on to say, "If the Government is to avoid disaster and national loss, it must buy on a basis of rigidly ascertained actual values at the time of purchase, consideration of 'potential value' under future tillage not being allowed to affect the decision." As a striking illustration of the disastrous effect of this "potential value" system, it cites the case of a large estate acquired by the late Government in Poverty Bay and surveyed into eleven sheep runs. When applications were invited, the terms rendered necessary by the price paid were so uninviting that in spite of comprehensive advertising not a single application was received. In the

* 1928, C. 5, p. 1.

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end the Government had to stock the land and remain on it as "occupier."

The Minister of Lands has threatened that the Government will, where necessary, exercise the powers of compulsory purchase given by the Act. One obstacle, however, that will have to be first removed by legislation is a provision introduced in 1907 (now contained in Sections 36 and 37 of the Land for Settlements Act, 1925) by which an owner can put his own valuation on his land and have it recorded on a roll subsidiary to the district valuation roll. In the event of compulsory purchase that sum, plus prescribed percentages, automatically becomes the selling price, if the land is acquired by the State, as well as the basis for land tax assessment. This provision "when it had been revealed as a stumbling block," says the *Dunedin Evening Star*, "was left undisturbed. In brief, the Reform Government knowingly allowed closer settlement to 'peter out.' In compensation for this grave sacrifice of principle the Government collected enhanced annual revenue from land tax and death duties and received continuance of support from the big land owning classes." The Prime Minister, embarrassed by the Government's inability to get owners of large territories to put fair values on their lands, proposes to alter the law so that it will secure fair values under a new system of valuation, and the *Evening Star* states that the experts agree that the government valuation plus 15 to 20 per cent. would form an equitable workable basis for the purposes of resumption and subdivision.

The New Zealand Labour party takes the view that "land settlement is one of the most fruitful avenues for improving the conditions of the Dominion and absorbing many of the unemployed." Its annual report lays stress upon the large area of land at the disposal of the Government, which can be profitably settled at a minimum cost. It includes the pumice belt in the Auckland and Wellington districts, comprising 1,715,766 acres, more than half of

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which is owned by the Crown and the balance by the natives. The report recommended "group settlement with expert and competent supervision and full attention to roads and transfer facilities," and at the annual conference of the party a resolution was carried that "the old methods of settlement involving isolation and back blocks life should be superseded by a more up-to-date system, adequately financed by the State, and having for its main purpose the settling of New Zealanders on the Crown and other lands which are abundantly available."

On April 11 the Minister of Lands announced that he had instructed the Commissioners of Crown Lands to select and survey the areas of undeveloped crown lands suitable for subdivision in their districts, so that Parliament might provide the finance necessary to prepare land for occupation and to assist settlers. One block of 20,000 acres in the Rotorua-Taupo district, for which surveys and a scheme of subdivision had been prepared, he intended to hand over to the Department of Agriculture to break in and to lay down in grass a sufficient area to enable each section to include a portion of the grass land. As evidence that the Government is acting and not merely vapouring, the Minister announced in the press on May 25 that the Government had just purchased four estates, totalling 6,428 acres, suitable for dairying or mixed farming, and providing from 22 to 24 farms. In addition the State central development farm at Weraroa is being subdivided, and when the pedigree stock has been sold, there should be eight or nine sections for ballot. He also, like the Labour party, has been impressed by the large areas of native and crown lands in an undeveloped state ready to respond to suitable handling and fertilisation, but requiring considerable finance for roading and assistance to settlers in the early stages and consequently necessitating financial authority from Parliament.

With public opinion at his back, the Prime Minister should be able to obtain from Parliament the necessary

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alteration of the law and authority to raise the requisite funds, for, though he is in a minority, no party will at this stage venture to oppose any reasonable scheme of land settlement.

The Question of Communications

While the Prime Minister's land settlement policy meets with general approval, the reverse is the case with regard to his completion of certain railway lines. The whole question of the running of our railways is a thorny one. Mr. Taverner, the Minister of Railways, said at Auckland on May 22 that there would be a loss of something under a million this year, and probably a little more next year. The railway traffic returns for the year ending March 31 last, though they show an increase of over two million passengers carried on the government road motor services, indicated a substantial decrease in the number of passengers carried on the railways. Nor is this a mere temporary loss. Mr. F. J. Jones, the late Chairman of the Board of Management of the Railways, in an interview published in the *Wellington Dominion* on May 28, gave the following figures :—

Year.	Capital cost per mile.	Rate of Interest.	Amount required out of every £100 earned to cover working costs.	Revenue per mile sufficient to pay all costs of railways.	Actual average revenue per mile per annum.
1900 ..	£8,000	3½	£65	£800	—
1929 ..	£32,000	5	£80	£8,000	£2,300

This position is not due to the cost of running being greater in New Zealand than elsewhere, for our percentage of railway operating expenses to earnings is 85·81, as compared with 90 in Great Britain and 80 in Canada and the United States. Hence he comes to the conclusion that "it is practically impossible to construct any railway in New Zealand that can ever pay, and, if we accept the Huntly-

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Pukemiro line, which carries a heavy coal traffic, it is probably fairly safe to say that no railway constructed in New Zealand during the last 15 years will pay." He concluded by asserting that the development value due to a railway could never be greater than the difference between the cost of working the transport business by a railway and that of working it by an equivalent and competitive form of transport—i.e., that the most economical source should obtain the business. These figures have not been challenged. With motor traction at present competing actively with our railways, and with the possibility of successful aeroplane services in the near future, any Ministry in New Zealand, in determining how far to proceed with the completion of our railways, has a difficult problem to solve. Sir Joseph has been applauded rather for what he has undone than for what he has resolved to do. When he came into office, he found that in order to avoid running the Main Trunk railway line through the heart of Palmerston North with level crossings and a consequent danger to life (several deaths had already occurred) his predecessors had gone some distance with the deviation. £216,000 had already been spent and £509,000 would be required to complete the proposed work, including the deviation of the line and the new railway station and yards. Sir Joseph's Ministry gave very careful consideration to the question of this deviation, no fewer than ten Ministers going to inspect it. They found that the whole work was not expected to produce any additional revenue, and that the cost of running the new station and yards would be increased to the extent of about £8,000 a year, apart from the loss of interest and sinking fund. With the decrease of both passenger and goods traffic, the General Manager was satisfied that an expenditure of about £33,000 on the present railway yard would provide all the necessary facilities that business requires for some years to come. Hence the Ministry promptly stopped the works, Sir Joseph giving a detailed statement of the facts on April 16 and

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announced that the workmen on the deviation were being transferred to the Wairoa-Gisborne line.

It is only fair to the Reform Ministry to say that when Sir Sam Fay and Sir Vincent Raven reported on our railways on December 11, 1924, in what is known as the Fay-Raven Report,* they declared "Palmerston North deviation and the new station yards are a necessity for traffic operation to-day."

Another line on which the Prime Minister has stopped work is the Rotorua-Taupo, a stretch of about 53 miles in the centre of the North Island, which the Reform Government considered would open up a large area of timber and which would have cost £700,000. Sir Joseph, however, speaking at Hawera on May 6, said that this railway would not have earned any income from the carriage of timber from the forest areas in the district for another 20 or 30 years, and that in the judgment of himself and his colleagues the work should not have been undertaken. But he gave no such statement of facts and figures as he supplied in the case of the Palmerston North deviation. With regard to his action in stopping the latter there has, with very few dissentients, been a chorus of approval, in which some of his opponents joined.

Sir Joseph's policy, as set forth in his Motueka speech on May 23, is to "eliminate wasteful short sections of railway," for, he declares, short railways will have to give way to motors. He finds that £448,000 of the deficit consists of aid from ordinary revenue to meet the shortage of earnings on short distance railways, and at Hawera on May 6 he stated that there had been a loss of £770,000 on development lines of railway during the past year. In his Motueka speech he stated his intention of completing the following railways:—

In South Island—

- (1) South Island Main Trunk, Wharanui-Parnassus gap,

* *Appendix to Journal of House of Representatives*, 1925, Vol. II, D 2A, page 25.

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76 miles by the latest route (note some of the calculations mentioned hereafter are based on an earlier route of 84 miles), to be completed in three or four years.

(2) Nelson-West Coast via the Buller Gorge; Gowan to Inangahua, 42½ miles, to be completed in three or four years.

In North Island—

(3) Napier-Gisborne via Wairoa (East Coast), Waikukupu to Gisborne, 33 miles, to be completed in four or five years, being governed by bridge requirements.

(4) Stratford Main Trunk (West Coast), Tahora to Chura, 20 miles.

These distances are approximate.

The proposed completion of the South Island Main Trunk line has roused much hostile comment. The construction of this particular 76 miles (with a train ferry service from Picton to Wellington) would make a complete railway transport system between all parts of the North and South Islands without change of carriage in the case of passengers or break of bulk or delay in the case of goods traffic. But in his Motueka speech Sir Joseph said that the Government was not going to embark on a fanciful ferry service across Cook Strait between Wellington and Picton. In his speech at Hawera on May 4 and in subsequent speeches the Prime Minister claimed that, with the completion of the gap between railheads, passengers would be drawn quite irrespective of the districts immediately served in a sufficient number to make the line payable from the jump, and that the South Island Main Trunk line would be as successful as the North Island one.

The estimates of the experts and the consensus of public opinion is, however, against him as regards the completion both of the South Island Main Trunk line and the Nelson-West Coast line. The position is put with studied moderation by the *Auckland Star* (a staunch supporter of Sir Joseph) on May 28, as follows :—

In view of the serious financial issues involved, it is to be hoped that the Prime Minister will reconsider the position carefully before coming to an irrevocable decision. No doubt Sir Joseph Ward is on

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strong ground when he maintains that the bridging of this gap in the Main Trunk would greatly increase the productive capacity of the whole line. We may further assume that the linking up of the northern and southern sections would tend to promote settlement in country still unoccupied, and would thus promote the ends that the founders of our State railway policy always had in view. But we must take also into account the competition of marine transport on the one hand and motor transport on the other; for these factors must seriously affect the solution of the problem. Moreover, though the estimated cost is moderate, the ultimate expenditure may prove to be much heavier than is now contemplated; and, on the whole, we think that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Railways will be well advised to collect further information on these points before any decisive step is taken.

Mr. Jones, in the interview already referred to, estimated the net annual loss to the State on the construction of the 84 miles (on the former route) at £140,800, and considered that if the State subsidised a motor service to bridge the gap between the present termini to the amount of £33,600, so that the user would get his goods carried at the same rate as by the railway, the State would save £107,200 per annum. The Reform Government, according to the Public Works Statement,* realised that the further prosecution of the Nelson-West Coast line would have to be seriously considered in view of the increasing efficiency of transport by road, that the introduction of a road motor service between the railway heads at Wharanui and Parnassus merited serious consideration, and that it would be necessary to investigate whether certain lines of railway (in view of the motor competition) should not be closed down altogether, but probably they had only reached the stage of what is known in parliamentary language as "keeping the matter steadily in view."

The Fay-Raven Commission,† while not feeling competent to express a decided opinion on the location or order of construction of new lines for the purposes of development, did express itself in favour of the completion of the South

* 1926, Vol. II., D I, pp. i. and v.

† See page 26 of their report.

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Island Main Trunk line and of linking it up with the North Island Main Trunk line by means of a train ferry between Picton and Wellington, the necessary landing stations and ferry boats to cost about £500,000. This train ferry service was, in the opinion of the Commission, vital to the success of the scheme.

In consequence of this recommendation, a committee consisting of Messrs. S. E. Fay, Operating Assistant, and E. Casey, Inspecting Engineer to the New Zealand Railways, was appointed to investigate the economics of linking up Wellington and Christchurch by means of the proposed train ferry, and the completion of the line between Wharanui and Parnassus. Their report* stated that, assuming such a ferry service in operation, as far as goods are concerned, it would be impossible to compete with the direct sea freight for goods between Wellington and Lyttelton (Christchurch); that as far as passengers are concerned a day route as part of a through system was impracticable, that a night route would take at least 13 hours between Christchurch and Wellington instead of 11½ by the ferry steamer as at present, and would cost, even if no sleeping accommodation were provided, more than the present fares, i.e., Christchurch-Lyttelton rail, and Lyttelton-Wellington, by U.S.S. steamer. In consequence the committee condemned both projects, considering that the new route would attract only a small proportion of passengers, and the annual loss to the State would be too heavy.

The figures of Mr. Jones and the Fay-Casey Committee have not been seriously challenged.

A deputation of the Auckland Chamber of Commerce on June 5 urged upon Sir Joseph that the Wharanui-Parnassus gap should not be completed without a thorough investigation in the light of modern conditions and development, and the Otago Provincial Council on the same day carried a remit for the Dominion Conference of the New

* See *Appendix D to the Railways Statement* and *Appendix to Journals of House of Representatives*, 1926, Vol. II, D2, p. 61.

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Zealand Farmers' Union "that before proceeding with the extension of the South Island Main Trunk railway the Government should satisfy itself that the proposition is economically sound." The Wellington Chamber of Commerce has adopted a similar attitude. Sir Joseph's reply to the deputation was that he intended to ignore the Fay-Casey report entirely; he maintained that the Fay-Raven report did not advocate a train-ferry service (which is incorrect) and that in any event the Government was committed to it—the completion of the South Island Main Trunk line—in fulfilment of its pledges. Sir Joseph's difficulty is that at the election he received a large degree of support on the strength of his pledge from the Canterbury, Nelson and Marlborough districts which would be traversed by the line.

The situation is thus summed up by the *Wellington Evening Post*, on June 5, under the heading "Unaccepted Challenge."

As the public was taken into the Cabinet's confidence when the Palmerston North deviation was stopped, there seems to be no reason against—and every reason for—similar candour in connection with the acceleration of the South Island Main Trunk and other long distance railways. To say merely "long distance" is not enough. Distance is no fetish. Sir Joseph Ward came down to tin-tacks at Palmerston North. Why not at Ward—or even at Parnassus? . . . So far, however, Sir Joseph Ward has not seized the chance to expound the South Island Main Trunk position in the same way as he exploded the situation at Palmerston North. He has not accepted the unique challenge, and couched lance against lance. In his speech in Auckland he replies to South Island Main Trunk criticisms by repeating his generalised defence of long distance railways; he has not taken hold of the alarming figures published and combated them in any specific manner. . . .

And all that Sir Joseph said in Auckland last night about revenue falls and leakages (to the Treasury deficit and the railway shortage he now adds the superannuation vacuum) emphasises the need for more light. The statesman who showed how money ought to be left in the ground at Palmerston North (perhaps for ten years, perhaps for ever) should show with at least equal clarity that the money ought not to be left in the ground between Ward and Par-

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nassus. He should inquire farther on the lines where challenge has led. And the public, now knowing what the ex-chief of the railways thinks, should also be told the responsible opinion of the present General Manager.

The demands of the business community are so reasonable that Sir Joseph will meet with strong opposition in Parliament if he persists in going on without first having the economics of the line thoroughly investigated.

The Prime Minister has invited tenders for a steamship service from Dunedin via Bluff, Hobart, Melbourne, Wellington and Lyttelton to Dunedin, and via the same ports in the reverse order, sailings to be at intervals of ten and eleven days alternately, steamers to be not less than 5,000 tons gross, with a speed of at least 14 knots, to carry 250 passengers, and general cargo and cargo in cold storage. The contract is to be for two years and requires at least 70 voyages. At present the Union Steam Ship Company, Limited, runs a service every three weeks, making 17 voyages in the year, each voyage occupying about 20 days. The proposed service will be inferior to the service of 50 years ago, which was discontinued owing to the diminution of trade.

Speaking at Auckland on June 6, Sir Joseph Ward stated that he hoped

next year to have restored our finances to a sufficient position to enable us to subsidise steamer communication between New Zealand and the East. The necessity for extending New Zealand markets in the direction indicated was emphasised by the growth of tariff barriers against the Dominion's products once favourable to their reception.

Unemployment

Despite the efforts that the Government is making to relieve unemployment—and Sir Joseph Ward stated on May 3 in answer to a deputation that nearly 3,000 more men were now employed on public works than this time last year—reports from different parts of the country

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show that unemployment is increasing. In the *Monthly Abstract of Statistics*,* the Government Statistician shows that the number of applications for employment remaining on the books of the Government Labour Bureaux were 2,534 on April 16, 1928, 3,211 on April 15, 1929, and 3,335 on May 13.

On all relief works the contract system is applied on a basis of 14s. per day, and, said Mr. Ransom, the Minister for Public Works, "every man must earn it before he gets it." The report of the Parliamentary Labour party on its work in Parliament, considered by the annual conference of that party on April 3, pointed out that the Ward Government was pledged to standard wages in government employ and on relief works. This standard wage, therefore, is doubtless the price that the Government is paying for the support of Labour, but it is apparent that in many instances it attracts workers already occupied from the rougher jobs in the country, and so aggravates instead of relieving the problem of unemployment. In fact, Sir Joseph is reported to have said at Invercargill that there were people coming from Australia to swell the ranks of the unemployed, which is the obvious effect of making relief work sufficiently remunerative and attractive. "Australian methods" were advocated by a section of the unemployed who attempted to hold a meeting in the Trades Hall at Wellington on April 30, when the Trades and Labour Council had them ejected by the police. At a meeting convened by the Council to give the dissatisfied unemployed a chance of airing their views, Mr. Semple, M.P. and Mr. Fraser, M.P. firmly maintained that the Labour party in New Zealand had always stood for constitutional methods, and that it was no use anyone coming along and advocating violence. A vote of confidence in the Unemployment Committee of the Labour party was carried with only eight dissentients out of about 150 present, and the representatives of Labour proceeded by the usual method of deputation on May 3 to

* Vol. 16, No. 5, May 27, 1929, p. 41.

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the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Works. In order to assist the Councils of the four chief cities—Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin—to provide work for their unemployed, the Government has offered each city £25,000 for unemployment relief on works other than maintenance if the City Councils will authorise expenditure for the same purpose on a pound for pound basis. This offer has been accepted by Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Loans are being arranged for relief works, chiefly roads, but so far Auckland has not availed itself of the offer. In these efforts to eliminate unemployment the Labour party is co-operating both with the Government and the municipalities, insisting upon relief works being paid for at trade union rates. They realise that the Ministry and the city councils are doing their best, but they do not realise that it is this very insistence on trade union wages for relief works that is aggravating instead of diminishing unemployment.

New Zealand.

June 27, 1929.

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
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